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This paper is a political and constitutional interpretation of autonomy as a value that 
justifies the American adversary system and freedom of speech. Traditionally, 
autonomy has been understood in terms of pursuing an individual’s self-interest by 
denying the government’s paternalistic intervention from the perspective of anti-
perfectionist liberalism. In the arena of free speech, autonomy has been the prevalent 
justification, by theorists, for the protection of individual speech with minimum 
governmental interference so as to increase an individual’s self-fulfillment. However, 
collectivist approaches lay a persuasive foundation for governmental intervention in 
speech in order to reinforce people’s autonomous deliberation through the democratic 
decision making process by restraining the side-effects of large media’s 
monopolization of deliberation. This justified paternalism does not harm autonomy, 
which is the foremost concern of individualist theorists of free speech. 
Thomas Scanlon’s idea of listener’s interest can provide a useful theoretical 
foundation for a theory about the mutually supportive relationship between autonomy 
and paternalism in the arena of freedom of speech. In addition, Joseph Raz’s 
perfectionist liberalism and autonomy theory lays jurisprudential foundation for the 
claim that the government can legitimately retain the power to paternalistically control 
heteronymous activities in order to guarantee the plurality of options for autonomous 
decision.  
This newly positioned relationship between autonomy and paternalism in free 
speech theory can be applied to the adversary system according to the reflective and 
analogous relationship between freedom of speech and the adversary system. They 
pursue the same value, autonomy, as their functional purpose. Because paternalistic 
interventions into autonomy can be accepted to some extent in the perfectionist 
liberalism of free speech, the value of autonomy in the adversary system can be 
interpreted differently from the common understanding of individualistic liberalism, 
which is also called the Dominant View in the field of legal ethics. The Dominant 
View justifies lawyers’ amorality using as its excuse the liberal ideal of the adversary 
system: maximizing interests of the client. With autonomy and paternalism in an inter-
dependent relationship, which is set up in perfectionist liberalism, this Dominant View 
can be reasonably criticized. 
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1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Overview 
When it comes to the practice of law, the American legal system is known to be liberal. 
That means, first, the liberal principle functions at the level of practice within the law 
market. Second, the behavior of legal subjects in the market is justified by liberal 
political democracy; and third, liberal constitutionalism supports this political 
liberalism. These liberal elements, in fact, make the American legal system obviously 
different from Civil Law systems. Even though it is not easy to clearly specify what 
liberalism means because of the diversity of features associated with it, liberalism has 
truly predominated over the entire field of American society where law is involved.
1 
The purpose of legal representation is to maximize the client’s interest. Known 
as zealous advocacy, this has long been considered the best virtue of lawyering in 
Common Law culture. The principle of zealous advocacy entails many of the lawyer’s 
duties such as the duty of confidentiality. Although the lawyer, as an officer of the 
court, has to keep the public good in mind, her primary goal is meeting her client’s 
needs. All activities, except those that the law prohibits, are permitted in her practice; 
these behaviors are truly “zealous.”
 2 Sometimes, however, in practice, zealous 
advocacy creates moral difficulty. The lawyer must agonize over the ethical tension 
that exists between her client’s interest and the truth—between partisanship and 
disinterestedness. 
                                                 
1 Liberalism itself has theoretically diverse forms. From a theoretical perspective, Lockean liberalism is 
different from Rousseauian liberalism. In reality, American liberalism, principally from John Locke’s 
theory, is used for attacking the left wing while European liberalism is used against the right. Adding to 
the difficulty of using the term is the popular usage of the term “liberal” in American political practice 
to mean ‘progressive’ rather than ‘conservative.’ The specific meaning of liberalism that I use will be 
explained in the next section. 
2 Model Rules of Professional Responsibility 1.3 embodies this principle. “A lawyer shall act with a 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”  
2 
The firmly institutionalized background of lawyer’s zealousness, the adversary 
system, is inherited from the long tradition of the Common Law.
3 The dispute 
resolution process has been led not by the judge but by the party, so the role of the 
lawyer is to do her best to help her client win. This kind of partisan advocacy, 
however, may bring about serious problems in practice. Charged with responsibility 
for the client’s success, the lawyer may use morally suspicious tactics especially in 
litigation. These include deliberately causing the adversary to spend much time and 
money: “overuse of depositions and interrogations,” “abusive scheduling practices,” 
“objectionable questioning techniques,” and “evasive strategies.”
4 The adversary 
system works to defend the lawyer’s moral wrongdoing through the mechanism of the 
“institutional excuse.”
 5 
In terms of the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality, the idea of zealous advocacy 
offers an easy pretext for evading the truth in hard cases where the lawyer has to face 
an ethical dilemma. For example, a client who gives truthful information, the 
disclosure of which would prevent harm to an innocent person, is such a case.
6 The 
adversary system plays a crucial role in sustaining the lawyer’s loyalty to her client in 
this context, as well. Even though this situation is not a simple case, it would be 
morally problematic for the lawyer to run away from or just eschew the dilemma by 
using the systematic excuse of the adversary system.
7 Furthermore, the adversary 
system has come to govern the entire method of adjudication, not just in litigation as a 
primary principle.  
                                                 
3 See Gary Goodpaster, On the Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J.CRIM.L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 118 (1987). 
4 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
AND REGULATION 56 (2002). 
5 DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 57 (1988); Daniel Markovits, Legal Ethics from the 
Lawyer’s Point of View, 15 YALE J. L. & Human. 209, 257-63 (2003). 
6 See Morales v. Portuondo, 154 F.Supp.2d 706 (2001).  
7 See Abbe Smith, Zealous Advocacy in a Time of Uncertainty: Understanding Lawyer’s Ethics: Telling 
Stories and Keeping Secrets, 8 D.C.L. REV. 263 (2004).  
3 
A country’s legal system, within the constitutional law, reflects a picture of its 
political tradition. If the adversary system is a “sub-system” of diverse legal systems 
which are also “sub-systems” of many social systems, it should work exactly for the 
aim of the social systems that is ascertained in the Constitution.
8 Then, the American 
adversarial legal system must be deeply intertwined with not only constitutional but 
also with political theories, which means that the principle controlling the adversary 
system plays a role in both American constitutional and political arenas. 
Constitutionally, the adversary system works for the criminal defendant’s rights 
contained in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments and the jury trial right contained 
in Article III, section 2, and the Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, by 
serving as a rule of the decision-making process. Politically, the adversary system 
reflects the practice of American democracy. Because decision-making or conflict-
solving is one of the central jobs of democracy in the political field as well, a society’s 
principle of democracy has influence on the adversary system. 
In a democratic society, the constitution is a set of rules that incorporates the 
principles for practicing democracy.
9 Each society has its own peculiar perspective on 
democracy. Generally, we say that American legal or constitutional systems are 
relatively liberal in their political conception by virtue of their close connection with 
liberal democracy theory, which strongly emphasizes the protection of individual 
rights. The adversary system, of course, can be considered liberal as well. Especially 
known as the best way to discover the truth and to enhance the client’s interest, the 
adversary system is liberal with respect to its emphasis on individual interest. Liberal 
political democracy theory vindicates the liberalness of the adversary system. 
                                                 
8 ALAN DONAGAN, Justifying Legal Practice in the Adversary System in THE GOOD LAWYER: 
LAWYER’S ROLES AND LAWYER’S ETHICS 123, 124 (1984). 
9 CARL COHEN, DEMOCRACY 120 (1971).  
4 
However, if the American democratic theory that the adversary system reflects 
turns out not to be purely liberal, it will be hard to claim that the adversary system is a 
completely liberal institution. If we do not look at the adversary system through purely 
liberal eyes, then the lawyer’s zealous advocacy can be redefined as well.
10 A new 
interpretation of zealous advocacy might be directly related to a solution to the 
dilemma raised by the old understanding of the adversary system. An examination of 
the adversary system will make a significant contribution to the study of democracy 
and constitutional theory. 
Usually, these types of behavior by the lawyer are considered a matter of 
individual morality. But morality can be easily ignored in practice because it does not 
have any systematic binding power unless all lawyers are strict followers of a moral 
principle such as Kantian self-rule. In addition, the ideal of enhancing the client’s 
interests and rights to the fullest is considered ethically good in itself. This sounds, 
however, quite utilitarian. We simply need a more compelling reason. On the contrary, 
if the method of accomplishing the lawyer’s duty, zealous advocacy, is morally 
problematic, it may lose its persuasiveness. The “liberal” adversary system is usually 
assigned the blame for possible moral wrongdoing. But I do not think that the 
American adversary system is necessarily liberal. What I wish to obtain from this 
alternative understanding of the adversary system is to weaken excuses for the 
overzealous wrongdoing of lawyers. To support my argument, this paper will focus on 
clarifying the political meaning of the adversary system: is it really justified by liberal 
democracy because it reflects the very reality of liberal democracy?  
My methodology uses a comparison with another arena of constitutional law. I 
pay attention to the constitutional right of freedom of speech which, I think, functions 
                                                 
10 See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE 
PERVASIVE METHOD 135 (1998).  
5 
very similarly to the adversary system in terms of seeking the same target: finding 
truth and enhancing individual autonomy. Although the adversary system and freedom 
of speech do not have a direct relationship constitutionally, they share a common 
purpose with respect to the democratic function. I think that for the purpose of this 
paper—the political meaning of the adversary system—this functional analogy works 
despite the fact that they are different kinds of entities: one is a legal system and the 
other is a basic right. In fact, they are not extremely alien to one another. A legal 
system has to do with legal rights. The adversary system protects many constitutional 
rights even though there is no specific stipulation to do so in the U.S. Constitution. By 
comparing the political meanings of these similarly functioning institutions and rights, 
I believe that a more objective result can be acquired. 
Martin Redish, in his article about the function of the adversary system in 
tobacco litigation, claims that the adversary system should be defended from the 
criticism of left communitarian theories. His explanation is that “liberal democratic 
adversary theory” works as a fundamental rule of American political and 
constitutional theory, and that the adversary system is its demonstrative 
concentration.
11 That is to say, he thinks that American democracy endows the 
adversary system with political and constitutional significance, and American 
democracy is just liberal. He asserts, in addition, that the ideas stemming from 
communitarianism, which stresses “the common good,” have a weak theoretical and 
practical connection to democracy theory because liberal political democracy stands in 
the background of the American Constitution. This fact, he says, can be well-observed 
in the areas of freedom of speech and due process; those constitutional rights are the 
constitutional manifestation of liberal democracy, too.
12 The conclusion of Redish’s 
                                                 
11 Martin H. Redish, The Adversary System, Democratic Theory, and the Constitutional Role of Self-
Interest: the tobacco Wars, 1953-1971, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 359, 363-4 (2001). 
12 Id., at 372~92.  
6 
paper is that, unless they used illegal fraud to the court, it is wrong to blame lawyers 
who did their best in representing tobacco companies, even though their arguments 
were based on partial scientific facts that favored their clients and that might have had 
negative effects on public health.
13 His justification, certainly, relies on a defense of 
the liberal adversary system. 
My interest in Redish’s article stems from the fact that he is almost the only 
constitutional law scholar who has written about the political and constitutional 
features of the adversary system. And his libertarian perspective motivated me to 
delve into creating a counterargument. Although his theories on democracy and 
freedom of speech support his position on the adversary system, this support is not 
established logically, even from the libertarian perspective. Many of his conclusions 
arise, not from logic, but from his preconceived notions of how the adversary system 
operates. My own views of how the system operates may not be so different from his, 
but in this paper I want to show how the adversary system as evidenced by an analysis 
of the system’s institutional goals, might be justified by a non-libertarian democracy 
theory. 
Specifically, Redish’s characterization of American democracy, which is the 
alleged political background of the adversary system, is too narrow to explain all the 
aspects of the adversary system. American democracy theory can be typified as 
liberalism-based because a totalitarian country, as Redish proves, would never be able 
to adopt the adversary system because its governmental interests always have priority 
over private interests.
14 However, even in liberal democracy, public interests, which 
are an allegedly totalitarian value, can be harmonized with individual interests, which 
are an allegedly liberal value, without straying into authoritarianism or totalitarianism. 
                                                 
13 Id., at 392~405. 
14 Id., at 394.  
7 
The issue is the position of individual self-rule in the course of the collective decision-
making process, in other words, the issue of individual and collective autonomy in a 
democratic society. If we take a close look at the relationship between collective self-
decision making and individual autonomy, we come to find that totalitarianism is not 
needed as a justification for governmental regulation of individual autonomy for the 
purpose of achieving the public interest. In order for deliberation in democratic 
collective decision-making to work properly, we need to find a compromise between 
individual autonomy and paternalistic regulations. This tension between autonomy and 
paternalism is the main clue for addressing the initial inquiry that motivates this paper. 
I will begin my analysis by making clear what adversary theory is. The 
adversary system has developed over a long period of time in Common Law practice. 
New understandings and interpretations of the system become possible when we 
analyze this history and demonstrate the difference between past and present systems. 
For example, the origin of the adversary system is regarded as the ordeal and the trial 
by battle of the medieval litigation system. This system had quite a different 
institutional purpose and operated within a very different practical reality. 
Demonstrating the relationship between those institutions and the adversary system 
will show how and why the meaning of the adversary system changed. 
The adversary system generally has two values to serve: truth-finding and 
enhancing individual rights and autonomy. First, the adversary system is known as the 
institution best suited for finding the truth. The competition for truth-finding by two 
parties, plus a neutral decision-maker, is a scientifically advantageous arrangement if 
the parties agree on the common purpose of fact-finding and there are fair rules to 
govern this competition. However, the players of the adversary system tend to chase 
their own interests and to conceal their own weakness. Even though fair rules for 
evidence work in the competition, parties may well evade its application and find easy  
8 
ways to win that may cause harm to the opposition. Second, another value the 
adversary system pursues is protecting individual rights and autonomy. Especially in 
criminal cases, the system plays a very important role in fighting against the 
prosecution, which usually has greater power than the defendants, to protect their 
constitutional rights. Nevertheless, if the defendants or the parties in a civil case regard 
victory as the sole target, the rights of their opponent or of third parties might be 
severely damaged through the use of such methods. 
To investigate the more exact constitutional meaning of the adversary theory, I 
will use the analogical method of the relationship between the adversary theory and 
freedom of speech. Both of these not only have the same values—truth-finding and 
protecting individual autonomy— but they also share a similar logical structure of 
justification. As a prototype for the realization of adversary theory, freedom of speech 
has its own meaning within the structure of Constitution. If I can discover the exact 
political and constitutional meaning of freedom of speech, I can apply it to the 
adversary theory. For this purpose, I will also study the history and the value of 
freedom of speech. In the history of the First Amendment, we can find the American 
political mindset in the founding period about the right to free speech, and this can 
provide us with a persuasive answer to the same question about the adversary theory. 
The values of free speech are interpreted according to various perspectives, which I 
divide into three general categories in this thesis: the utilitarian, right-based, and 
democratic views. By analyzing those perspectives, I will try to identify and criticize 
liberal interpretations of freedom of speech, including Redish’s, and elucidate the 
problems of their arguments. 
In this paper, I identify autonomy as the most significant value of both the 
adversary system and freedom of speech. My central aim is to prove that the liberal  
9 
democratic interpretation of autonomy, which many libertarian scholars, including 
Redish, support is not reasonable enough to exclude all non-liberal approaches.  
The libertarian approach, in which the pursuit of individual interests is the supreme 
target that all legal institutions and individual rights have to follow, is logically 
inconsistent with liberal democracy theory. My point is that some paternalistic 
intervention against individual autonomy is needed in the arena of the adversary 
system as well as of freedom of speech. In democratic theory, paternalism can be 
associated with liberalism. We can observe this from the democratic interpretation of 
autonomy as a value of both freedom of speech and the adversary system. The matter 
of who will play this paternalistic role in practice cannot be easily determined. As 
William Simon contends, lawyers may have broader discretionary power. But what I 
want to suggest in this paper is hinted at in the competing Civil Law legal system: 
judges. Even though judges play an important role in the adversary system, I think 
their role should be broadened. 
Specifically, Chapter 2 discusses liberal adversary theory. Lockean thought 
provides the strongest intellectual foundation for American liberalism, which 
emphasizes the rights of individual property and individual interest over those of 
government. To clarify what the value of autonomy discussed in the adversary system 
is, I will focus on how that value arises. It is imperative to ask, first of all, what kind of 
autonomy is the target of the adversary system. Is it the client’s or the lawyer’s or 
both? I will cover the lawyer-client relationship to make this clear. Generally, on the 
one hand, the client takes the initiative in the process of determining what she wants, 
and the lawyer follows the client’s wishes. Being a professional with special 
knowledge, on the other hand, a lawyer holds the superior position in deciding the 
details. Within this matrix, the matter of the lawyer’s amoral behavior, which is also 
related to the lawyer’s autonomy, comes out. It extends to the matter of whether we  
10 
can regulate the lawyer’s amoral zealousness or not, which was the question that I 
raised at the outset. Philosophical study of autonomy and paternalism will help solve 
this problem. I will compare Stephen Pepper’s liberal justification of the lawyer’s 
amorality based on the client’s autonomy and David Luban’s paternalism-oriented 
intervention theory.  
Chapter 3 concerns freedom of speech. After sketching its history, I will 
analyze the value of freedom of speech: truth, autonomy, rights, democracy. Then, I 
will focus on autonomy, which is the value of the adversary system as well. As one of 
the deontological values of free speech theory, especially, Thomas Scanlon’s idea of 
autonomy in freedom of speech reveals a critical clue about how individual autonomy 
and paternalism can work together. His view underwent a change from an extremely 
autonomy-oriented perspective which presupposed a perfectly autonomous human 
being to a compromised one which permits some extent of paternalistic regulation on 
the speech. One of the main issues of Scanlon’s theory is that the listener’s autonomy, 
which is composed of audience interests and bystander interests must be considered 
when it comes to the conflicts of autonomies. This listener’s autonomy becomes a 
strong ground from which to argue against the libertarian explanation of autonomy. 
Redish’s libertarian perspective on freedom of speech will be criticized in this chapter, 
as well. I will show that the stream of his logic about this matter is not consistent 
enough to be persuasive against rival views. 
Finally, in Chapter 4, I will identify the proper relationship between individual 
autonomy and paternalism, in democracy and freedom of speech, by comparing and 
analyzing the perspectives of the following influential scholars: Robert Post, Morris 
Lipson, Richard Fallon, Owen Fiss and Cass Sunstein. From their struggle to come to 
terms with individualism and collectivism in deliberation within the democratic 
decision-making process, a process which has directly to do with freedom of speech, I  
11 
will build my critical argument about how autonomy works in freedom of speech. 
Lipson’s theory will get a special attention with respect to the listener’s autonomy for 
its support of collectivism. The proper connection between an individual and a 
community, discussed by these theorists, suggests an answer to the question of what 
the political meaning of autonomy is. With this answer, I will try to identify the value 
of autonomy in the adversary system. If paternalistic intervention is permitted, I will 
present its justification and discuss how to apply it practically to the adversary system 
itself. 
 
1.2 Definitions and Jurisprudential Background 
At this point, I need to clarify what ‘liberalism’ or ‘liberalness’ means in this paper 
because liberalism comes in several varieties within which certain conceptions conflict 
with each other. The overall target of liberalism that I criticize in terms of the 
adversary system and freedom of speech is the one which is founded on 
‘individualism’ and ‘self-interest.’ In particular, Redish’s “liberal democracy theory” 
means precisely this individualistic liberalism.
15 And all of the ‘liberal’ interpretations 
of autonomy that will be explicated in chapter 2 and 3 are projects achieved by this 
liberalism based on self-interest, which can be defined as “anti-perfectionism” 
according to Joseph Raz’s jurisprudence of ‘perfectionist liberalism.’
16  
Anti-perfectionist liberalism has occupied the status of “mainstream liberal” 
theory.
17 It puts forward the priority of the right over the good, which leads to the 
result of governmental neutrality.
18 John Rawls, whose idea has since the 1980s 
                                                 
15 Strictly speaking, his idea seems libertarian rather than liberal. 
16 JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 107-62 (1986). 
17 Robert P. George, The Unorthodox Liberalism of Joseph Raz, 53 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS 652, 
654 (1991). 
18 Raz says, “the anti-perfectionist principle claims that implementation and promotion of ideals of the 
good life, though worthy in themselves, are not a legitimate matter for governmental action.” RAZ, 
supra note 16, at 110.  
12 
caused brisk debates between liberalism and communitarianism, is a representative 
liberal political theorist of anti-perfectionism. His “political liberalism” presupposes a 
“rational individual” who can entertain “rational autonomy” in “the original 
position.”
19 In other words, theories of anti-perfectionist liberalism are constructed 
within the dimension of the individual.  
By contrast, communitarianism understands the person from her relation to 
society or community.
20 Criticizing the liberal conception of the individual isolated 
from society, communitarians claim that the value of individual should be defined by 
reciprocal action between individual and community. This difference in the basic 
understanding of the human being produces further differences in these theorists’ 
conceptions, in fields such as justice, morality, happiness, and the function of the state. 
Especially, communitarians mostly support active behavior on the part of the 
government to realize “common good” which is emphasized in their theories.
21 In this 
vein, collectivists’ defense of paternalistic governmental intervention in free speech, 
which will be discussed in chapter 4, can be understood as an application of the 
communitarian ideal. 
Communitarianism has its varieties, as well.
22 Representative communitarian 
theorists, such as Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor, Alasdair McIntyre, and Michael 
Walzer, have their own typical perspectives. Sandel’s communitarianism starts by 
criticizing Rawls’ “deontological liberalism” which says that the concepts of the good 
and the right are decided by independent individuals without governmental 
intervention. Sandel suggests instead that those concepts should be constituted by 
                                                 
19 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 72 (1993). 
20 STEPHEN MULHALL & ADAM SWIFT, LIBERALS AND COMMUNITARIANS 13 (1996). 
21 In terms of an active function of government, Raz’s perfectionist liberalism takes the same attitude. 
22 There is a theorist who finds the tradition of communitarianism at Anti-Federalist thought in the 
American constitutional history. BEAU BRESLIN, THE COMMUNITARIAN CONSTITUTION 5-14 
(2004).  
13 
inter-related individuals in a society.
23 Taylor tries to emphasize the concept of good 
which is also mainly defined in terms of the connection between the individual and 
society.
24 McIntyre contends that virtue should be reintroduced and reinforced to 
upgrade the morality of a contemporary society.
25 And Walzer’s communitarianism is 
focused on justice of redistribution according to the peculiarity of a community.
26 
However, none of them supports totalitarianism such as communism. 
Communitarianism is not theoretically related to totalitarianism. Therefore, Redish’s 
confusion between them, which will be shown in chapter 3, should be logically 
corrected. 
With respect to liberty, the anti-perfectionist’s understanding of liberty is 
narrower than perfectionist liberalism or communitarianism. As Isaiah Berlin properly 
indicates, anti-perfectionism emphasizes “negative liberty” which means “non-
intervention” from others.
27 This liberalism based on negative liberty is fairly equated 
with individualism. The Dominant View of the adversary system and the traditional 
defense of freedom of speech rely on negative liberty and individualistic liberalism.  
However, negative liberty alone cannot account for the values of social pluralism and 
toleration which are evident characteristics of contemporary democracy. And this is 
also the mistake of Redish’s understanding of liberalism: he did not consider different 
possible aspects of liberalism and try to trade on an anti-perfectionist principle out of a 
fear that communitarianism or perfectionist liberalism will degenerate readily into 
totalitarianism. 
                                                 
23 See MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMIT OF JUSTICE (1982). 
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On the contrary, Raz’s perfectionist liberalism covers positive liberty, freedom 
of participation, which is constituted by the extended social context. This point makes 
Raz’s liberalism reflective of communitarianism.
28 He adopts “value-pluralism,” like 
Berlin’s critique of negative liberty, as a foundation of liberal autonomy theory.
29 
With this background, autonomy works as an “intrinsic human good” in Raz’s 
liberalism.
30 Autonomy, for Raz, means free choice without any coercion, and the 
government should enlarge the opportunities of moral choice and reduce that of 
immoral choice, which can make autonomy perfect. This perfectionist liberalism may 
accept paternalism if paternalistic intervention of the government “enhances” people’s 
opportunity of autonomous life and if the interference is not forceful.
31 For this reason, 
my main idea about autonomy and paternalism, which was hinted at in Scanlon’s 
theoretical shift regarding autonomy in the arena of freedom of speech, can be 
supported by Raz’s perfectionist liberalism. Specific demonstrations concerning it will 
be made in chapter 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 MULHALL & SWIFT, supra note 20, at 326. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY THEORY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will clarify the constitutional and political meaning of the American 
adversary system. Aiming at this target, I begin with its institutional meaning and 
historical development from which several items for further abstract political 
meanings will be extracted. This study reveals what people really wanted to have from 
the adversary system, and provides an opportunity, from the critical analysis, to 
redefine the system as it works in practice on a different theoretical foundation. The 
most significant part of in this chapter is about the institutional values of the adversary 
system—truth finding and individual rights or autonomy—which justify all legal 
behaviors performed in practice, and which are sometimes used to excuse an agent’s 
illegal or immoral activities. I will analyze and criticize these values with respect to 
liberal democracy theory. And I argue that these goals share close similarity with 
those of protecting the constitutional free speech right, which will be discussed the 
detail in the next chapter. 
My main concern in this chapter will be finding answers to some complex 
questions about the values of the adversary system that are raised in the course of 
practice. Seeking after truth may suppress autonomy, and protecting autonomy may 
hide truth. I will prove that the possible cacophony between these two can be properly 
arranged and that, even though such an arrangement may seem paternalistic, even 
liberal theories can accept the paternalism required to promote both values. In order to 
do this, I closely examine the lawyer-client relationship and philosophically analyze 
autonomy and paternalism.  
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Liberal democracy theory is generally considered the dominant political 
foundation of the adversary system. Liberalism, democracy, and the adversary system 
have some values partly shared in common. The adversary system seems to work best 
with the pursuit of self-interest which the American liberal democracy wants to protect, 
and with autonomy which democracy theory pursues. In other words, political 
ideology, political system, and legal system converge at the fundamental point of a 
shared value: protecting and enhancing individual autonomy. And this is the typical 
view of liberal democracy theorists and constitutional theorists. In particular, Martin 
Redish is a representative constitutional law scholar who tries to establish the 
theoretical basis of the adversary system using the theory of American liberal 
democracy. He adjudges that adversary theory is quite liberal by virtue of its 
individualistic character, which works as a fundamental normative principle of 
American political and constitutional theory.
32 However, as the examples I gave in the 
previous chapter illustrate, an adversary theory that is too tightly supported by 
egregious individualism may raise some problems of evidence distortion.
33 After 
studying what the adversary system is, I will give special attention later in this chapter 
to Redish’s argument for liberal democracy theory. Reviewing the system’s 
compatibility with those projects, I will prove the irrationality of excluding 
paternalistic intervention. 
 
2.2 Definition 
The adversary system is one of the mechanisms used to resolve disputes through 
litigation or non-litigation. Structurally, a passive and neutral adjudicator makes a 
                                                 
32 Redish, supra note 11, at 364. 
33 Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L. J. 301, 312 
(1989).   
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decision based upon the evidence produced and presented by the parties.
34 We can 
identify three necessary elements of the adversary system from this definition: a 
“neutral and passive fact finder,” “party presentation of evidence,” and a “highly 
structured forensic procedure.”
35 These elements should work together within the 
system in the way suggested by Stephan Landsman, a scholar who gives a clear 
analysis of the adversary system.
36 The adversary system has been the major 
framework within which the method of dispute resolution is characterized and 
lawyer’s ethical behaviors are defined.
 37 It is an American judicial icon that is quite 
different from the Civil Law country’s inquisitorial system in which an active 
decision-maker leads the whole trial.  
This framework has three important characteristics. The first is that, in the 
adversary system, the decision maker should not be biased. To fulfill the fairness ideal 
of a judicial system, the adversary system adopts neutrality and passiveness as the 
stance of the adjudicator. Therefore, it is the parties who launch the fight and manage 
the “definition of the issues.”
38 This is also an expression of the intention of the 
judiciary to avoid becoming systematically “partisan.”
39 Landsman interprets the fact 
finder’s neutrality and passiveness in two ways. First, they signify that the adversary 
system takes “dispute resolution,” not “truth-finding” as the foremost target.
40 
Compared to an active adjudicator seeking truth, a passive adjudicator works only 
within the framework which the parties construct, and tries to meet their needs: 
solving their dispute.
41 Second, they have a more advantageous condition in which to 
                                                 
34 MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYER’S ETHICS 13 (1990). 
35 STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 2-6 
(1984). 
36 Id. 
37 CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 563 (1986). 
38 Id. at 564. 
39 LANDSMAN, supra note 35, at 2-3. 
40 Id. at 3. 
41 Id.  
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adopt the jury system.
42 Jurors are laypersons. Neutrality and passiveness are more 
favorable as conditions for allowing untrained people to discuss and decide the case.
43 
The second characteristic is that evidence should not be explored by the 
decision maker, but by the contenders. This element can be seen as another way to 
express the first characteristic: it is the parties themselves who take the initiative in 
litigation because the adjudicator must maintain her neutrality and passiveness. In 
contrast, in the inquisitorial system, which has active judges, people readily tend to 
believe that their judicial system would be unjust if a judge did not seek to find 
evidence for each side during the process of a case. But in the adversary system, the 
parties’ competition for the best evidence, nonetheless, serves to attain one of the 
values of the adversary system that will be discussed later in this chapter: finding the 
truth. This is based upon a belief that, by struggling to gather more plausible facts than 
does our adversary we can access objective truth by providing the decision maker with 
better materials to consider. Furthermore, the principle of active competition is 
directly linked with another value of the adversary system: autonomy. The adversary 
system institutionally guarantees the maximization of the parties’ own interests or 
rights within the law.  
This deployment of zealous competition in the adversary system is called 
partisanship. And the practical activity of the procedure is performed by the parties’ 
representatives.
44 Each partisan party hires a lawyer, a professional of the law, to find 
the most favorable evidence and to lead the process in a way that benefits partisan.
45 
The client anticipates the lawyer’s zealous advocacy, and the lawyer does her best to 
promote the client’s interest with all her technical capability. Within the lawyer-client 
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relationship, what the lawyer has to do in practice for the client and how she addresses 
issues such as “competence,” “confidentiality,” “conflicts of interests,” are determined 
by this zealous advocacy.
46 Therefore, we can say that zealous partisanship works as a 
foundational principle of the adversary system. And the theoretical justification of 
zealous partisanship is the enhancement of the parties’ individual autonomy.
47 That is, 
the principle of zealous partisanship is closely related to “the conception of legal 
rights,” which comes from the conception of “individual autonomy.”
48 Generally, 
autonomy is regarded as a significant value not only of morality but also of democracy, 
defined as a system of self-rule. In addition, American liberalism highlights individual 
rights. We may well think that the adversary system is established purely on the theory 
of liberal democracy. However, this proposition is open to strong theoretical criticisms 
about what autonomy is and about what conditions best protect the client’s autonomy. 
Further discussions will be presented in the following sections. 
The third characteristic of the system of enhanced autonomy for adversary 
parties is a set of sophisticated rules for fair procedure. These are composed of “rules 
of procedure,” “rules of evidence,” and “rules of ethics.”
49 Compared with the 
inquisitorial system, in particular, rules about evidence and professional responsibility 
are much more structured toward making fair decisions between the more aggressive 
parties in the adversary system. In addition, appellate courts, historically, were created 
to oversee the parties’ and the adjudicator’s observance of the rules through the end of 
the procedure.
50 Without these rules, the conflict-solving process would continue to be 
like a battle or an ordeal. The next section will provide a historical sketch. 
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In this paper, I will apply an extended conception of this partisan formation, 
which founds the judicialized adversary system, to the American political and 
constitutional fields.
51 As Redish contends, “the adversary theory” is one of the 
conflict-abating processes applicable to all political fields, and is not confined within a 
judicial method of decision-making.
 All societies have conflicts among their 
constituencies and ways of solving them at the same time. The adversary theory 
proposes that every active party of a disagreement should have an equal opportunity to 
appeal through the use of specific rules within a democratic society. Thus, it is 
possible to say that the core of this theory is the individual rights and autonomy of the 
zealous parties.
52  
 
2.3 History of the American Adversary System 
The adversary theory and the institutionalized adversary system are coordinated 
concepts under which diverse procedures can interact with each other.
53 This is 
because the adversary system is not a short-term creation, but has been constructed 
and ameliorated over the long history of the Common Law. In medieval Europe, the 
adversary mechanism started with diverse “rituals” of criminal procedure such as the 
judicial combat and ordeal which had been practiced by the twelfth century.
54 In the 
battle trial, judicial officers supervised the fight, and people believed God decided the 
case by exonerating the winner of a duel as innocent.
55 However, even though the 
battle trial was adopted late in England after an invasion of the Norman in 1066, it 
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could not remain prevalent, and had been almost eradicated by the fourteenth century 
because of its intrinsic prejudice for the rich, who were able to receive training or to 
hire skillful combatants.
56 With the atrophy of judicial combat, the ordeal developed 
as an alternative. The Church was deeply involved with managing the ordeal deeply 
supporting a belief that God would, though the supernatural indication, stop a 
righteous person’s persecution.
57 By its very nature, the ordeal raised many problems 
of cruelty because it was a method of torture. Eventually, church involvement was 
forbidden by a decision of the Lateran Council in 1215.
58 Consequently, during the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the judges in England had to adopt a local panel 
trial, the participation of the representatives of “hundreds” or “vills” in the court, after 
a short transitional period when judges could not help getting much discretion in a 
dispute because they had no other choices.
59 This was the origin of the jury system. 
According to Landsman, these medieval origins provide the advent of the 
adversary system on two grounds. One ground was the concept that the active parties 
of a conflict should prove their innocence.
60 The other was that the formation of the 
tradition of putting a limitation on the role of the judicial officials over the whole 
process of litigation.
61 Actually, the origins of the adversary system looked fascinating 
because the concepts of litigant’s activeness and decision-maker’s passiveness were 
built already in the medieval twelfth century era, a time when the general public did 
not have any serious notion of individual rights or autonomy. It is certain that those 
concepts were not a product of the existence of individual rights. Instead, I think that 
people believed that God would provide the correct answer to a conflict when a 
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grievant vigorously pursued what he or she wanted before the church court. In other 
words, the truth which God had endowed to people, was believed to come out as a 
result of a person’s active behavior. In summary, the trial by battle and the ordeal, the 
historical origin of the adversary process, aimed at something different than an 
individual right: instead it aimed at God’s will, construed as a specific or universal 
truth. 
The development of the adversary system was necessarily accompanied by that 
of the jury system. The jury system is an indispensable element of the adversary 
system because the jury usually takes on the important role of the neutral and passive 
adjudicator in the adversary procedure. Besides, the right to a jury trial is a 
constitutional right, found in Article III, section 2 of the Constitution; the Sixth 
Amendment; and the Seventh Amendment.
62 Ever since the Normans introduced the 
jury system, and with the downfall of the trial by battle and ordeal, the English courts 
have accepted the jury as the decision-maker in the trial. However, the first juries were 
not characterized by neutrality and passiveness.
63 Jurors, who were selected from the 
neighborhood of the litigants, privately tried to discover the facts of a case in advance 
by communicating with all relevant people.
64 In this sense, the early version of the 
jury system looks somewhat inquisitorial.
65  
After the fourteenth century, with the aid of better training skills and 
institutions for the representatives of a trial, the roles of the jury and judge became 
passive and neutral, and the system came to be more adversarial.
66 Later, changes to 
the task of the witness and more organized evidence rules caused the adversary system 
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to become more common and popular.
67 It was in the late eighteenth century that a 
solidly structured adversary system, similar to the contemporary system, appeared in 
England and America.
68 Because the jury became passive and neutral in practice, it 
worked as a significant check against governmental and judicial absolutism by holding 
independent decisions in the cases where the government wanted to harm its political 
competitors through the judicial process.
69 Entwined with the jury trial, the adversary 
system could realize what became its characteristic principle of partisanship. The 
lawyers must persuade the jurors, who are laypersons and extremely passive until it 
comes time to make a conviction, to adjudicate the dispute in their favor and to 
thereby maintain their client’s interests and rights. From the political point of view, 
more importantly, the advent of the jury has a democratic meaning because the power 
of making decisions, from small interpersonal issues to significant community or 
national matters is transferred from the elite to the general public. This means that the 
language of legal matters also becomes more realistic one,
70 and moreover, the jury 
system accelerates citizens’ participation in official governmental work. The citizen 
jurors retain the power to check the legislature by invalidating laws.
71 In addition to 
endowing the jury system with democratic meaning because of its external effects, we 
should give attention to the mechanism of the jurors’ decision-making process among 
themselves as well. Jurors continue discussing until they come to a unanimous 
conclusion. They do not use the majority rule. In spite of its small scale, we can say 
that the jury system demonstrates how to realize the deliberate democracy in practice. 
Accordingly, I can infer that the neutral function of the jury, which is a critical aspect 
of the adversary system, not only elevates the independence of the judiciary from 
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other branches, but also make possible the enthusiastic deliberation of disinterested 
jurors in a court, which is another crucial feature of democracy.  
With the establishment of the bar, the promulgation of the law governing 
lawyers, and the settlement of appellate review, the adversary system became 
complete after the eighteenth century.
72 In addition, the adversary system was 
strengthened by the Bill of Rights which secured related rules such as trial by jury and 
the right to counsel.
73 The accomplishment of the adversary model in this period was 
based on enhanced social or economic conceptions arising out of the American 
revolution, the French revolution, and the industrial revolution.
74 Those variations 
surely had a strong influence on people’s minds about the individual liberty and rights. 
Thus, it might be easy to think that the adversary system was based on a liberal ideal; 
but, when we examine the entire history of the adversary system, there is much room 
to interpret its institutional meaning differently and to see its relation to non-liberal 
ideals. We can ascertain this from a detailed discussion of the value of the adversary 
system in the following sections. 
 
2.4 Value of the Adversary System 
Thus far, I have confirmed Wolfram’s indication that the adversary system is a 
cultural and historical product of America.
75 Now, I turn to the institutional targets of 
the adversary system and the theoretical goals of the adversary process. The goals of 
an institution not only show what it aims to be, but justify its current practice. 
Particularly, the comparison between the purpose of the adversary system and the 
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reality of its fulfillment can give us useful guidance about how to solve some of the 
moral conflicts of legal practice. 
 
2.4.1 Truth 
Generally, truth-finding is frequently mentioned as one of the common goals of the 
adversary system.
76 Truth-finding must be the first target of all dispute resolution 
processes because truth bears an authority to which all dispute participants are 
subordinate. Advocates of the adversary system contend that the adversary system is 
the most efficient way to search for the truth.
77 The deeply devoted parties whom the 
lawyers represent in the process do their best to collect favorable evidence and to 
impeach unfavorable evidence through cross-examination, so that the passive 
adjudicator has the opportunity to review more facts about the case.
78 This argument 
usually tries to support itself by arguing for the superiority of the adversary system 
over the competing European inquisitorial system. Because of her weak motivation, 
the single arbiter of the inquisitorial system who presides with the status of the 
moderator in litigation cannot, relatively speaking, satisfactorily gather facts to make a 
decision unless she chooses to approach it with a special care to.
79  
On the other hand, the truth-finding goal of the adversary structure can bear a 
poisonous fruit. Even though many facts intending to prove the truth are presented by 
the active parties, they may also easily produce evidence that hides the truth. The 
                                                 
76 Id., at 565-8; Sward, supra note 33, at 316-9; Luban, supra note 5, at 68-103; RHODE supra note 10, 
at 170-8. 
77 Sward, id. at 316. 
78 WOLFRAM, supra note 37, at 566. 
79 WOLFRAM, id. Related to this argument, a study done by Thibaut, Walker and Lind reinforces it 
with some comparative empirical demonstration. However, their study shows the inquisitorial system 
has advantages at some other situations, too. John Thibaut, Laurens Walker, E. Allan Lind, Adversary 
Presentation and Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 86 HARV. L. Rev. 386 (1972). Luban argues that this 
research is the only one which compares both systems with respect to the truth- finding purpose, so it is 
hard to conclude that the one is better than the other. LUBAN, supra note 5, at 69.   
26 
critics of the adversary system mostly focus on this point.
80 With an absolute shortage 
of the empirical statistics that show the adversary system’s superiority over the 
inquisitorial system for getting to the truth, arguments for that superiority usually 
depend upon Karl Popper’s methodology of “scientific rationality”: attaining the truth 
by enthusiastic “dialectic of assertion and refutation.”
81 That is, it is easier to get to the 
truth through a party’s logical arguments than through an adjudicator’s sole 
inspection.
82 Luban indicates that there is a counterargument to Popperian theory; 
namely, that Popper’s methodology is not dominant even in its field.
83 It has a fatal 
theoretical flaw: that there can be no advance toward the truth through an assumption 
that is known to be false and which is prohibited from disproof by the procedural rules 
of the system in which the false assumption operates.
84 Fact-finding process in the 
adversary system by lawyers falls into this flawed situation.
85 
Even though there are discovery rules designed to prevent covering the truth,
86 
in practice, the process of discovery has been used as another method of attack.
87 It 
can be used as a weapon for harassing the adversary or for lengthening the 
procedure.
88 Ironically, the rules for prohibiting abuse have become the most notorious 
and favored tactic arising out of lawyer’s overzealousness. This may trigger another 
problem: the disparity that results from taking advantage of the rule. The wealthy may 
have more opportunity to use discovery, because of the extra costs and delay in 
litigation that are produced. Consequently, the results of litigation may be susceptible 
to the party’s wealth, which severely harms judicial justice. 
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2.4.2 Legal Right 
The second goal of the adversary system is to protect individual legal rights, which 
justifies the system further. First of all, this proposition has to do with the “autonomy 
of the individual” as a legal right, which I referred above as the core ideology of the 
liberal adversary theory. The value of this legal right lies in its tricky relationship with 
the first value of finding truth. Basically, litigation can attain its goals by excavating 
objective truth. And the adversary system is also known as the best way to obtain an 
individual’s interests or rights through the form of zealous partisanship during the 
process of fact-finding.
89 However, in the process, the parties may sometimes want to 
achieve their goals by hiding the truth for their own interests, as noted earlier. The 
adversary system places greater emphasis on the parties’ autonomy for the purpose of 
conflict resolution than on finding the truth, and this may produce moral questions 
about what the lawyer is required to do in the course of representation. 
From the constitutional point of view, the advocates of the adversary system 
claim that it is the system best suited for preserving human dignity, for it allows the 
parties to lead the important process of enhancing their individual rights in whatever 
way they wish so long as it is within the regulations.
90 From the procedural point of 
view, the adversary system protects several constitutional rights: the right to habeas 
corpus and jury trial. With respect to the client’s individual rights, the lawyer does her 
best within the rules of the adversary system, which is the most advantageous system 
for clients, especially in criminal cases.
91 And this is strongly supported from the 
perspective of individualism.
92 In particular, the value of protecting individual rights is 
more conspicuous in criminal cases generally because the prosecution has more power 
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than the defendant.
93 Protecting the defendant’s right in a trial has great significance in 
terms of preventing “possible abuse” of the prosecution’s power, but it is also true that 
there can be possible “erroneous convictions” or “erroneous acquittals.”
94 Furthermore, 
the defendants’ rights are constitutionally guaranteed in a criminal trial: the Fourth 
Amendment right against search and seizure, the Fifth Amendment privilege not to 
incriminate oneself, and the Sixth Amendment right to get the lawyer’s legal aid.
95  
I completely agree that the preferred purpose of the adversary system should be 
the respect and protection of individual rights in criminal cases, as well as in civil 
cases. Compared to the continental inquisitorial system, in which the prosecution 
appears to take a relatively superior status over the defendant, the adversary system 
seems to be a more rights-protective institution. However, the very fact that the value 
of rights protection can be in strong tension with the value of truth-finding, as I 
explored above, makes things complicated. For example, a criminal trial lawyer’s task 
of the highest priority may not be to discover the truth, but to give the client the best 
result, preferably, an acquittal. In this case, the lawyer does not have an obligation to 
find the truth, and she can even use the “plausible false defense” in the trial, unless she 
presents false evidence or commits perjury.
96 What if this kind choice on the part of 
the lawyer incriminates an innocent person? Can the adversary system still be 
considered rights-protective? Is the adversary system’s concern only the rights of the 
defendant? In my opinion, this should not be so. This is why I think there should be a 
balance between the value of truth-finding and the value of legal rights. Both of these 
are equally important with respect to justice in a society. 
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Even in civil cases, the structure of the fight between the two opponent parties’ 
makes it possible for one of them to use a weapon that may cause severe devastation 
to the adversary’s rights or dignity.
97 Realistically, there are some overzealous lawyers 
who routinely use this kind of attack method to incapacitate their opponent in 
litigation. At that point, I would hesitate to even think of the adversary system as a 
very individualistic institution; instead, it appears to be frankly self-centered. Sward 
picks out the cause of this phenomenon as “the loss of individual control to the 
attorney.”
98 Litigation can be substantially dominated by the lawyers rather than by the 
clients, and lawyers’ overzealousness may evoke selfish acrimony.
99 Luban compared 
adversarial pursuit just for the client’s interests with the medieval trial by battle, which 
showed no mercy to the opponent but killed to protect the fighter’s life or his 
employer’s individual interests.
100 Wolfram refers to Charles Darwin’s theory of 
“survival-of-the-fittest.” However, he still defends the adversary system based on the 
fact that the judicial system has rules for controlling the contention and making it 
fair.
101  
It is not easy to find the best system through which we can seek, as equally as 
possible, the exact truth and the protection of individual rights. I think the American 
adversary system has been chosen by the people as a result of historical context. Even 
though I must accept that the adversary system is very advantageous for protecting 
individual rights and interests, it contains a loophole in its logic of individual rights, 
especially in criminal trials. When we broaden our perspective concerning the rights of 
the individual to include “the other’s rights,” individual rights argument becomes less 
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persuasive. What I want to say here is that we should be overly hasty in crediting the 
individual rights argument of the adversary system. Such a belief can lead to an 
unconditional excuse for all legal and ethical wrongdoings in the practice of lawyers.  
 
2.4.3 Autonomy 
The value of autonomy in the adversary system follows, essentially, along the same 
line of argument as the discussion of individual rights. It stems from the definition of 
the adversary system: zealous partisanship. The active parties have the liberty or 
autonomy of maximizing their own individual rights. Namely, autonomy is an 
inherently guaranteed value for the client within the adversarial position. Therefore, 
the fundamental duty of the lawyer is to “enhance the autonomy” of the client.
102 
Generally, clients do not have much legal knowledge, so they must depend on their 
lawyer’s advice. Sometimes, the professional’s counsel is critically against the client’s 
intention. At this point, a question is raised of how much the lawyer can affect the 
client’s decisions or how much the client’s autonomy should be sustained in the 
relationship with the lawyer. The reason why I discuss autonomy in a designated 
section even though it has the same root as the contents of the previous section is that 
it contains an implication that is useful in analyzing the liberal theories in the legal 
ethics field which compare autonomy with the value of freedom of speech. I address 
this in the next chapter. Because the value of autonomy plays essential roles in both 
cases, juxtaposing them will be useful in terms of their political significance. 
To realize this meaningful zealous partisanship, the lawyer has to be neutral to 
her client. If the lawyer’s private beliefs overwhelm the client’s intention, it is 
manifestly an intrusion of the client’s autonomy. As I mentioned above, however, 
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some overzealous lawyers entirely dominate their client’s ideas and immorally 
manipulate the entire procedures. This is because clients without any knowledge about 
the law are usually more likely to give up their right to decide critical matters and to 
let the lawyer do it for them. At the same time, most clients wish to increase their 
rights and interests in conflicts with their opponents. They are easily enticed into 
attempting to use illegal or immoral methods, and the lawyer, who must protect the 
client’s autonomy, cannot prevent all of those attempts. To solve these problems, we 
must elucidate what the client’s autonomy is. Before getting into it, though, I will 
sketch theories about the attorney-client relationship first. 
 
2.4.3.1 Relationship between Lawyer and Client 
Three models are usually introduced for explaining the lawyer-client relationship: “the 
lawyer-as-statesman,” “the lawyer-as-friend,” and “the lawyer-as-hired-gun.”
103 As far 
as the client’s autonomy in concerned, the model of the lawyer-as-hired-gun promotes 
the most autonomy while the lawyer-as-statesman permits a high degree of lawyer’s 
discretion. Indeed, according to the lawyer-client relationship, there are different 
possibilities for realizing autonomy, which is inherently embodied in the conception of 
zealous advocacy. Consequently, the matter of how much autonomy the adversary 
system should protect ultimately determines what kind of attitude the lawyer must take 
toward the client. 
First, the lawyer-as-statesman model gives much room for the lawyer’s 
“practical wisdom or discretionary judgment” in terms of confining the client’s 
interest.
104 This model lays stress on the lawyer’s practical knowledge rather than on 
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the client’s untouchable will. The lawyer may decide whether she accepts to represent 
or keeps representing the client, under the condition that the representation 
“[promotes] justice” or “[is] consistent with the legal system’s values.”
105 William 
Simon, a legal scholar who emphatically presents this model, contends that the lawyer 
should hold a discretionary status during representation of the client for the purpose of 
elevating justice, and he criticizies the Dominant View that is based on the liberal 
model of the lawyer-as-hired-gun.
106  
There is a criticism, however, that the client is presumed to lack the 
competence to decide her own moral behavior within this model.
107 On this model, the 
lawyer must teach the morally untrained client how to be just. This assumes an 
absolute moral superiority of the lawyer over the client, so that the autonomy of the 
client may become too weak to fulfill the adversarial principle of partisanship. 
Furthermore, the conception of “justice” which works as the basis of the lawyer’s 
discretion can be either personalized or obsessed to the established authority because 
every lawyer may have a different notion of justice, or each lawyer may acquiesce to 
the norm of justice within the current legal system for fear of conflict among these 
plural views.
108 Nevertheless, this model is the most effective one for controlling the 
“threatening nature” of the client.
109 The client who sticks to her interests rather than 
the morality of law can push the lawyer to follow her intention. But within the model 
of the lawyer-as-statesman the lawyer can make her own moral decision for furthering 
the justice of the legal system irrespective of the client’s immoral pressure.  
Second, in the model of the lawyer-as-friend, the lawyer can maintain a 
balance between the client’s interests and the moral imperative. Charles Fried, a 
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designer of this model, proposes an analogy of “[legal] friendship” for the relationship 
between the lawyer and the client, although they have limitations to becoming real 
friends to each other.
110 The term lawyer as “legal friend” in Fried’s context is mainly 
derived from the general definition of “friend” as being allowed to have the “freedom 
to choose and to be chosen” and even the “freedom to [reserve] the universalizing 
claims of morality.”
111 As long as the lawyer makes friends with the client, that 
friendship should be evidenced by the lawyer’s zealous advocacy for the client’s 
interests. However, according to the “reciprocity” of friendship, the lawyer’s 
“identity” and moral beliefs should be esteemed by the client. Accordingly, the 
lawyer’s withdrawal, because of a disparity of moral viewpoint with the client, is 
allowed if the lawyer wishes to do so.
112 
With respect to protecting the lawyer’s personal faith, the lawyer-as-friend 
model is similar to the lawyer-as-statesman model to some extent. But the former 
takes a much milder view of protection than the latter because the lawyer does not 
teach or force the moral justice of the legal system onto the client in this model.
113 The 
lawyer can just ignore the client’s immoral request and leave her. The issues of a 
threatening client and a lawyer’s discretion, though, happen in the lawyer-as-friend 
model as well. The same question of the client’s constriction of autonomy is also 
raised because of the lawyer’s discretionary power,
114 and the same counterargument 
can be suggested for the reason of the definition of autonomy introduced in the section 
above. 
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However, Fried makes clear that we should distinguish the lawyer’s personal 
wrongdoing from those that are institutionally permitted. He opposes the immoral 
means which the lawyer chooses voluntarily to defeat the opponent, but justifies the 
immoral results of the lawyer’s zealous counseling about a client’s unethical purpose 
so long as the counseling is within the scope of the law.
 115 The only reason for the 
latter is that the lawyer protects the client’s autonomy. As for autonomy, Fried 
explains that by regarding the client’s interests as her own interests, the lawyer can, as 
a “legal friend” of the client, enhance the client’s autonomy “within the law.”
116 He 
establishes the lawyer’s morality as going to “preserve and express the autonomy of 
the client vis-à-vis the legal system.”
117 He values ethically all efforts of the lawyer to 
carry out the client’s legal right.
118 Furthermore, Fried thinks that in relying on 
“personal integrity,” the lawyer, as a friend of the client, “would not” adopt immoral 
methods such as “[pursuing] socially noxious scheme, [foreclosing] on widows or 
orphans, or [assisting] in the avoidance of just punishment.”
119 Trust between friends 
works as a moral prohibition against nasty means for winning in practice. 
Nonetheless, can the lawyer really be a friend of the client? Whereas Fried 
wants to emphasize the humanity-oriented aspects of the relationship; in reality, the 
main motivation for sustaining the lawyer’s loyalty to the client is money.
 120 And 
because of a lack of reciprocity between the client and the lawyer, they can hardly be 
real friends. At the incipient stage of the friendship, the autonomy of choosing a 
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partner is only the client’s, while general friendship is created by the parties’ common 
intention to collaborate with each other; what Fried referred to as natural friendship.
121 
The lawyer supplies a unilateral moral and legal obligation to protect the client’s 
interest and autonomy over nearly the entire process of representation. Without moral 
reciprocity, I do not think that the relationship can be called a friendship. In addition, 
this romanticized use of the term may trivialize the moral problems that happen during 
the lawyer’s representation. There can be an unacceptable moral wrongdoing 
connected with institutionally guaranteed immoral results of the lawyer’s legal 
representation, as the Fugitive Slave Act demonstrates.
122 Not many lawyers are 
expected to avoid immoral means during their zealous advocacy in order to maintain 
personal integrity with the friend client.  
I discussed earlier how the lawyer’s zealous work for the client’s autonomy 
supports institutionally permitted immoral representation in the lawyer-as-friend 
model. My question is, what does the client’s autonomy have to do with the lawyer’s 
morality? Fried differentiates “the lawyer’s own wrong” and “the wrong of the 
system.”
123 Does this not mean that the morality of the lawyer should be determined 
on the basis of the lawyer’s individual choice? Does the client’s autonomy mean that 
she is able to do whatever she wants if it is legal? If the lawyer is a friend of the client, 
is it a friend’s duty to let the client do anything immoral she wants? All of these 
questions can be answered after making clear what autonomy in the adversary system 
is. The next section addresses this issue. 
Third, the lawyer-as-hired-gun model is, as its title says, designed to allow for 
the largest autonomy for the client. With no power to reject the client’s immoral 
requests, the lawyer cannot persuade the client to choose a moral direction, nor can the 
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lawyer leave her because of a conflict of moral belief. Few accept this model as 
appropriate now because of its extremity.
124 In its “contemporary reformulation”, the 
lawyer possesses the autonomy to pick up and withdraw from the clients if she needs 
to do so because of her moral convictions.
125 In other words, the manifest difference 
between the classical hired-gun model and the contemporary version is that the latter 
endows the lawyer and client with the possibility of “moral dialogue.”
126 Compared to 
the lawyer-as-friend model in which the lawyer can talk about morality and persuade 
the client, the contemporary hired-gun model allows the lawyer to do no more than 
stress the importance of the moral behavior.
127 
In the prevailing the contemporary version, the lawyer-as-hired-gun model 
admits that autonomy is not the client’s exclusive possession. Freedman contends that 
the lawyer retains practically “full autonomy” before making a contract with a client 
meaning that she can choose the client whose legal or moral cause is proven to be 
acceptable.
128 In addition, she has three more conditions that justify her resignation 
from representation: “if the client consents;” “if withdrawal can be accomplished 
without significant harm to the client’s interests;” or “in a matter other than criminal 
litigation, if the lawyer discovers that the client has knowingly induced the lawyer to 
take the case or to take action on the client’s behalf on the basis of material 
misrepresentations about the facts of the case, and if withdrawal can be accomplished 
without direct divulgence of the client’s confidences.”
129 From Freedman’s 
explanation, we can confirm that there may be some restrictions on the client’s 
autonomy because of the lawyer’s moral autonomy even in the most libertarian model. 
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In sum, the models of the lawyer-client relationship vary according to the 
degree of the client’s protected autonomy. Although the adversary system is known as 
the institution best suited for broadening the autonomy of the client, most of the 
lawyer-client relationship models performed in the adversary system do not entirely 
prohibit the lawyer’s moral intrusion on the client’s autonomy. Like two sides of the 
same coin, this subject entails the question of how much of her own moral autonomy 
the lawyer can have in the course of representation. To the scholars who contend that 
the lawyer’s amorality should be refuted, the lawyer’s autonomy of moral 
representation is the core item to be discussed. Interrelated with the matter of the 
client’s autonomy, the lawyer’s moral autonomy can also be decided through the study 
of the client’s autonomy. For these dual targets, in the following chapter I will deal 
with what the client’s autonomy is and whether this autonomy can be interrupted 
paternalistically by the lawyer’s moral autonomy. 
 
2.4.3.2 Scope of Lawyers’ Behaviors 
At this point, I need to classify lawyer’s behaviors to make clear what I want to deal 
with in this article in terms of the client’s autonomy and the lawyer’s moral 
paternalism in the adversary system. Based on the models of the lawyer-client 
relationship, the lawyer’s activities which supposedly have no ethical problems can be 
left out. In criminal cases, I think that lawyers should not reject a client’s request for 
representation, even if the lawyer holds a conflicting moral belief about the client’s 
crime because people’s right to a lawyer’s assistance is constitutionally guaranteed. 
Whatever wrongdoing the client committed, the lawyer is only required to provide 
legal assistance that is ethical according to her moral standard.  
With the exception of this example, almost all cases provide the opportunity 
for moral evaluation through the lawyer’s paternalistic behavior. In the first place, the  
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lawyer may dissuade the client from an immoral plot against the adversary or the 
government during her representation. When the client wants to use immoral methods 
to make the opponent frustrated, in particular, the lawyer may withdraw from the 
relationship for fear of violating her own moral rules. This case is justified even in 
Fried’s liberal model of the lawyer-as-a-friend. I think that this paternalistic behavior 
is justified and it does not constrict the client’s autonomy in the adversary system 
because it is permissible even according to the definition of paternalism given in the 
liberal version of autonomy. The lawyer’s dissuasion seems to be bad because it may 
contain a kind of threat which reflects a paternalism based on the lawyer’s superior 
status above the client in terms of legal knowledge. This paternalistic threat possibly 
makes the client “subordinate” so that her autonomy, which is crudely meant as 
“doing what one wants” and “choosing freely without any constraints,” may be 
restricted.
130 However, as Luban elucidates, this “moral activist” lawyer’s paternalism 
does not happen frequently for the reason that, in practice, lawyers are not 
economically independent of the client.
131 And when the lawyer takes the third party’s 
right or the public interests into account, the restricted autonomy of the client has 
nothing to do with her subordination, but just with the lawyer’s refusal of the client’s 
immoral will.
132 
What I want to take issue with in this chapter is when the lawyer performs 
paternalistic immoral behaviors for herself irrespective of the client’s intention. These 
may comprise three different subcategories. First, when the lawyer acts exactly on 
behalf of the client’s immoral plan. Second, when the lawyer represents immorally 
opposing to the client’s moral plan. Third, when the lawyer reveals the confidentiality 
                                                 
130 Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: a Reply to Stephen 
Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1036 (1990). 
131 Id., at 1036-7. 
132 Id., at 1037.  
39 
which is obtained during the representation.
133 The first and the second ones shed 
stronger light on the lawyer’s immoral behavior itself rather than the client’s morality. 
And those cases are the main motivation of this study of the adversary system due to 
their usual dependence on it for an excuse. I, personally, deny that the adversary 
system justifies those lawyer’s immoral activities, and can therefore not be regulated. 
Strictly speaking, if the client agrees with the lawyer’s immoral tactics, as in the first 
subcategory, the lawyer’s behavior is not paternalistic according to the general 
definition of paternalism which will be discussed in the following sections, because it 
does not limit the client’s rights. On the other hand, the lawyer behaves totally 
paternalistically with respect to the client’s moral autonomy when it comes to the 
opposite situation, as in the second subcategory. In this case, the lawyer’s behavior 
needs special justification grounded on the general justification of paternalism against 
autonomy. For the first subcategory, we have to interpret autonomy itself differently 
from the mainstream liberal understanding based on the liberal interpretation of the 
adversary system in order to override the contention that we cannot regulate the 
lawyer’s immoral behavior legally or morally at all. Specifically, when we think of the 
party’s whole autonomy to do the immoral behavior in the adversary system, we can 
still say that another type of paternalism is needed for restrictions on it. The essence of 
autonomy should be studied this interpretation. I believe that it is effective for this task 
to compare autonomy as the value of the adversary system and as autonomy as a value 
of freedom of speech. A concrete comparison will be done in the chapter 3 and 4. 
The third subcategory is a disputable one. Even though the lawyer’s duty of 
confidentiality, with its necessary conditions, is stipulated in most of the states’ codes 
of professional responsibility, there may be cases where the morally committed lawyer 
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has to reveal a secret and ready to accept a discipline. We should evaluate this 
behavior from the point of morality as well as law, and protect it if it proves to be 
worth doing. We cannot say that this behavior is paternalistic because the lawyer 
reveals not for the client’s own good. Thus, the meaning of autonomy will also be a 
decisive factor for determining its moral worth. In particular, what I want to explore in 
this article with respect to the duty of confidentiality is whether the lawyer’s revelation 
can be compatible with the American adversary system or not. I believe that they are 
compatible with each other if the adversary system can overcome the inculcated and 
exclusive connection with liberalism when it comes to the meaning of autonomy as the 
value of the adversary system. Explained by various political or philosophical theories, 
the adversary system can support not only the ground of the liberal interpretation in 
the application of the duty of confidentiality but also a non-liberal basis of the 
protection of the lawyer’s moral revelation. This matter can also be reduced to the 
relationship between autonomy and paternalism.  
 
2.4.3.3 Autonomy and Paternalism 
In the adversary system, the client’s autonomy is seemingly understood as the ultimate 
target to fulfill. This works as the most powerful justification of the institutional 
excuse for the lawyer’s amoral character during representation. Some scholars insist 
that achieving the client’s autonomy is inherently morally good,
134 while others try to 
differentiate the lawyer’s moral activity from the client’s autonomy.
135 In fact, there 
are lawyers, deeply committed with their own moral faith, who may decline to do 
what the client asks and who may persuade him to do the right thing. To the people 
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who believe that autonomy is the unchanging highest value of the adversary system, 
these kinds of attitudes on the part of the lawyer seem to be morally problematic. And 
practically, because the lawyer is a legal expert and there are many cases in which the 
client has to follow the lawyer’s advice, the lawyer’s interruption of the client’s 
autonomy can easily be paternalistic. Following Gerald Dowrkin’s definition of 
paternalism—“the interference with a person’s liberty of action justified by reasons 
referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, values of the 
person being coerced,”
136 we can evaluate this feature of the lawyer’s behavior. Now, 
in this section, I will find whether the adversary system let the lawyer work 
paternalistically to keep her moral code repressing the client’s autonomy.  
First of all, for more concrete research there need to be some studies on what 
autonomy is in the context of the adversary system. The definition of the client’s 
autonomy has to do with that of the lawyer’s paternalism, which also arises from her 
autonomy. Of course, scholars think that only the client’s autonomy has to be 
protected in order to make the adversary system work properly, because the client 
could not fall back on the lawyer if the former did not exercise her autonomy and the 
latter rejected taking the client’s autonomous intentions.
137 Besides, there is a belief 
that the lawyer’s protection of the client’s autonomy is part of the constitutional 
order.
138 Because the lawyer’s representation is a way of protecting a constitutional 
right, the constitutional ideal of protecting this individual right can be achieved by the 
lawyer’s representation that promotes the client’s autonomy.
139 
However, I think that the autonomy which the adversary system wants to 
pursue as its foremost value is composed of the client’s autonomy and the lawyer’s 
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moral paternalism, which was evidenced by the lawyer-client relationship in the 
previous section. If the lawyer has to support all of the client’s interests and will in her 
representation, the lawyer’s moral paternalism becomes minimized whereas the 
client’s autonomy is fully protected. On the other hand, if the lawyer’s moral power 
carries her to a point beyond the client’s interest and will, the client’s autonomy 
cannot prevail over the lawyer’s moral autonomy. Though the lawyer’s moral 
paternalism is antagonistic to the client’s autonomy, I think that both of them have to 
be understood as one party’s overall autonomy in the adversarial process. Generally, 
we are apt to think that the autonomy in the adversary system that is the protected 
value is just the client’s, but we need to reconsider this for three reasons. First, the 
lawyer is not just a messenger of the client. She analyzes facts and creates appropriate 
strategies for the client’s interest during her representation. She retains fiduciary 
autonomy. Second, the individual right, which is another of the adversary system’s 
persuasive value justifications for the client, has much to do with that of the lawyer. 
The client’s success is the lawyer’s direct concern legally and materially; the lawyer 
has a fiduciary duty and her income depends directly on it. Third, the client has the 
autonomy to select the lawyer. With the exception of the cases of court-appointed 
lawyers or public defenders, the right to initiate the relationship between the lawyer 
and client is always the client’s. The autonomy of the party, the client and the lawyer, 
can be calculated together because the former usually autonomously chooses the latter, 
on the basis of maximizing her interest. For these reasons, in this section I will 
elucidate the party’s autonomy in the adversary system in terms of the conflict and 
compromise between the client’s autonomy and the lawyer’s moral paternalism.
140141 
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Autonomy is a sophisticated philosophical concept, so it can be described in 
various ways: Rawls’ justice, freedom, and equality, Scanlon’s Millian Principle, 
Ronald Dworkin’s equal respect, and Kantian freedom and responsibility, Berlin’s 
equivalent of liberty, and so forth.
142 Even though it is hard to define autonomy, it 
naively means “self-decision making” if we etymologize it: auto(self) and nomos(rule 
of law).
143 This naïve meaning may entail confusion with adjacent concepts, especially 
liberty. In other words, the client’s autonomy is different from the liberty the client has 
about what he wants to do. This is because liberty also contains self-determination in 
itself. Gerald Dworkin’s “characterization” of the constituents of autonomy helps us 
define the conception.
144 His criteria of autonomy are these: “logical consistency,” 
“empirical possibility,” “value conditions,” “ideological neutrality,” “normative 
relevance,” and “judgmental relevance.”
145 In addition, Douglas Husak’s analysis of 
autonomy requires perspectives from three patterns: “autonomy as the capacity to 
exercise choice,” “autonomy as the capacity to choose,” “autonomy as conformity to 
moral law.”
146 Extraordinarily, Luban finds “no intrinsic value” in autonomy, and he 
contends that “responsibility,” “creativity,” and “authenticity” make up the idea of 
autonomy in terms of “moral, romantic, and psychological” aspects.
147 With these 
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considerations, a conception should fit for much more complicated requirements if it is 
to be called autonomy.  
One aspect of autonomy that is different from liberty is the possibility of 
involving it with the conception of responsibility. This is well observed, especially in 
the Kantian morality theory. Autonomy, for Kant, means the condition of the moral 
agent’s “morally-motivated exercise of freedom to choose.”
148 Kantian autonomy is a 
prerequisite of moral legislation for an agent; no observance of the law from a 
subservient will can be morally good. And this works as bedrock for the principle of 
responsibility: “what we ought to do given the innate dignity of all persons.”
149 From 
this point, autonomy is different from the conception of “free choice” or “freedom of 
will” which is a “precondition of autonomy” for choosing between “moral motivation” 
and “heteronymous motivation” with moral neutrality.
150 Kant’s autonomy can be 
restricted by the government when one’s autonomy conflicts with the others’, whereas 
the State has an inherent duty of safeguarding the citizen’s autonomy.
151 This cannot 
make sense as long as the restriction means the “command” of the state because 
logically none of that is present in the Kantian structure of autonomy.
152 However, a 
person with rationality may give up autonomy at her will, unless the responsibility for 
her action is cleared off.
153 Therefore, in terms of emphasizing a constituent’s 
autonomous obligation to a society,
154 the external intervention on one’s autonomy 
may be possible under the condition of her consent within the Kantian understanding 
of autonomy. Detailed accounts of paternalism will follow in the next sections. 
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The most decisive way to distinguish autonomy from liberty is to look at their 
limitations. “All interference with liberty is necessarily interference with autonomy” 
whereas autonomy can be limited without interference to liberty.
155 Dworkin provides 
John Lock’s example about a prisoner and an episode of Odysseus to explain their 
difference.
156 Telling the prisoner that all doors of his cell are locked, the guards let 
one of the doors unlocked without any information about this fact. When the prisoner 
“reasonably” never tries to get out, it can be said that his autonomy is interrupted, but 
he has still liberty to leave the cell. To the contrary, Odysseus, who tied himself to the 
boat so as not to be killed by the siren, gives up his liberty voluntarily, but still has 
autonomy because “he has a preference about his preference, a desire not to act upon 
certain desires.”
157 That is to say, one’s autonomy can be encouraged while liberty is 
rejected.
158 The significant reason for strictly distinguishing autonomy from liberty is 
their different relationships with paternalism. Paternalistic behavior always limits 
liberty, but we can have some cases in which paternalism promotes autonomy.
159 In 
other words, the lawyer’s moral paternalism interrupts the client’s liberty, but may 
promote her autonomy. But it is also true that, in most cases, right, liberty and 
autonomy are restricted at the same time by the performance of paternalism because 
they largely overlap.
160 
According to Gerald Dworkin’s definition, which I referred earlier, paternalism 
simply means “interference with one’s liberty for her own good.”
161 If the lawyer 
forbids the client from doing what she wants for the client’s own moral good because 
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he is following his moral beliefs, he acts paternalistically. At this moment, the 
questions are, first, whether the lawyer needs to be paternalistic to the client; second, 
whether the lawyer’s moral paternalism is justified, and if so, under what 
circumstances this justification operates. The first question has to do with the 
discussion of the lawyer’s amoral role. Especially, the debate between Stephen Pepper 
and David Luban suggests the necessity of further thought about the essence of the 
lawyer’s duty, which is allegedly maximization of the client’s autonomy. The second 
question is philosophical research on lawyer’s moral paternalism. Luban also has the 
insight into this. 
Pepper’s heartfelt support for the lawyer’s amoral job comes from nearly 
absolute respect for autonomy. His basic idea is that enhancing client’s autonomy is 
morally good for itself. This autonomy enlargement can be achieved by free access to 
the legal system, and lawyers are necessary helpers for this access. Therefore, the 
lawyer’s job which protects the client’s autonomy, does not have moral problem in 
spite of her amoral-looking behaviors. Pepper ascribes all moral responsibilities to the 
client if the lawyer engages in lawful actions.
162 He also refers to the adversary system 
justification for the role assignment between the lawyer and the judge.
163 His “first-
class citizenship model” is entailed by lawyer’s professionalism which is firmly 
established by Richard Wasserstrom.
164 The lawyer’s interests, he insists, are always 
subjugated to the client’s according to this professionalism.
165 Two significant 
presuppositions of Pepper’s contention are that “law is a public good available to all 
[first-class citizens],” and that the American legal system “accommodates individual 
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autonomy by leaving as much room as possible for liberty and diversity.”
166 The flow 
of his logic goes like this:
167 
Law is a public good which increases autonomy. 
The expansion of individual autonomy is morally good. 
Autonomy relies on access to the law in a highly legalized, American, society. 
(First-class citizenship is the same as individual autonomy.) 
First-class citizenship also banks on access to the law. 
Practically, only lawyers can make this access to the law possible. 
Therefore, the lawyer’s job, which makes first-class citizenship come true, is morally good only 
by replacing her own moral belief with the client’s individual autonomy. 
Pepper’s recognition of the legal profession is instrumental and passive. The lawyer 
must serve the purpose of the client’s autonomy while being positive about the law. 
He believes that the described law should be the test by which the morality of a 
behavior is decided. He really wants lawyers to be waivered from moral decisions by 
interpretation of vague laws.
168 Thus, Pepper thinks that there is no reason for lawyers 
to paternalistically interrupt clients’ autonomy because it is not their job to do so. The 
advantage of this attitude is that it could lower clients’ “unequal access to the law” 
which may come from lawyers’ refusal on account of her moral creed to represent the 
client.
169  
Pepper acknowledges two possibilities of criticism of his theory. The first one 
is that the access to the law depends on economic reality, so the practical inequality 
may happen even though morally neutral lawyers are well equipped in the legal 
market theoretically.
170 This is the same criticism, from the possible manipulations of 
market leaders, to that of the truth-finding value which the adversary system pursues, 
as I treated earlier. Pepper counter-argues that this inequality is a natural side effect of 
the capitalist market which cannot change the essence of lawyering because we are not 
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living in a socialist society.
171 Actually, he wants to evade the topic of distribution in 
his article saying that this is different matter from the function of lawyers in “a highly 
legalized society.”
172  
I do not think that this logic is reasonable. He presumes that access to the law 
is a matter of equality in a society, and lawyers helping this process of access are 
doing a morally good job because they promote equality. However, if lawyers, the 
only monopolized profession with the task of enhancing social equality, do not fulfill 
this task, their assumed functional morality has to be reconsidered. And Pepper 
confines all moral matters to the legal autonomy. In other words, the inequality of 
access to the law is an issue in reality. But Pepper just treats his presumption of 
lawyer’s “good” amoral function as an unrealistic abstraction even though very 
practical problems exist. This is because there are many cases in which lawyers cannot 
help people gain access to the law in fact. Furthermore, comparing the risk of 
inequality to the client because of the morally biased lawyer, I think that the possible 
inequality from the failure of the marketplace is much larger. We will not have many 
lawyers who will paternalistically interfere with their client’s autonomy for moral 
reasons because we are living not in “the socialist society,” but “a capitalist society.”  
I understand that autonomy in Pepper’s first-class citizenship model mainly 
means political self-rule because he emphasizes the “societal commitment” of the 
principle of individual autonomy.
173 According to this understanding, autonomy, 
which is activated by law and with the equal access through lawyers, is regarded as a 
societal outcome. Society always bears conflicts. Individual autonomy may be 
confronted, as well, which means that anyone in a society may have a chance to lose 
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her own autonomy from the conflict. Thus, equal access to the law for protecting 
autonomy is important. Pepper thinks that ensuring equality of the access by making 
lawyers amoral outweighs the immoral results from the amorality. However, equality 
is not composed of only formal aspects. Whereas lawyers’ amoral behaviors, as 
Pepper contends, guarantee formal equality of access to the law, they may lower 
substantial equality. The degree of equality which the client can get from her lawyer 
varies according to the lawyer’s circumstance. There are many variables to determine 
equality of the access to the law, including lawyers’ amorality and Luban’s economic 
analysis.
174 Lawyers vary in terms of ability, political stance, morality, finance, and so 
forth. Even though clients are well equipped with lawyers for the access to the law, 
real equality of access cannot be achieved if there exists substantial difference in 
lawyer’s service that comes from these circumstances of the lawyers. Accordingly, it 
is logically risky to presuppose that lawyer’s amoral duty will make the equal access 
to the law and to conclude that lawyers should be free from the accuse of the 
immorality. 
For his counter-argument on the second possible criticism, Pepper insists that 
his first-class citizenship model is better for the lawyer’s amorality than the adversary 
system justification, as well.
175 He argues that lawyers, except special criminal cases, 
usually work at the office which has almost nothing to do with litigation. In other 
words, lawyers’ role representing the client is not mainly defined within the 
framework of the adversarial deployment in which the lawyer should be dedicated to 
the zealous advocacy with amorality.
 176 Whereas the adversary system justification 
for the lawyer’s amorality is just applied to the position of litigation, Pepper claims, 
his first-class citizenship model is for all types of lawyer’s representation. However, as 
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Luban’s criticism on it, all legal customs, chiefly the “rules” molded by the adversary 
system, in the American society are influenced by the adversary system directly or 
indirectly.
177 The “cautiousness” and “complicatedness” of the practice comes from 
the “adversarial” litigation culture.
178 For example, the rule of confidentiality created 
to regulate the litigation circumstance is applied to the office work of the lawyer.
179 
Furthermore, I do not think that the adversary system justification is not the suitable 
subject to compare with Pepper’s first-class citizenship model because the adversary 
system does not justify the lawyer’s amorality and excessive partisanship completely 
as I found in the earlier sections. Even though there are scholars who generally lay 
stress on lawyer’s ethical behavior but accept the lawyer’s amoral characteristic only 
in the criminal cases,
180 the adversary system cannot provide perfect justification, 
which has often to do with the liberal interpretation, for immoral lawyering. 
 
2.4.3.4 Paternalism and Liberalism 
To answer the questions I raised in section 2.432, I need to investigate specifically 
whether the lawyer’s moral or immoral interruption is harmful to the client’s 
autonomy, first. Because this interference is usually done for the “client’s own good” 
in terms of morality,
181 it can be called paternalism according to the definition I 
clarified earlier. If the lawyer’s paternalism shrinks the client’s autonomy, it cannot be 
permitted within the context of the adversary system where individual autonomy is 
regarded as the supreme value. That is to say, we have to know whether the lawyer’s 
moral or immoral paternalism in relation to the client’s autonomy can be justified in 
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the adversary system. In this section, focusing on Luban’s, Thompson’s and Husak’s 
philosophy of paternalism, I will contend that paternalism may promote the client’s 
autonomy instead. 
To judge the morality of paternalism, we have to answer some questions about 
autonomy, first. Is autonomy always morally good? Is encouraging a person’s 
autonomy always morally good, too? In the course of criticizing Pepper’s defense of 
the lawyer’s amorality, Luban offers a good inspiration about these matters. He says, 
“the desirability of people acting autonomously [should be seen from] the desirability 
of their autonomous act.”
182 While the subject of an autonomous act does not have to 
be good for granted, acting something autonomously and “increasing individual 
autonomy” is always morally good to Pepper.
183 However, Luban indicates that the 
fulfillment of autonomy may produce an “immoral action,” so autonomous acting is 
not always morally good, and promoting people’s autonomous act may not always be 
good, too.
184 If we accept Luban’s logic, it will be possible to interpret the lawyer’s 
paternalism more flexibly. 
Then, we need to know the general relationship between paternalism and 
autonomy. Even if paternalism itself contains some of obstruction of autonomy by 
definition, they are not always in conflict. In other words, autonomy cannot be the 
reason of preventing all paternalistic behaviors.
185 This is because there are some cases 
in which paternalism can instead protect the autonomy. This is also the main logic of 
the justification of the paternalism. Basically, individual autonomy has to conflict 
because individuals may have different contents or forms of autonomy and they have 
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to be connected with each other.
186 Controls on opposing autonomies through 
paternalistic action are needed for at least minimum protection of the greatest number 
of people’s autonomy, even under the utilitarian concept.
187 Gerald Dworkin also 
supports this idea by providing a reverse interpretation about John Stuart Mill’s harm 
theory.
188  
Another justification for paternalism is the consent of the person who is 
deprived of liberty.
189 As in the example of the episode in Odysseus referred to earlier, 
this consent happens because of the reasonable choice of voluntary permission in 
order to avoid the worst situation: “self-destructive actions.”
190 This justification is 
supported by the logic that autonomy is still “preserved” in the paternalistic behaviors 
with the grant.
191 And this permission is composed of “explicit,” “tacit” and 
“hypothetical” forms.
192 Most instances of consent are the explicit ones by the clients 
and concern the lawyer’s paternalism in the lawyer-client relationship,
193 but there 
must be some cases in which the lawyer can assume the client’s consent in a necessary 
situation such as emergency, if the lawyer’s moral paternalism is allowed theoretically 
and practically. However, the liberal societies we live in ask for a stronger 
rationalization for the infringement of individual autonomy as in Luban’s 
assumption.
194 The point is that, as for the relationship with autonomy, paternalism 
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first needs its general philosophical ground for the specific justification of the lawyer’s 
moral paternalistic action. 
Luban’s analysis and diagnosis of the problem of incompatibility between the 
philosophy of the liberal society and paternalism are plausible. Citing Ronald 
Dworkin’s liberalism, he explains liberal society’s inevitable difference from 
paternalism: the theory of relativism that, based on individual rationality, “political 
decisions must be independent of any particular conception of the good life”
 195 versus 
the theory of interruption that assumes a certain idea’s superiority. To solve this 
theoretical dissonance, he suggests modifying the liberal society’s presuppositions. 
One suggestion is to reduce the belief in “the concept of rationality” in a liberal 
society, and the other is to “hold” paternalism “in check” with “side-constraints”
196  
Autonomy can be still used to decide the means for the moderate end through 
the “rationality,” “prudence,” and “practical reason for deliberation.”
197 And even in a 
liberal society in which the decision makers are theoretically “fully rational 
individuals,” “paternalistic social insurance policies” are accepted “autonomously” for 
fear of having unexpected harm of “health, property, and rights.”
198 As for the “side-
constraints,” Luban tries to focus on Thompson’s limitation of paternalism against the 
need of rights protection.
199 Thompson presents three strict conditions for performing 
paternalism. Thompson’s conditions are, first, “impaired decision making” meaning 
“being ignorant of a crucial fact about the situation in which he acts;” second, “limited 
restriction of liberty,” meaning that “the intervention is temporary and reversible;” and 
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third, “preventing a serious and irreversible harm,” meaning that “the harm is one that 
the person wishes to avoid more than he wishes to do.”
200  
However urgent the excuses that paternalism has, the paternalistic behavior has 
to restrict individual liberty, sometimes seriously, and moreover, it is very hard to 
define “a person’s own good” because the notion is subjective and relativistic. In other 
words, weighing the benefits from paternalistic interruption and disadvantages from 
infringed liberty is not an easy process, morally and legally. Thus, it is safer to adopt a 
strictly permitted paternalism than to let the individual liberty be restricted under 
ambiguously justified conditions. However, Thompson’s conditions are too limited to 
activate paternalism through the full respect for autonomy. They can block all 
paternalistic laws, for example, for the public good, interest, or safety. At the same 
time, they contain a logical contradiction. Under liberal principles, autonomy comes 
from rationality. As Luban points out, Thompson’s first condition means the state of 
absence of autonomy within the framework of this rationalism, as well.
201 The 
problem is that because the perfectly rational person is presupposed as “the measure of 
all things” in a liberal society,
202 a person with irrationality may not be regarded as 
autonomous, so that she can be paternalistically interrupted in her decision making 
process. That is to say, Thompson’s first requirement of “impaired decision making” 
may produce very risky results of less-protective autonomy, which are the opposite of 
its original purpose. 
From the practical point of view, we may have more cases in which less strict 
conditions are applied in the professional areas. Even though the client’s or the 
patient’s decision making capabilities are good enough not to permit the lawyer’s or 
doctor’s paternalistic interventions, the professionals have to decide to interfere for the 
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purpose of better treatment or prevention of the third’s harm.
203 As long as we stick to 
liberal relativism, it is hard to justify the special needs of the professional’s 
paternalism. After all, paternalism within the liberalism context should have its 
limitation according to both ideas’ theoretical dissonance coming from liberalism’s 
nearly absolute respect for individual liberty or autonomy. Even though some 
paternalistic interventions can be permitted with the consent of the person or, like 
Mill’s theory, for fear of doing harm to other people.  
As for the scope of the lawyer’s behaviors of section 2.432, all categories of 
problematic paternalism cannot be satisfactorily justified using strict liberal ideas. 
Specifically, lawyers’ paternalistic behaviors in the adversary system, which is 
understood as one founded on liberalism, need special justification apart from 
liberalism. To prove its specialness, returning to the lawyer-client relationship can be 
useful, but we need not resort to Luban’s analysis of the justification of paternalism 
from the epistemological ground.
204 Clients who are usually rational or autonomous 
enough to pursue their own interests are different from other subjects who need the 
paternalistic interruption. This fact raises the necessity of different approach from the 
general theory of paternalism. I suggest that we should consider a different 
interpretation of autonomy in the adversary system in the liberal contexts. I will 
demonstrate that the paternalism in the adversary system can be compatible with 
liberal political ideal, and it does not harm the liberal ideal of autonomy. 
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2.4.3.5 Instant Summary 
The value of the adversary system allows us look at what it really means. The value of 
finding truth is susceptible to the substantial practice which may produce a strong 
side-effect by dexterous lawyers: hiding truth. Protecting legal rights and autonomy 
produce complicated moral problems when it comes to the liberal performance of the 
adversary system, even though autonomy is considered as the core target which cannot 
be given up. To solve all these questions, even in liberal contexts, some degrees of 
paternalistic intervention are needed. And theoretically, liberalism may have a 
harmonized conception of autonomy with paternalism. 
 
2.5 Adversary System and Liberal Democracy Theory 
The constitutional law scholar Martin Redish explicitly claims in his article that the 
adversary system should be considered only as a liberal institution where the liberal 
democracy theory stressing on self-interest prevails among various political 
conceptions.
205 He understands, basically, that the adversary system’s characteristic of 
the party-led process is connected with the individualistic aspect of liberal democracy. 
Taking the system’s special emphasis on individual autonomy into account, we cannot 
deny that the adversary system is simply a liberal institution. However, I think that it is 
open to non-liberal democracy theories at the same time because, first, we can find 
some logical inconsistencies in the liberal interpretation of the adversary system, and, 
second, the legal institution is potentially interwoven with diverse political theories 
within a democratic society where even minorities should be respected. In this section, 
I will probe into general liberal democracy theory and its connection to the adversary 
system theoretically and empirically, and criticize on Redish’s belief that there are 
exclusive ties between the liberal democracy theory and the adversary system. 
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2.5.1 Conceptual Aspect 
Liberal democracy is a type of democracy theory with which the idea of liberalism is 
combined. Basically, being harmonious with liberalism, which takes individual 
interests and rights seriously, democracy as a system of collective decision-making 
through the participation of all constituents equipped with equal rights can work most 
effectively. Some troubles occur in spite of these conceptual conjunctions, though.
 206 
American liberalism, as a rule, can be regarded as an inheritance of classical Lockean 
liberalism which purports to ensure the rights or liberties of the subject from the 
governmental intervention by proposing minimal government.
207 The specific 
components of liberalism for the union with democracy are as follows: first, “freedom 
of expression, of movement, of association, and so on, as individual rights subject to 
special legal or constitutional protection,” second, “an institutional separation of 
powers between executive, legislature and judiciary,” third, “the institution of the 
representative assembly,” fourth, “the principle of the limited state, and a separation 
between the public and private spheres,” fifth, “the epistemological premise that there 
is no final truth about what is good for society.”
208 In brief, liberal democracy means 
an autonomous decision-making system of a society that has a full set of liberal ideals. 
The adversary system, through which the litigants seek for wins and for their 
self-interest, apparently answers the above elements of liberal democracy, too. 
However, because of the possibilities of letting the participants become selfishness-
oriented, the most general disapproval of the adversary system is, at the same time, its 
own liberal democratic function: the pursuit of self-interest. Even though the political 
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meaning of self-interest is different from selfishness, in practice, we risk the 
possibility that the former is commonly understood as the latter. In this section, I will 
find what the essence of self-interest and individualism is, first. 
In constitutional law, theories about constitutional rights should be 
individualistic because they should safeguard individual rights from governmental 
encroachment.
209 Known as a “rational, free, and autonomous” agent, an individual 
has the right to be protected for her preference and freedom.
210 This individualistic 
idea presents the adversarial posture between individual rights and governmental or 
community interests.
211 The trouble happens at this point; because the government has 
to fulfill a common goal. To solve this problem, the individual interest and the social 
goal should be compromised and balanced.
212 The adversary system is one of example 
of this kind of problem-solving mechanism. 
The very reason why we call the adversary system individualistic is that the 
individuals who are mostly interested in the case and “takes advantage of their self-
interest” govern and take responsibility during the entire dispute resolution process.
213 
A social problem is supposed to be solved through the parties’ self-interested seeking 
process without thinking about others’.
214 Arguing selfishly, however, the parties have 
a tendency to distort the facts because of the allurement of “extreme individualism.”
215 
Furthermore, individualism establishes an independent individual agent as separate 
from the community where individuals live their lives.
216 This conception is reinforced 
by individualistic “moral relativism” and “value skepticism.”
217 But we cannot think 
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the life of an individual without her “interpersonal attachments.”
218 As a social or 
cultural being, an individual cannot ignore others around her when making her life-
affecting decisions.
219 To sustain this relationship with others, it is a matter of course 
that one may not always stick to her own self-interest. 
Responding to these criticisms about individualism and the adversary system, 
Redish argues in two ways: that the adversary system can work altruistically,
220 and 
that the altruistic behavior or the pursuit of common good is not necessarily the 
opposite of seeking of self-interest. However, his counterarguments are truly 
problematic, as well. First, he refers to the matching of altruism with the adversary 
system. If individuals work together, forming a team for a common interest against the 
opponent, they can, he argues, create true “communitarianism.”
221 He thinks that 
examples like “right-to-life advocates” and “the 1960’s Freedom Riders” demonstrate 
the possibility of combination because the constituents of a group struggle for their 
common “altruistic” value with an “adversarial mode” of the conflict.
222 However, the 
relationship among the members of a group is not a concern of our discussion about 
individualism. We cannot say that the adversary system does not serve individualism 
because individuals can make a group for a common purpose; not being an enemy 
from the first, they are just collective individuals. Besides, an altruistic-looking 
purpose cannot verify the association between altruism and the adversary system. The 
self-interest which the adversary system serves is not the result of what an individual 
achieves in a conflict, but the result of the conflict itself: the triumphant party is, by 
definition, self-interested. Regardless of an individual’s purpose of litigation or other 
decision-making processes, she is considered as obtaining her self-interest if she 
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defeats her opponent and is able to accomplish what she intended. In seeking triumph, 
in some cases the adversaries try to hide or distort the truth to make it work for their 
advantages. Furthermore, the lawyers who give legal advice to their clients may not 
have an altruistic mind even though they are the members of the same group that is 
seeking an altruistic goal. They usually work with such groups to earn the money, 
which is—typical self-interest—pursuing behavior for a lawyer. 
Second, Redish contends that altruism and the common good can be created 
from self-interest. These conceptions are not always different each other.
223 The 
reason why he presents it is that he wants to prove that the behaviors seeking for 
individual interest are the best choice of people in a society. It is true that the concepts 
of “common good” and “altruism” seem to be a little bit different. The former is the 
goal of communitarianism as a citizen’s concern, while the latter means the attitude of 
helping others rather than oneself.
224 However, those concepts are usually considered 
synonyms that mean being against the narrow self-interest. Redish tries to prove the 
fact that free and fair decision-making based on individual interests through free and 
open debate is the best way of conflict-solving process by disproving the impossibility 
of communitarian goal of enhancing common good in a society. He establishes six 
hypothetical options describing various sorts of perspectives about the interests of a 
society.
225 And he justifies the open communication of information using the option of 
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“prisoner’s dilemma.”
226 After insisting that “the sum total of each individual’s private 
self-interest” is not a perspective which liberal democratic adversary system takes,
227 
he takes an extremely negative view about the possibility of the communitarian goal, 
which he defines as: “the determination of what policy choices would maximize the 
welfare of the collective as a whole, rather than the welfare of particular individuals; 
the particular policy choices are to be determined through an assessment of a 
consensus of the community, following a process of open deliberation.”
228 His point is 
that “on a purely practical level,” a massive and diverse society like America cannot 
constitute the “consensus that amounts to a monolithic community interest.” 
229 
However, his understanding of communitarian society as evidenced by his description 
of it as “a monolithic community interest” is wrong. The communitarian society does 
not seek after a monolithic community interest. A society chasing “monolithic” 
community interest is already a totalitarian one, like communism, which is located far 
away from democracy.
230 Furthermore, with this false presupposition, he creates a 
biased analysis of a communitarian society in the name of a deconstructed version of 
the ideal, which he describes as: “if collective maximization of welfare is impossible 
because of inherent conflicts in individual interpretations and/or values, the choice of 
one set of those interests by those in power, combined with the simultaneous 
imposition of the label of common good on that set of interests.”
231 Ignoring the 
                                                                                                                                             
interest; (6) if collective maximization of welfare is impossible because of inherent conflicts in 
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process of social deliberation, mediation, and compromise for the value of a society, 
which is called the political process in a democratic society, his idea simply reveals his 
fear and abstention from “common” things. Communitarianism is one of the various 
democracy theories. Communitarians understand that a community should be 
constructed “free individuals” and from “joint values and collaborate discourse.”
232 It 
is not be a theory of communist society.  
In sum, the actual means of connection between liberal democracy and the 
adversary system is not solid enough to overcome the whole attack on the narrowness 
of self-interest in the conceptual area. Although Redish tries to protect his view of “the 
liberal democratic adversary system” resisting the blame of its pursuit of narrow self-
interest, we can observe many flaws of his logic. This means that there can be other 
possibilities: that what the adversary system seeks may not be individualistic self-
interest, or that liberal democracy is not the only political background of the adversary 
system. In the same breath, Redish’s examples about altruism and communitarianism 
themselves work as contrary evidence for a tie between the adversary system and non-
liberal democracy theory. 
 
2.5.2 Empirical Aspect 
The adversary system’s feature of self-interest orientation turns more conspicuous 
when contrasting it with its comparative institutional equivalent, the inquisitorial 
system. It is well known that most Civil Law countries, which also take democracy for 
their political ideology and institution, adopt this inquisitorial system. Even though 
both systems are appreciated as effective and just, they have their own “built-in 
biases,” too.
233 What I want to do with both systems in this section is to throw their 
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differences into comparison and to find the best way of practicing the adversary 
system according to its theoretical ground. If liberal democracy theory in which self-
interest is respected as the foremost value provides the adversary system with its 
leading justification, then I think that some moral restrictions are needed, and that 
contrary to common belief, this is needed in order to best fulfill the ideal of self-
interest. 
The paramount difference of the inquisitorial system from the adversary 
system is the leader of the decision making process. Controlling the whole procedure, 
the judge is, in person, in charge of collecting all evidence which is required to make a 
decision.
234 As noted earlier, the adversary system, on the contrary, gives the party that 
status instead of the judge. Professionally trained judges, in the inquisitorial system, 
start the hearing and call witnesses at their discretion. Some types of evidence which 
cannot be accepted in the adversary system, such as “improperly obtained” evidence,  
“hearsay,” and “tendency and coincidence evidence,” are sometimes not excluded by 
the inquisitorial judge if she sees them as necessary.
235 These results come from two 
beliefs in the context of inquisitorial system: trust in the professionalism of the judge 
and the supreme task of finding truth in a dispute. Usually, judges of Civil Law 
countries are selected and trained from the beginning of their professional career 
without practicing law as a lawyer. People believe, even though it is very rebuttable, 
that judges have broader and deeper legal minds and that they are well equipped with 
knowledge. Another belief is about the value of truth. People believe that real truth has 
to be revealed and it is better for individual participants. With the help of all possible 
evidence, the judge has to find the truth in spite of the sacrifice of the individual 
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parties’ self-interest. There are alleged defects of this belief in judges, of course. If 
even “well-trained” judge makes a “prejudgment” in a sloppy fashion by not focusing 
opposing evidence, the result would be heavily biased.
236 This is a flaw of the 
inquisitorial system, but there are some preventive and compensatory processes that 
mitigate against it: the participant’s chance of active appeal and appellate review of 
fact finding.
237 In short, all these features of the inquisitorial system are brought about 
and justified by its inherent “communitarian” nature.
238 However, we cannot confine 
the inquisitorial system within only the communitarian idea because more diverse 
procedural protections of the parties are needed for its best and fairest results, and 
these originate from the idea of individualism. 
When it comes to the adversary system, its general difference from the 
inquisitorial system is its many individualistic institutions for the parties’ autonomy. 
Above all, the most concrete difference, I think, is the elaborateness of the rules of 
evidence. They are the necessarily required minimum order in the free battleground of 
litigation. As I explicated earlier, these rules became an indispensible element of the 
adversary system throughout the whole history. The problem is that there always 
exists the “potential for distortion of evidence” through immoral but legal methods.
239 
The positivist justification for these behaviors, then, ignores the presupposition of the 
system. The participants’ maximized autonomy is fulfilled successfully on condition 
that each party respect and keep the rules and referees. The attempt to disrupt the rules 
of evidence should not be tolerable in the adversary system more than in the 
inquisitorial system for this reason. Furthermore, the lawyers in the adversary system 
who usually do the amoral behaviors in the name of the client’s best interests also 
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have their professional obligation for ethics as the public officers,
240 like the lawyers 
in the inquisitorial system who have strong independence from the clients.
241 Lawyers, 
even in a liberal society, cannot be just perfectly private professionals because of the 
social meaning of their job. 
 
2.5.3 Instant Summary 
Redish’s idea seems to me inflexible enough to exclude other theories that are not 
individualistic libertarian theories even though he wants to have a “liberal” theory. I 
regard his idea as libertarian because of its excessive emphasis on self-interest. The 
problem is that he is so strictly devoted to the “liberal adversary theory,” that his 
perspective cannot see any of the liberalness of diversely-named other theories. 
Communitarian, republican, and even socialist theories, with the exception of some 
extremists theories like communism, totalitarianism and some kinds of libertarianism, 
may be connected with some liberal elements. I think that the adversary system, also, 
can and should be open in its theoretical foundation to these other ideas. 
 
2.6 Chapter Summary 
So far, I have studied the characteristics of the adversary system itself within the 
juridical framework. The history of the system reveals that it came from the long 
tradition of Common Law and the jury system has a close connection with it. The 
values justifying the adversary system are finding truth, and individual rights and 
autonomy. We can notice that each one has logical and empirical side-effects that are 
different from our usual beliefs about them. To avoid possible serious injustice born 
from these effects, some paternalistic interventions are needed. Paternalism, properly 
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applied to reality, does not afflict individual autonomy even in a liberal society. This 
contention is strongly supported by a discussion in field of freedom of speech. The 
next chapter will address this task. 
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CHAPTER 3 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ITS VALUES 
 
3.1 Introduction –Similarity with the Adversary System 
As I have emphasized, the target of this thesis is to make clear the political meaning—
more specifically, the democratic meaning—of the American adversary system: 
whether there is any possibility that this legal system could be interpreted as a “public 
interest-oriented” institution, not lingering at the limitation of narrow individual 
interest, but rather placing public interest at its center. To complete this task, I need to 
know the constitutional meaning of the adversary system because a country’s legal 
system, within the boundaries set by its constitution, is closely related to political 
reality. Thus, the adversarial legal system, by which many constitutional rights are 
protected, must be deeply connected with not only constitutional but also political 
theories.
242 However, the U.S. constitution does not say anything about the adversary 
system directly.
243 It has totally been built up by the Common Law tradition.  
Scholars like Monroe Freedman, nevertheless, contend that the Framers 
“constitutionalized” the adversary system and the Supreme Court placed its 
imprimatur upon this constitutionalized system with coherent decisions.
244 In the 
constitutional area, the adversary system arguably appears in the protection of the 
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments in a criminal case, in the Seventh Amendment, 
as a constitutional process for the legal adjudication, and in jury trial right of Article 
III, section 2,. In the political field, the adversary system reflects the theory of 
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democracy. Because the community’s decision-making and conflict-resolution among 
the constituents are two of the main jobs of democracy in the political field, the 
principle of democracy in a democratic society has its own peculiar influence on the 
adversary system. For example, many European and Asian countries, where different 
democratic theories are finding inspiration in the American theory of democracy, as 
noted in the previous chapter, have inquisitorial systems, in which judicial procedure, 
generated by the Civil Law tradition, is usually led by the independent judge who also 
makes the decision. Of course, among those countries, the inquisitorial system also 
varies according to their legal and political cultures. 
In chapter 2, I elucidated the characteristics of the adversary system within the 
juridical framework and the relationship between the system and the liberal democracy. 
Here, I need to lay the groundwork for its constitutional meaning to get an ultimate 
target of this thesis: defining the exact political—democratic—meaning of the 
adversary system. My methodology for this study is indirect reasoning. I will delve 
into a constitutional right, freedom of speech, which shares a similar target value with 
the adversary system, and catch its political meaning in relation to liberal democracy 
theory, and then, compare it with the adversary system. The reason why I need to 
make a detour to grasp the political meaning of the adversary system through 
reasoning by analogy with freedom of speech is mainly that the American Constitution 
is silent about the adversary system even though the system works as an institutional 
ground of protecting many constitutional rights.  
Since it is a Common Law institution, it is generally difficult to review the 
adversary system from a constitutional point of view. We can, however, glean a great 
deal about the political meaning of element targets of the adversary system by looking 
at those of freedom of speech, which are very similar to those of the adversary system, 
because the latter acts in the field of the constitutional law. In other words, I can  
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obtain objective results from the freedom of speech study because a constitutional 
right works within the systematic framework of the Constitution and according to a 
society’s political reality and history.
245 
Freedom of speech is a constitutional right. It is the foundation of people’s 
political life. Both the adversary system and freedom of speech have a similar value to 
realize in the constitutional and the political arenas even though they are different in 
that the former is a legal institution and the latter is a constitutional right. I have 
named that common value “autonomous truth-finding.” Both of them have not only 
the same values—truth-finding and protecting individual autonomy— to fulfill but 
also justify themselves using similar logical structures. When it comes to the adversary 
system, proponents claim that it is the best way to find truth and protect individual 
right and autonomy, just as freedom of speech is. In particular, I want to focus on 
autonomy, which is supported as a targeted value from both parties in a strong fashion. 
In the previous chapter, we found the fact that the justification of the lawyer’s 
paternalistic behavior toward the client in the adversary context highly depend on 
what autonomy means. And liberal relativism is not enough for the necessity of 
professional intervention in practice, so we need another interpretation of autonomy 
for which the adversary system works. By referring to the achievement of the idea of 
autonomy in different constitutional areas, we can take notice of the possibility of 
autonomy’s association with a political theory other than liberalism. If this proposition 
proves to be true, then the adversary system itself can be interpreted from different 
political perspectives. Autonomy in freedom of speech is the best subject to compare 
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autonomy in the adversary system against because, in reality, it works with diverse 
political thoughts. 
The details that I will cover in this chapter are the history and the value of 
freedom of speech. From the history of the First Amendment, I can find the mindset of 
the American Constitution and politics about the free speech right in the colonial era 
and the founding periods, when I think that we can get a persuasive analogical hint to 
the adversary theory because it would be possible for Americans to have 
constitutionally reassessed the entirety of their legal institutions with the enhanced 
spirit of human rights at that time. The values of free speech are interpreted from 
various perspectives, too. I personally place them into three categories in this thesis: 
the utilitarian, the right-based, and the democratic views. Analyzing these three 
perspectives, I will review critically what the liberal interpretations of freedom of 
speech, including Redish’s, are and elucidate what the problems of their arguments are 
from their own liberal perspective.  
This analysis requires special study about free speech: the value it pursues. The 
liberal interpreters of freedom of speech emphasize the individual right to express 
oneself and individual autonomy. For example, Redish captures “the individual self-
realization” as the only absolute value which freedom of speech seeks out.
246 However, 
collectivist theories may interpret free speech as a necessary ground for deliberation, a 
democratic decision making process. Everyone has an equal opportunity to express a 
grievance and to lead a discussion in a judicial or non-judicial way when the parties’ 
interests collide with each other, which means the manifestation of people’s free 
speech right at the same time. With these methodological frameworks, the discussions 
on freedom of speech within the constitutional structure will suggest a proper model to 
                                                 
246 Redish, The Value of Free Speech,  130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593-4 (1982).  
71 
track down the target of this chapter, the constitutional and political meaning of the 
adversary theory. 
 
3.2 Relationship between the Adversary Theory and Freedom of Speech 
Actually, it is Redish’s contention that the adversary system has a close theoretical 
connection with freedom of speech that provided the starting point for this chapter. 
Redish, who views the adversary theory as a liberal democratic idea, claims that 
freedom of speech is a fundamental individual right embodied in the Constitution, to 
and be protected by the liberal democratic adversary theory. Thus, freedom of speech 
and the adversary system should be tied tenaciously to each other.
247 In addition, 
Freedman, another libertarian scholar, insists that the role of the adversary system 
should be recognized within the very libertarian American Constitution by referring to 
Geoffrey Hazard’s expression: “the adversary system stands with freedom of speech 
and the right of assembly as a pillar of our constitutional system.”
248  
Basically, I agree with the fact that both of them lie in close relation to what 
Redish and Hazard believe. However, first of all, I do not agree with their argument 
that the adversary system and freedom of speech are closely connected because these 
scholars’ descriptions of that connection seem ambiguous. Furthermore, I do not think 
that the adversary system protects freedom of speech or that the latter facilitates the 
former directly, and I do not think that both of them are grounded in the liberal 
democratic theory. I do think that both of them have similar functions and values to 
fulfill within the constitutional and political area and “reflect” each other. The 
adversary system is a legal institution grounded on and interacting with the American 
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constitutional tradition and American democracy. It serves the purpose of finding truth 
and protecting autonomy. Freedom of speech is also a constitutional right grounded on 
and interacting with the American Constitution and American democracy. It also 
functions for the purpose of finding truth and protecting autonomy. They are 
“similar.” In addition, they should “reflect” each other because, as I argued in chapter 
1, this constitutional institution and right are highly intertwined with the same political 
democracy theory within the constitutional boundary. To accomplish the target of my 
thesis, I think these are worthwhile enough reasons for comparing these two 
institutions. Therefore, there is no need to exaggerate or overestimate their “similarity 
and reflection” as a close connection or relationship. 
The reason why I think of their relationship like this is as follows. Most of all, 
there is no direct description of or allusion to their affinity in the Constitution. Instead, 
the adversary system “comprises” the following constitutional rights: “personal 
autonomy,” “the assistance of counsel,” “equal protection by the laws,” “trial by jury,” 
“the right to call and to confront witnesses,” and “the right to require the government 
to prove guilt beyond the reasonable doubt and without the use of compelled self-
incrimination” which are included in the “broader and fundamental concept” of due 
process of law.
249 As I argued in the previous chapter, the history of the adversary 
system shows that the modern form of the system has developed alongside the jury 
system. The jury trial inherently demands the adversarial model for truth-finding. The 
most forceful argument for the adversary system is “fundamental fairness” under the 
guarantee of procedural due process.
250 In particular, the right to have a jury trial in 
serious criminal cases certifies the protection under the due process clause.
251  
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Secondly, Redish’s development of the argument about that relationship is not 
coherent. He starts his contention by, defining the relationship between the adversary 
system and freedom of speech like this: “…free speech and due process, which 
together provide the constitutional grounding for the adversary system.”
252 And this 
relationship works like this: “the values of adversary theory are embodied in two key 
constitutional guarantees of individual rights: the First Amendment’s guarantee of 
freedom of expression and the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of procedural due 
process.” Then, he replaces those relationships of “grounding” and “embodying” with 
a relationship of “reflecting:” “as a matter of constitutional theory, the adversary 
system reflects the intersection between…free expression and…procedural due 
process, both of which flow logically from the premise of liberal democratic adversary 
theory.”
253 
In fact, his way of finding the democratic and constitutional meaning of the 
adversary system is not so different from what I am doing in this thesis. He tries to 
connect the adversary system with the American liberal democratic theory and liberal 
constitutional theory of the First Amendment in his article. And he makes a 
convincing argument that first, in the philosophical concept, the adversary system 
coincides with the liberal political idea of “epistemological humility” which comes 
from possessive individualism and philosophical pluralism.
254 Because the notion of 
common good essentially starts from the conception of self-interest, the 
communitarian argument of democracy is wrong.
255 Next, in the empirical concept, 
self-interest promotion has been a “fundamental element” of the American politics 
through its entire history.
256 And, in the constitutional concept, freedom of speech 
                                                 
252Redish, supra note 5, at 361.  
253 Id., at 394. 
254 Id., at 367-71. 
255 Id., at 372-8. 
256 Id., at 379.  
74 
serves the liberal democratic ideal of self-realization. Then, he concludes that liberal 
democratic adversary theory “complements” the presupposition of freedom of speech 
because of the close connection between the two.
257 However, his logic seems circular. 
Having the same political and constitutional relationship with liberal democracy, 
freedom of speech presumes a logical foundation in the adversary system, and vice 
versa.  
Personally, this fault seems to result from his strong intention to found the 
adversary system on the liberal democratic theory. To emphasize the democratic 
liberalness of the adversary system, the constitutional reasoning associating it with 
liberalism should be added. Defining freedom of speech as a liberal constitutional 
right, he manipulates the close connection between the adversary theory and freedom 
of speech for this purpose. His establishment of this connection can easily justify his 
liberal perspective on commercial speech in the freedom of speech arena and the 
lawyer’s (over)zealous advocacy or amoral behavior in the adversary system arena.
258 
In the following sections, I will seek to disprove his project by analyzing what 
freedom of speech really means with respect to democracy. 
 
3.3 History of the First Amendment 
Prior study of the history of the adversary system shows that its modern version was 
formed in the eighteenth century. Now, we can see how people could have a 
conception that they have the right to express themselves freely from the history of 
freedom of speech, particularly from the history of the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. But the entire history of freedom of speech from the modern era 
can lead us to understand the meaning of the constitution accurately. Compared with 
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the history of the adversary system, the history of freedom of speech does not as far 
back because the free speech right was created with the spread of civil rights 
protections in the twentieth century. 
The conception that speech has to be protected started with Blackstone’s 
“Commentaries” in 1765 which contained the prevention of previous restraint and 
freedom of the press.
259 Even though the colonial government gave the people the 
freedom to criticize it, laws governing speech still did not promote a wide range of 
liberty. Substantial speech protection as a fundamental right was discussed by the 
Framers of the United States Constitution, and promulgated in the Bill of Rights in 
1791. Therefore, we can conclude that the history of freedom of speech in America 
belongs to the history of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution in the 
eighteenth century when the modernized adversary system appeared. 
As nation-states developed, the government, staffed by God’s holy agents, was 
considered religiously authoritative because of the influence of the Church. 
Antagonism against the government was regarded as a kind of blasphemy.
260 As time 
went by, this tendency had been shrewdly used by the secular governments for their 
political prosperity.
261 Governments counted criticism of themselves as treason, and it 
had been a felony from the medieval era in common law tradition.
262 Specifically, the 
prosecution of constructive treason, seditious libel and prior restraint had been the 
main instruments to repress dissents.
263  
In medieval England, treason was regulated by the Statute of Treasons, first 
enacted in 1352 and clearly constricted by Edward III including “compassing or 
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imaging the death of our lord the king.”
264 Because this provision required an overt act 
for the charge of treason, speech alone was not subject to prosecution, which had the 
effect of protecting speech.
265 However, other kingdoms started to criminalize speech 
disapproving the government in the name of the “constructive treason” until the 
framing period of the United States Constitution.
266 
Since Star Chamber launched the crime of seditious libel in a decision of 1606, 
seditious libel was another item commonly used to suppress dissidence in England.
267 
It meant “the intentional publication, without lawful excuse of justification, of written 
blame of any public man, or of the law, or of any institution established by law.”
268 A 
seditious tendency, without more, was interpreted as being sufficient to satisfy 
“Intentional tendency in real cases.”
269 The reason for creating seditious libel was to 
make up a jurisdictional deficiency. Star Chamber, which was the Crown’s favorite 
legal guard, did not have jurisdiction to decide constructive treason cases.
270 
The third means to repress freedom of speech in English history was prior 
restraint. This was a prevalent tactic in English law and applied to all written 
publications, so every writer had to get a license from the government before 
publishing.
271 It was a powerful and die-hard convention; even though the English 
government abolished licensing for prior restraint, the remaining habits became the 
most decisive factor to make American people awake and take on the Bill of Rights in 
1791.
272 
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The enactment of the First Amendment was a result of the political struggle in 
the American continent. Even though prior restraint and seditious libel withered in 
England, and criminal litigation for seditious libel ended with the John Peter Zenger 
trial in colonial New York, in 1735, the government still had a power to prosecute 
dissidents for seditious libel.
273 After the American Revolution, people could get 
formal protection from the new Constitution in which the federal government was 
believed to have only limited power to inflict the individual free speech right.
274 
However, many people and the press, formerly part of the resistances to the colonial 
government, were still paranoid about the risk of its speech regulation. They pushed 
the new government to promulgate a written safety net, the First Amendment.
275 
From these historical facts of the First Amendment, we can imagine the 
intrinsic nature of the right of free speech in America. Freedom of speech was the 
most substantial value for the American people to achieve their independence from 
England. People retained a fundamental disbelief of the government itself from the 
experience of the colonial era. To them, the government was likely to constrict their 
speech right with seditious libel prosecution, which was not forbidden to the new 
government. As James Madison explained, the framers wanted to integrate the spirit of 
the whole Constitution into the First Amendment.
276 
Finally, I point out the value of freedom of speech that people and the framers 
had in framing period. The freedom of speech the American people wanted to 
entertain was intended to make antagonistic speech to the government fully protected. 
The speech was mainly political. Their greatest concern was the independence of the 
country, so the dissent to the colonial government was of the gravest importance. In 
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other words, people and the framers did not confine their speech right to the matter of 
narrow self-interest or right although they thought much on individual liberty. Instead, 
the community’s, the state’s or the country’s interest was their urgent purpose. In 
addition, the free speech right was the thing acquired by the long political struggle, not 
endowed by God or natural law. People were not satisfied with the Constitution 
without a Bill of Rights which ensured the protection of free speech. This may be 
interpreted as having something to do with the non-liberal point that the law can create 
rights and determine the range of their protection. And this was the beginning of 
freedom of speech in the American context. 
 
3.4 Value of Free Speech  
Speech must be protected. However, all speech cannot be protected. There are some 
values which should be achieved by protecting speech. Speech corresponding to these 
values cannot be prohibited. Thomas Emerson, whose analysis on the value of free 
speech has been considered a basic model among the First Amendment scholars, 
proposed four leading values for which freedom of speech should work: “assuring 
individual self-fulfillment, advancing knowledge and discovering truth, providing for 
participation in decision-making by all members of society, and achieving a more 
adaptable and hence a more stable community.”
277 He thinks that each value is 
indispensible and “interdependent.”
278  
Redish assesses and shows the dynamics of other scholars’ interpretation about 
Emerson’s free speech values in his paper. On the one hand, Meiklejohn and Bork 
emphasized the political functions of the speech, apparently Emerson’s third and 
fourth item, so he insists that the government should stick to support the political 
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speech even though it gives up other speech to save “self-government value.”
279 On 
the other hand, there is an “individual development” group: Edwin Baker stresses on 
the individual liberty suggesting “the liberty model” of free speech value, and Thomas 
Scanlon gives priority to “autonomy.”
280 
Those theories can be generalized as liberal approaches in terms of giving 
precedence to individual interest of speech rather than the public interest regardless of 
the origins of their value when they conflict each other. It is possibly true that liberal 
free speech theories have been dominant almost over the entire history of the 
American Constitution so far. However, the American Constitution was founded on 
the circumstance of the competitive coexistence between liberalism and non-liberalism, 
which makes sense with the First Amendment theory as well. To demonstrate this, I 
will focus on the value of autonomy. By observing how it has been theoretically 
interpreted in a democracy, I can get a clue to interpret the whole right of freedom of 
speech. In particular, I will deal with the shift in Scanlon’s perspective on autonomy. 
His changed standard shows how much paternalism can be accepted in a liberal 
society. In sum, I will find the way to relieve the tension between autonomy and 
paternalism in terms of the democratic value of freedom of speech in this chapter. 
First of all, I will analyze what the liberal free speech theories say and criticize 
them from their own perspectives. For this purpose, I will use Emerson’s first and 
second items in this section. This is because these are free speech values for which 
there are parallel values in the adversary theory: truth-finding and individual right or 
autonomy. Other values of free speech pertaining to the political process arise 
primarily from the relationship between the individual and the government: a method 
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to check the government and to protect self-government.
281 Even though those are also 
liberal theories, I choose the former, more individualistic ones to compare the 
adversary theory’s target, especially in the matter of “individual self-realization” 
which is associated with Redish’s argument. Furthermore, the latter values can 
possibly be used for the collective decision making process in a democratic society. 
Public interest is more likely to be concerned with the citizen’s participation in the 
political process. The democracy theory can be fulfilled by public deliberation which 
needs people’s voluntary participation, autonomy and free speech. Thus, freedom of 
speech can be a precondition of the democracy theory, too.  
Representative differences between the liberal and the non-liberal views on 
freedom of speech, specifically, can be observed in several speech-related areas: 
campaign finance, commercial speech, hate speech, obscenity, and so forth. The 
liberal free speech theories, in which the individual right is emphasized, support less-
limited collection of campaign money, less-restricted commercial speech and 
advertisement, higher tolerance of hate speech and obscene expression. On the 
contrary, the non-liberal free speech theories, in which the public interest is considered 
strongly, take a relatively strict stance on the campaign finance or commercial speech 
for the equality of people’s participation in the political process with unbiased 
information regardless of their monetary situation, and regulate hate speech and 
obscenity actively for harming the solidarity of the community. 
 
3.4.1 Truth 
Just as the adversary system pursues truth as a paramount value, so does freedom of 
speech. At the same time, the adversary system and freedom of speech are thought of 
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as indispensible methods to reach the truth. The framework of their thinking is based 
on the liberal ideal that the goal of finding truth through them can be accomplished by 
allowing every possible individual speech or piece of information to take part in a 
field like the marketplace of ideas and to compete for the stage of the truth. With the 
same target of truth, the adversary system and freedom of speech work within this 
same framework. Actually, this framework itself is very important for the comparison 
between the adversary system and freedom of speech because they converge on this 
most prominent aspect of the functional activation process.  
Moreover, it is questionable whether freedom of speech can work effectively 
through the liberal framework. Finding truth by the liberal freedom of speech theory 
has to rely on the logic of the adversary system’s truth-finding function like Millian 
contention. As the incompleteness of the adversary system’s logic, which I 
demonstrated in the previous chapter suggests, freedom of speech’s logic is bound by 
the epistemological and empirical limitation of truth. Frederick Schauer appropriately 
points this out in his book.
282 I will reorganize his criticism according to the 
relationship between freedom of speech and the adversary system in this section. 
 
3.4.1.1 Liberalness 
Freedom of speech is an indispensable right to find the truth. Truth can be discovered 
best when people express themselves freely. This belief was embodied first in the 
Supreme Court’s principle of a “marketplace of ideas” which Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr. expressed in Abrams.
283 In this theory, the truth should survive market 
competition while error and falseness should not. Utilitarian philosopher John Stuart 
Mill’s individualism was a major influence on Justice Holmes, particularly with 
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respect to his idea of the laissez-faire economic market. Mill contends that all 
expressions including falsehood should be freely expressed because those expressions 
can be utilized to prove the truth’s truthfulness in the competition.
284 Mill’s utilitarian 
argument depends on the form of the adversary system. He makes an example of 
litigation where cross-examinations are performed as a demonstration of a truth 
competing process.
285 Furthermore, Chafee insists that the adversary system should be 
a basic method to inspect truth in a society by this truth argument of free speech.
286 As 
I criticized in the previous chapter, however, the adversarial competition for the truth 
can lead to an incorrect result if contenders abuse the rule by seeking after their own 
self-interest. In addition, even Civil Law countries which have adopted the 
inquisitorial system for their fundamental fact finding structure can determine truth 
well with the right of free speech. Therefore, Mill’s protection of free speech can 
confront the similar criticism when there exist some abusers in the competition. 
Mill’s idea is based on the belief that “the will of the people” is “the most 
numerous” or “the most active part” of them, that is, the majority, and “the tyranny of 
the majority” is considered as an evil of a society.
287 This leads to his individualistic 
argument that “individuality [is] one of the elements of well-being,” which Justice 
Holmes later took up.
288 Holmes’ idea, a successor of the Common Law, was based on 
liberal grounds with some exceptions. Like Mill’s theory, however, Holmes’ 
marketplace of ideas theory has some logical and empirical flaws.  First, the 
presumption that truth will always win the game over falsehood through a struggle is 
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unreasonable.
289 This idea highly depends on John Milton’s confidence on the priority 
of truth.
290 Harry Wellington provides the Holocaust as a persuasive example.
291 In the 
long run, truth may be discovered regardless of unfair attacks by fallacy, but truth 
usually tends to be enervated by distortion in the short run.
292 The second criticism 
points out a problem of the epistemological background of the marketplace of ideas. 
The metaphor of the marketplace of ideas presupposes individualism.
293 Stanley 
Ingber argues that the individualistic truth-competition theory does not satisfy even its 
own logical requirement of individual “moral relativism and value skepticism.”
294 
According to this theory, nobody is able to know what truth is even though one truth 
wins the game, unless there exist “objective truths.”
295 Consequently, the competition 
of truth boils down to people’s “labeling” a value as truth or falsehood.
296 Within the 
individualistic presumption, free speech’s purpose of truth-finding is incapacitated.
297 
Third, excessive trust in the function of the market causes unfair results. We have 
already experienced “market failure” in economics. The market does not always 
provide the participants with fair chances. One’s access to the media, which is the 
main public opinion-maker now, varies according to the participant’s wealth, social 
status, and power. Like governmental interventions into the market to ensure fair trade, 
we need a new judicial consideration about the marketplace of ideas.
298 
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3.4.1.2 Truth-finding in the Adversary System and Freedom of Speech 
The research on free speech’s purpose of finding truth shows considerable 
resemblance with the purpose of the adversary theory. That is because both of them 
share a similar framework within which to fulfill that purpose: positive ideal of truth-
finding through the liberal competition of speech, even to the point of conferring the 
opportunity to falsity. Methodologically, the truth-finding process is the most critical 
point to compare and combine the adversary system with freedom of speech. Both of 
them aim for the same goal, and work for it in the same way. I will focus on the 
function here, and I will save the framework for the next chapter. In the previous 
chapter, however, I indicated the logical flaws of the truth-finding ideal of the 
adversary system. Accordingly, that of freedom of speech should have the same 
logical defects: especially the Popperian metaphor’s realistic problem with the 
adversary theory and the marketplace of idea’s contradiction with its own philosophy 
of relativism. To prove this, we should start with the epistemological research about 
truth. 
Actually, the truth-finding function itself has an important epistemological 
meaning in any rational society. According to Schauer’s explanation, truth progresses 
knowledge, and freedom of speech works critically as a truth acquiring mechanism.
299 
In addition, without the support of further philosophical theories of truth such as 
“correspondence, coherence, or pragmatism, this graveness of truth cannot be 
recognized because we can believe in the existence of truth without believing in 
absolute certainty.
300 In fact, the truth-finding function is not incompatible with 
“skepticism” because some people may argue that if we can't be absolutely certain that 
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something is true, then truth has no meaning or usefulness at all.
301 However, truth is 
still a useful concept because we can at least have stronger arguments or reasons for 
believing some things are true.
302 While we may be skeptical about the possibility of 
absolutely certain knowledge, we are entitled to think that some things are more likely 
to be true than others. 
However, we need a substantial test of truth when we have to decide what truth 
is in a discussion. In essence, the liberal marketplace of ideas theory encourages 
people to discuss what truth is and how to get it through the adversary mode, which 
will work as a more significant framework in the next chapter, permitting even false 
ideas to join in the field of discussion. The theory presumes that more collected 
knowledge and information render circumstances more advantageous for finding truth 
through the unrestricted discussion.  It transforms the matter of truth to that of 
discussion. However, Schauer indicates that this presumption needs a “causal link” 
between open discussion and “increased knowledge.”
303 Because truth can be defined 
through the discussion, he names this belief a “consensus theory of truth” or “survival 
theory of truth.”
304 He criticizes the theory’s inherent indeterminacy on truth for the 
reason of its impossibility of having any “objective test” of truth.
305 I assume that the 
target of his criticism is particularly the liberal adversarial mode of discussion to find 
truth which Mill presented in his theory. And I agree with the Schauer’s idea that this 
liberal mode cannot provide any objective standard of truth-evaluation in accordance 
with the theory’s innate relativistic way of thinking.  
From the theoretical aspect, we are not able to determine that a statement is 
true without a specific criterion in a discussion. Only the participation itself does not 
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guarantee a rational answer to even all presumably rational participators.
306 At this 
very point, we should acknowledge the gravity of orientation of discussion for truth. 
Liberal theories cannot present a coherent result to discussion by virtue of its own 
tendency of individualistic relativism. I, personally, will suggest republican ideals for 
an alternative test of discussion in the following chapters. From the empirical aspect, a 
discussion without an evaluation test may as well take what the majority of discussion 
participants want as the truth. During this process, it is possible that social or political 
power, rather than an objective standard, work to determine truth. Schauer argues that 
Nazism and American slavery exemplify this tendency.
307 They are typical examples 
of the wrongfulness of subjectivism which distorts truth in the name of discussion 
result. 
Mill believed that truth is “self-evident” and triumphs over falsity through 
competition.
308 This is the inheritance from the philosophy of the Enlightenment that 
presupposes a rational human being as the subject of activity.
309 However, it was 
disproved by history and the “contemporary insight of psychology” which show that 
people are not always rational.
310 In a similar vein, Popper’s theory was made within a 
presupposition of a group of rational scientists, so it is wrong to apply it to society in 
general without any theoretical alteration.
311  
 
3.4.2 Self-realization, Autonomy, Individual Right, and Liberalism 
Self-realization is a contestable value for protecting freedom of speech. This is 
because it has a wide academic spectrum to explain, from Robert Bork’s view that 
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speech does not have any reason to be cared specially for self-fulfillment to Redish’s 
view that speech must be protected expansively for self-actualization, which he 
believes is the predominant value.
312 What I want to discuss in this section is whether 
Redish’s extraordinary assertion is right or not: “the constitutional guarantee of free 
speech ultimately serves only one true value, individual self-realization.”
313 If 
individual self-realization works as a supreme value for the protection of freedom of 
speech, the protected range of speech can be much wider than it is in other views. 
Thus, it becomes less persuasive to treat the traditionally less protected speeches such 
as commercial speech, defamation, obscenity different from the political speech which 
needs high protection.
314 This libertarian idea of free speech is deeply connected with 
his individualistic liberal perspective on the adversary theory, which permits even a 
lawyer’s overzealous representation, in the political field.  
At this point, I need to make clear the relationship between the conceptions of 
“self-fulfillment,” “individual interest,” “individual right,” and “autonomy.” Those 
appear frequently as the values which can be served by freedom of speech in the 
“individuality” area. Emerson presents self-fulfillment as one of four free speech 
values, and Redish places it as the supreme status over all other values. More 
particualarly, Redish defines “self-realization” as alleviation of the individual’s 
“power and ability” or domination of the individual’s “own destiny” by her own 
judgment, so this conception contains both the aspect of “individual decision-making” 
and “individual development.”
315 Individual interest and individual right are common 
values which all liberal theorists try to attain through free speech. Autonomy, which is 
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indispensable for democracy, can mean self-rule and decision-making. In sum, self-
fulfillment is the broadest conception in which the liberal free speech theory wants to 
make it all to protect individual right or interest, whereas autonomy means self-rule 
and independent decision-making process to protect individual right or interest. 
In the previous chapter, I discussed that the logical and moral defects of 
adversary theory’s purpose of maximizing individual interest and right. If Redish’s 
idea about the self-fulfillment value of free speech is proved not to be a competent 
argument, it may influence the liberal interpretation of the adversary theory by virtue 
of the close logical relationship between freedom of speech and the adversary theory. 
Aiming at this final comparison, I begin by analyzing what “self-fulfillment” as the 
value of freedom of speech in the philosophical context means. To inspect this liberal 
motto of freedom of speech, I will shed light on the liberal free speech theories 
themselves first. I classify them into three specific perspectives according to their 
purpose and function: utilitarian, right-based, democratic views. I borrowed this 
framework generally from D. F. B. Tucker’s study on liberalism of freedom of speech 
in which he analyzes it with the tools of “functionalist” and “deontological” liberal 
theories.
316 My methodology is different from Tucker’s in that, first, I think 
democratic perspective for freedom of speech has its own significance as an 
independent issue to talk and has different way of thinking like Redish’s within the 
same context, even though Tucker explains it for one of the functionalist liberal 
theories. Second, I try to narrow down the understanding of the free speech theories 
focusing on their representative qualities for fear of losing the purpose―criticizing 
Redish’s self-fulfillment theory―with too extensive discussions. Third, in the 
democratic perspective, I will try to find the overlapping factors of free speech value 
that liberal and republican political theories have in common after criticizing Redish’s 
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theory. This is because, as I mentioned before, the democratic perspective of free 
speech allows not only the liberal theorists to think the individual autonomy, but also 
the republican theorists to consider the democratic participatory process of 
deliberation. 
 
3.4.2.1 Utilitarian Perspective 
First of all, it is natural right theory that was criticized as “nonsense” when Bentham 
sketched out utilitarianism. He thought the English lawmaking process which 
depended upon traditional “idea of right” was unreasonable and unscientific, so 
insisted that this process should apply “the principle of utility” for just legislation.
317 
Mill, a successor of the utilitarian philosophy, whose theory gave foundation to the 
“marketplace of ideas” in American freedom of speech theory as I sketched above, 
also set up his theory of liberty on the utility basis even though he understood 
happiness qualitatively rather than quantitatively. Essentially, before Mill, the 
utilitarians could not be called liberals because they did not attempt to protect people’s 
right and liberty gravely, although they use the theoretical framework of utility which 
can be “a psychological feeling of well-being” or “desire.”
318 
At first, Bentham’s utilitarianism tried to correct the social maladies of the 
capitalism which supported the increasing economic and social disparities of the 
nineteenth century, by literally universalizing its motto, “the greatest happiness for the 
greatest numbers.” This idea was left in the freedom of speech field and made the 
government apply a pure balancing test in terms of maximizing the total amount of 
happiness and minimizing the gross weight of suffering for the most people. And it is 
true that the utilitarian balancing test is still the most frequently used method in the 
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Supreme Court’s decision-making process about constitutional rights. However, since 
the theory’s excessively formalistic generalization, unreasonable phenomenon started 
to happen with the technical balancing test. In other words, even though it was 
designed and worked for the possible equal status of the suppressed by the capitalistic 
social structure, consequently, Bentham’s utilitarianism made the situation worse by 
its own theoretical defect: an ignorance of people’s individuality and autonomy.  
This is why Mill’s utilitarianism took liberty seriously. He believed in the 
difference in quality of happiness, and that to protect the happiness of the whole 
society, society had to lay emphasis on individual rights. His focus of free speech 
theory was to protect the individual speech right and reduce the harm which should be 
evaded while exercising the right. Because he understood that individuals are beings 
not who must follow the predefined social values, but who try to find out “reasons” to 
provide “deference to social norms,” they should get an equal chance to express 
themselves and communicate with others.
319 According to Mill’s perspective, the 
increased liberty of speech can contribute a society’s happiness by giving individuals 
the maximized autonomy for self-development which can be extended to a society’s 
profit when accumulated.
320  
The limit of free speech is “harm” to others. Within Mill’s context, the liberty 
of speech can not be protected if it harms others. In other words, people can entertain 
their full autonomy to the extent that they do not do damage to others. The 
government can only legitimately interfere with speech which harms other people’s 
liberty significantly.
321 However, Mill does not give a specific definition of what 
constitutes harm in his On Liberty. Considering that conflicts and mutual damage 
among people of a community grows more and more as a society gets larger and more 
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complicated, we cannot easily make a distinction between how much harm we should 
stand from each other and how much injury we should prohibit. Utilitarian liberals like 
Mill, including his successor Justice Holmes in American law, believed that the 
marketplace of speech would solve this problem by itself during the process of 
pursuing the truth, so the government had better not interfere with people’s speech. 
From the macroscopic analysis which utilitarians use, they insist that governmental 
interference brings about worse effects from the point of “the long-term consequence” 
than the perfectly free speech policy.
322 But it is not difficult to find some 
unreasonable results that happen empirically according to this kind of belief as I 
discussed above. Even theoretically, this argument has a flaw: the condition of “long-
term” has a problem because nobody can insist that she spent enough time performing 
an experiment to make the principle a substantially long-term one.
323  
This theoretical imperfection of utilitarian liberal free speech means that 
deciding a specific speech causes harm to others is very difficult because it is hard to 
define and measure “the harm” itself. It, logically, lets courts tend to make the 
speaker-protective decisions based on this reasoning, which seems at least to be better 
than a policy of laissez-faire in the marketplace of ideas. In reality, however, 
balancing is still the most prevalent framework to solve the conflicts of rights or 
interests in the American courts whereas sheer balancing and the absolute protection 
of speech in terms of the contents of speech are abstained from.
324 Using this 
framework, however, the Supreme Court still has a vestige of “preferred position” of 
free speech which stemmed from Justice Stone’s footnote 4 of United States v. 
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Carolene Products Co.
325 This position gives a special deference to freedom of speech 
because it deeply interacts with the democratic process while freedom of economic 
activity is only an outcome of the political process.
326 Although Justice Frankfurter 
successfully argued against the terminology of the “preferred position of free 
speech,”
327 the Court has continued to use the presumption of reinforced protection on 
freedom of speech. As to the absolute protection, I will study the right-based 
perspectives on freedom of speech specifically in the next section. 
In brief, the utilitarian perspective on free speech takes individual interests 
seriously from the support of the marketplace of ideas theory. Owing to its 
philosophical foundation, the free pursuit of individual interests should be fulfilled for 
the society’s maximization of happiness which is composed of individual happiness. 
As one of the liberal theories, it focuses naturally on individuality rather than on 
society.
328 The conception of happiness in this context is not a quantitatively 
calculated version of happiness like Bentham’s, but a qualitatively estimated version 
of happiness like Mill’s. The utilitarian perspective believes not only that truth can be 
found within the competition of free individual speeches but also that the individual’s 
happiness can be accomplished by the protection of free speech. Individual freedom of 
speech is fully permitted to the extent that it does not do harm to others. Even though 
the impossibility or difficulty of calculation of interest or harm is presented against 
this argument, to solve the problem of conflict between freedom and harm, the 
speaker’s benefit and the listener’s harm from a speech or the speaker’s benefit from 
                                                 
325 304 U.S. 144 (1938). This case did not say the special protection of freedom of speech directly, but 
gave a suggestive remark about it firstly: “there may be narrower scope of operation of the presumption 
of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the 
constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments,…” The term “preferred position” was used in 
many cases including Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). “Freedom of press, freedom of 
speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position.” ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 260, at 
256-8. 
326 Id., at 257. 
327 See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77(1949), ROTUNDA & NOWAK, id. 
328 SCHAUER, supra not 282, at 61.  
93 
speech and the governmental interest of suppressing the speech should be measured 
and balanced. 
 
3.4.2.2 Right-based Perspective 
So far, I have covered the free speech theory from the consequential utilitarian 
perspective that freedom of speech is an instrument for finding truth, and enhancing 
social utility. On the contrary, there exist theories which free speech should be 
protected because it is a fundamental constitutional or natural right. The most 
representative theory which has influenced the American legal system is Locke’s 
liberal individualism. According to Locke’s social contract theory, human beings in 
the state of nature freely chose to live within a civil society building a government, so 
they have a right to deconstruct the government if it does not work as they wish as 
well. People have the natural rights of life, liberty and property which should be 
protected through the government.  
Individuals in the Lockean conception are “autonomous” enough to have 
conflict with the government which has to interfere with the fulfillment of individual’s 
rights.
329 Actually, the conception of autonomy appears in source as early as the life of 
Socrates. He understood the fact that the state had a “right” of punishment, and he had 
the “sovereignty” or “autonomy” to leave and deny the punishment.
330 Afterwards, 
Kant developed this conception of individual autonomy based on Socrates’.
331 For 
Lockeans, with the conception of rational individuals, the “collective judgment” which 
limits the individual right is considered basically improper if it could not have gotten 
consent from that collection of individuals.
332 Accordingly, the standard of restricting 
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rights is this: the very institutional activities which can “conceivably” be regarded as 
one’s value and which protect individual rights are acceptable.
333 They understand a 
political society as an institution for the “orderly exchanges” between individuals and 
for the “protection of property.”
334 This conception, of course, comes from their 
property-oriented mind. Even though we have few pure Lockean theorists now, it is 
hard to deny that this theory provided Western society with an embryonic modern 
liberal individualism. 
Relating to the conception of the individual, generally, the individual’s “value 
preferences” and freedom of action are the central interest in the right-based 
theories.
335 Within this context, all “free, rational, and autonomous” individual’s rights 
should be protected by the government basically, so it cannot quash all specific 
speeches.
336 Instead, the government has to find another reason from the outside of the 
free speech right to limit the speech: the speech’s “distinctive impact on a particular 
physical or social environment.”
337 This idea has been embodied in the principle of 
“content-neutral” and “the time, place, and manner” regulation in the Supreme Court 
decisions.
338  
Lockean liberalism, which presumes the rationality of all human beings, has 
been strongly criticized for the reason that it focuses only on wealth and property 
protection, which may cause a phenomenon wherein even the free speech right is 
understood as a materialized form of property and leading to a theory of severe 
selfishness.
339 The Lockean liberal’s slanted tendency to the economic property blocks 
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people’s communication because of excessive competition, which makes the 
distribution of established wealth in the economic or political market worse by the 
lack of participation. While this theory insists on the complete protection of speech as 
a natural right of the autonomous individual, paradoxically, it disables, in reality, 
communication because of inequality.  
To overcome these problems, John Rawls’ liberalism, which denies an innately 
“autonomous” individual, concentrates on “justice” rather than “liberty” from 
constraint based on the “social” determinant of the feature of the human being.
340 
Ronald Dworkin’s liberalism, which puts “rights” on a significant stage, emphasizes 
“equality” of rights.
341 Rawls understands equal distribution as a matter of justice and 
a political matter. Obligation to the justice theory, to him, is an indispensible part of 
political fairness, which can be a way to practice the ideal of democracy.
342 In this 
respect, it is possible to restrict liberty including freedom of speech. Influenced by 
Kant’s philosophy of “treating people as ends,”
343 Dworkin contends that “equal 
concern is the sovereign virtue of political community.”
344 To him, the core of 
liberalism is government’s equal treatment of people’s liberty, which is the best moral 
way to eschew the conflict of liberties. The equality of wealth distribution is a material 
prerequisite for this virtue,
345 and “being equally treated” is people’s right.
346  
Then, what is “speech” from the right-based perspective? The right-based 
theory’s definition of right is more significant than any other theories’ because 
whereas once an activity is construed as a speech, it can get a strong protection in the 
name of right, and once it is not interpreted as a speech, it cannot do that. It raises the 
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matter of the range of speech protection. The process of demarcation between 
protected speech and non-protected speech in the right-based perspective is clearer 
than in the utilitarian balancing process because the latter can hardly continue to have 
a coherent standard with different subject of balancing. With regard to the protection 
range of speech which is made by equally autonomous individuals, Scanlon gives an 
interesting analysis about speech besides the specification of harm to which I referred 
above. As for the conception of autonomy which is the subject of this section, he gives 
a significant hint on its range in relation to paternalism through his change of 
viewpoint on freedom of speech. 
Scanlon is one of the representative philosophers who laid theoretical 
foundation of strong protection of freedom of speech. He expands the range of 
protected free speech by creating new categories: “participant interests,” “audience 
interests,” and “bystander interests.”
347 Specifically, the participant interests mean 
those “we have in being able to speak,” audience interests are those “we have in being 
exposed to what others have to say,” and bystander interests are those of “who are 
affected by expression in other ways.”
348 This classification is made in terms of the 
subject’s “interests” in communication which should deserve equal respects. With 
respect to considering listener’s interests in addition to speaker’s ones in which 
traditional right-based free speech theories has always been interested, his perspective 
can be said to be broader than others. The central listener’s interest is, Scanlon 
explains, the interest in “having a good environment for the formation of one’s beliefs 
and desires.”
349 This classification can meet people’s needs for self-decision making in 
a democratic society. Public deliberation is necessary for collective decision making, 
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and the free and equal access to information is a fundamental condition of deliberation. 
If a person has audience interests like what Scanlon categorizes, she can practice 
wider autonomy in her political life. 
However, there can be some cases where these audience interests conflict with 
participant interests. To accept audience interests, some regulations, which otherwise 
would not be made in the traditional speaker-based account of expression, have to be 
made. Scanlon thinks that there is no risk to taking them if audience interests really 
exist. In other words, if we claim a right to hear more expressions than the amount 
which we have been traditionally supposed to hear, we need to reduce the possible 
harm to “unwanted exposure to expression.”
350 For this job, we have to prove that the 
benefit is higher than the risk when we balance them: between the audience’s 
“temporary costs of annoyance, shock or distraction” and “the more lasting benefits of 
a broadened outlook or deepened understanding.”
351 He thinks that if some 
expressions which cause this risk are restricted, the benefit to audience interests will 
be much higher than expected. I think that this idea harmonizes more with the 
democratic understanding of free speech. For this reason, apart from Rawls’ political 
liberalism for the mutual consent and Dworkin’s egalitarian liberalism for humanity, 
Scanlon’s consideration of listener’s interests, from the point of democracy, can be 
understood as an effort to overcome some problems of individualistic liberalism 
because it lays a foundation to regulate speech in the liberal context where the idea of 
absolute protection of speech has dominated. It will work for my main topic in the 
next chapter, the different understanding of the relationship between autonomy and 
liberalism. 
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To protect audience interests means to abandon governmental interruption of 
expression in order to protect audiences’ feasible acceptance of information and 
speech.
352 Basically, it is good to hear many kinds of different ideas and opinions 
because we will sometimes hear useful ones. In the course of this extension, the 
expression that harms our reasonable way of thinking should be restricted. Even 
though we are confident in our ability to have a rational choice in every situation, 
there can be expressions that hinder the rational choice intentionally or unintentionally. 
Listeners should be protected from “unwanted long-range effects” of those 
expressions.
353 
Those problematic expressions that cause the audience’s unconscious 
response—“false belief”—cannot be a subject of protection although that response is 
beneficial to the audience.
354 The same decision will be made even if the costs last 
longer than expected for the reason of “being misled, having one’s sensibilities dulled 
and cheapened, of acquiring foolish desires,” for example, a subliminal 
advertisement.
355 As we studied in the previous chapter, a misinformed person cannot 
decide autonomously even though she still has liberty to do so. For Scanlon in this 
case, speech that does not make a listener autonomous is not worthy of protecting. The 
significance of audience interests is that the audiences keep holding the autonomy to 
build their beliefs or aspiration.
356 In this respect, the listener’s right to get informed or 
educated has the same gravity to the speaker’s right of “expression.”
357 And Scanlon 
specifies that this right of information includes the prevention of concealing “what 
would otherwise become public.”
358 
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I understand that Scanlon’s “interests” in his categories means autonomy even 
though he characterizes them this way. This is because through each interest, a person 
can achieve self-rule by individual or collective deliberation. Particularly, I pay special 
attention to the discussion of the listener’s autonomy, which is described as “audience 
interests” in Scanlon’s categories, for it can suggest the proper relationship between 
individual autonomy and paternalism. From this discussion we can get a hint as to how 
“autonomy” might be defined in freedom of speech, which is one of the purposes of 
this article. 
Scanlon’s bystander interests also work meaningfully in terms that they can 
constrict participant and audience interests. Bystanders are people who happen to be 
affected by participants and audiences. According to Scanlon, their interests have two 
subcategories: interests of refraining from “undesirable side effects of acts of 
expression” and interests of the expression’s effect.
359 And protections of these 
interests are fulfilled in two ways according to the seriousness of their harm: the 
regulation of time, place, and manner of speech for harmful side effects and the 
regulation of immediate communication itself for jeopardy to central interests.
360 
Content regulation is so threatening to expression that it cannot be a general principle 
of speech regulation. The Supreme Court has enunciated that the “core” of the First 
Amendment is content-neutrality, and adopted it in very exceptional cases, as well.
361 
Even though Scanlon does not excavate the practical performance of regulations, 
however, we can at least find confirmation of possible interruption of participant 
interests and audience interests in the name of bystander interests from his argument. 
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Scanlon is basically a deontologist. Before modifying his theory in this way,
362 
his primary concern was with protecting the speaker’s ultimate individual autonomy. 
His specific change is to accept “justified paternalism” by acknowledging the 
vagueness of his former idea, the “Millian Principle.”
363 As Schauer points out that 
Scanlon’s belief was established on the social contract theory, Scanlon’s theory had to 
do with the “limited government” which is the best suited for enhancing the rational 
individual’s sovereignty or autonomy.
364 Therefore, his theory, even though Scanlon 
does not want to follow the utilitarian consequentialistic framework, also aims at the 
protection of individual speech as greatly as possible, influenced by Kantian 
deontology which is easily found in his assertion that “some acts of expression should 
remain free from interference, even if it can be shown beyond doubt that they give rise 
to significant harms.”
365  
Specifically, Scanlon wanted to reach this destination by setting up the 
“Millian Principle,” named after John Stuart Mill’s harm theory, the area of absolute 
protection of speech where no governmental interventions are permitted. It says, that 
“there are certain harms which, although they would not occur for certain acts of 
expression, nonetheless cannot be taken as part of a justification for legal restrictions 
on these acts. These harms are: (a) harms to certain individuals which consist in their 
coming to have false beliefs as a result of those acts of expression; (b) harmful 
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consequences of acts performed as a result of those acts of expression, where the 
connection between the acts of expression and the subsequent harmful acts consists 
merely in the fact that the act of expression led the agent to believe (or increased their 
tendency to believe) these acts to be worth performing.”
366  
Basically, this is a kind of reinforced version of contention that shows the 
superiority of the power of individual autonomy over state power,
367 grounded in the 
presupposition of the “equal, autonomous, and rational agents.”
368 Thus, whoever 
incites or encourages bad things, not to say good things, can entertain the absolute 
protection of her speech as long as the listener has a chance to think rationally and 
autonomously with the speech.
369 The listener has to take full responsibility for her 
behavior irrespective of the speaker’s speech because the listener is an independent 
autonomous rational agent. In other words, Scanlon believes that the state can not 
judge a person’s idea to be true or false, and that, furthermore, the state does not have 
a right to “prevent [illegal] conduct by outlawing its advocacy” because autonomous 
citizens would not entitle it to do so.
370 
Scanlon’s absolute protection of autonomy-related speech is directly criticized 
by Robert Amdur. As for autonomy itself, he indicates that Scanlon’s Millian principle 
fails to notice the side effects it may cause to autonomy. That is, autonomy can be 
subverted by “false or misleading information” even if an agent has a chance to think 
and act in an autonomous fashion.
371 We can check the non-autonomousness of 
decision with false information by looking at Locke’s example, which was explained 
by Gerald Dworkin.
372 A person in a cell can never try to get out with incorrect 
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information that the cell which is, indeed, unlocked has firmly locked doors. This 
overlook entails the subsequent protection of false advertisement which deprives an 
agent more possibly of autonomous choice in the name of autonomy enhancement.
373 
Another argument of Amdur is that Scanlon’s idea is quite aberrant from 
people’s common sense about justice. Referring to Robert Nozick’s “bucket theory of 
responsibility,”
374 he raises questions about the strangeness of Scanlon’s protection of 
insulated autonomy. Even though Nozick ignored Scanlon’s emphasis on the rational 
autonomy of an agent,
375 Amdur indicates, his argument gave us a chance to rethink 
the relationship between speech and responsibility. While Scanlon contends that his 
idea of the Millan principle coincides with “our normal views about legal 
responsibility,” Amdur argues that it is not compatible with “our normal views on 
moral responsibility,” and furthermore, even legal responsibility.
376 Amdur’s 
reasoning mainly depends on our “intuition” on moral responsibility. For us, it is 
absurd for a person who incited another’s wrongdoings to be free from punishments. 
Even though we are rational autonomous agents, the inciter should share responsibility 
if we are persuaded through rational communication with each other about the 
wrongdoings.
377 And legal responsibility has to “reflect” moral responsibility because 
there is no isolated conception of legal responsibility in our intuition.
378 According to 
Amdur, this is our natural intuition. 
I think that Scanlon’s biggest mistake is his excessive trust in the subject of 
autonomy: a rational agent. Although we can accept that a moral agent in a liberal 
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society ought to be autonomous, his generalization of an autonomous person’s 
responsibility goes too far. First of all, it is too rigorous to attribute responsibility only 
to the agent, in spite of her autonomy, because autonomous agents can do irrational 
things in practice. They can be enticed, impelled, or influenced by others through 
rational discussions. The speaker must have a share of responsibility. Scanlon’s idea is 
the typical formal logic of liberals. Second, even autonomous agents readily give up 
their autonomy for fear of more serious harm if needed. Like Amdur’s argument, 
people do not want to have “physical assaults” and “threats to their lives” let alone the 
harm of autonomy.
379 People do compromise on the value of their society, and 
priorities of values are determined by this process. This is called politics. Autonomy, 
of course, can be a subject of political compromise if needed. 
As noted earlier, Scanlon changed his position to less-protective speech in the 
later article after Amdur’s criticism. I particularly want to mark this conversion out in 
this section. Related with the values of the adversary system, autonomy is a subject to 
be explicated theoretically and practically. I can see some possibilities of more flexible 
application of autonomy from the change of Scanlon’s theory. This discussion also 
contains the political meaning of autonomy like liberalism and democracy theory. 
Based on Scanlon’s theories, I will study freedom of speech and autonomy further in 
the next chapter, and try to overcome the framework of liberal justification of 
autonomy with the discussion of democracy. 
 
3.4.2.3 Democratic Perspective 
This perspective is basically based on the utilitarian conception that liberty of speech 
and association are the most efficient sources for democracy.
 380 And democracy is 
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known as the best way to create the greatest happiness out of all other governmental 
systems. With this logic, the utilitarians infer that liberty should be held to the degree 
of a right.
381 However, Redish argues that this utilitarian “consequentialist” way of 
thinking hardly works for a value that Americans tried to achieve through democracy 
for several reasons.
382 First, there is no way to measure and compare the “efficiency” 
of democracy with other institutions.
383 Second, the history and experience shows that 
the American people are not susceptible to the utilitarian supposition about 
government: no empirical evidence concerning superiority of democracy’s efficiency, 
and no anticipatory possibility of the people’s replacement of democracy with another 
more efficient type of government.
384 I do not want to argue in favor of this utilitarian 
presupposition in this section, but instead I want to uncover the ideal and function of 
the free speech right within the context of democracy. In addition, I will analyze and 
criticize Redish’s value of self-fulfillment for which, he alleges, democracy should be 
well-equipped in a society. 
Generally, democracy is defined as a political system in which people rule 
themselves. Even though there are suspicions of the possibility of self-rule in practice, 
self-government is still valid in the sense that people can still participate in the 
political process by various methods, such as votes.
385 Since this “ruling oneself” 
process needs the voluntary participation of the constituents, a democratic constitution 
guarantees freedom for participation as a right. Thus, constitutional freedom and right 
become essential conditions of democracy.
386 The necessary freedom for democracy 
can be ascertained easily from what non-democratic governments never give their 
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people.
387 An autocrat who dominates her people may just let them entertain some 
freedom except ones that obstruct her sole governance: the liberty of the ruling, 
directing, and decision-making activities in a community.
388 However, complete 
freedom of speech can never exist in an autocratic society because freedom of speech 
requires a fundamental assumption of popular sovereignty for its background.
389 
Freedom of speech and political freedoms, therefore, are the indispensible rights in a 
democratic country.
390 
In other words, freedom of speech does two important jobs in a democratic 
society: distribution of information and criticism on governmental officers.
391 The 
people should inform themselves enough to maintain and display their “sovereign 
power” during a deliberation process, which, in part, is considered to be connected 
with free speech’s value of finding truth.
392 In addition, the sovereign has to have a 
chance to check entrusted governmental agents by criticizing them if they act against 
the sovereign’s will.
393 
Meiklejohn’s emphasis on the political function of free speech should be read 
within the context of democracy. Basically, the theme of Meiklejohn’s theory is “self-
government.” He believed that the government’s power is justified only from the 
consent of the people who elect the governing by votes.
394 His idea originated in and 
was guided by New England’s Town Meeting system.
395 It could possibly fulfill the 
desire for a genuine government ruled by people themselves: participation, 
deliberation, general vote, and so forth. From the democratic election mechanism is 
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the necessity of freedom of speech derived; the people need fair information to give 
consent to the government, and they must have the free speech right to share ideas and 
make an agreement.
396 He contends that the standard of limiting free speech should be 
whether it is part of a political process or not.
397 So even if some speech sounds very 
controversial and problematic, the government should protect it so long as it promotes 
political deliberation. In other words, his imminent concern is not so much people’s 
equal free speech opportunity as the free exchange of information for a democratic 
debate using their constitutional right.
398 He wants to preclude people from 
“monopolizing” communication, for example, through the mass media, which may 
bring about the governmental interruption.
399 For these reasons, Schauer interprets the 
democratic function of freedom of speech representatively contended by Meiklejohn 
as a denial of the rudimentary principle of “liberalism.”
400 This function, surely, has a 
tendency to promote prevention from the “atomistic and elitist character” of 
liberalism.
401 
However, democracy as the value of freedom of speech contains a conceptual 
contradiction. It has to do with a general problem that the idea of self-rule has. This 
means that “popular sovereignty” may prevent any trial for restricting itself.
402 In the 
freedom of speech context, there is a possibility that people, as a sovereign, can apply 
inconsistent or strict regulation to freedom of speech of a specific person or a group in 
the name of a “collective decision.” Does self-rule mean majoritarianism? Even 
though a democratic government is run by majority rule, it has a risk of altering itself 
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into despotism by the majority.
403 Actually, this is what liberalism or individualism 
has struggled against, and why the principle of rule of law or constitutionalism should 
cooperate with the democracy theory. Dworkin’s emphasis on equality based on right 
to liberty can be interpreted in this respect.
404 Schauer contends that for self-
government, people’s equal participation in the political process is more significant 
principle than majoritarianism.
405 In fact, majority rule contains the theory of equal 
participation in itself although it is easily disregarded or forgotten; the only moral 
obligation for all people to follow a decision made by majority rule derives from the 
fact of equal opportunity to take part in the decision-making process.
406  
I do not think that Meiklejohn’s theory of freedom of speech falls into this 
majoritarian dilemma of the democracy argument although he rejects the liberal free 
speech theories. He stresses people’s participation of democratic political process 
more than any other theorist does, and believes that freedom of speech should serve to 
facilitate this participation. Because the equality of information is an indispensible 
element for political participation as a listener’s right, he does not ignore the ideal of 
equal participation. However, his excessive emphasis on political participation may 
create a problem. Tucker indicates that Meiklejohn’s view has a risk of degrading 
speech other than political speech through the categorizing and balancing process, 
which may give rise to the principle that all speech should serve only the political 
purpose of a society.
407 This principle may possibly be embodied in censorship 
repressing certain types of speech categories.
408 It could be very undemocratic in terms 
of the democratic ideal of equality. Furthermore, while many types of speech contain 
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political messages, they can also use what are less protected modes of expression in 
Meiklejohn’s narrow context, such as art, music, and literature.
409 Surely, these should 
not be treated like lower grade speeches.
410  What Meiklejohn, however, wanted to 
emphasize in his theory was that at least in the political area, the government should 
protect speech as much as possible for the purpose of attaining democracy. Protecting 
a perfect speech right for democracy means that the government has to do its best job 
to enhance people’s ability to practice democracy in a society. When it comes to the 
ability to fulfill the purpose of democracy, liberals identify it with individual 
autonomy which literally follows the definition of democracy: self-rule.  
At this point, I have to clarify what autonomy means in terms of free speech’s 
value of democracy. According to Scanlon’s definition of autonomy as a self-
regarding individual mind making oneself sovereign, as I lay out above, self-rule 
seems to be manifest within this definition. The question is whether the idea of self-
fulfillment can be a value which freedom of speech serves. Analyzing it from the point 
of ethical philosophy, Schauer criticizes it as being unpersuasive. Based on 
Aristotelian “happiness” which defines a “rich life” in terms of individual growth and 
self-development,
411 any activities enhancing these functions are considered to be 
intrinsically good. They do not work for other values instrumentally, but are for 
themselves “primary good.”
412 Freedom of speech, therefore, should be accomplished 
by virtue of its primary goodness. However, Schauer indicates that this view “over-
estimates” freedom of speech. First of all, speech is just one of various means of 
expression of the human being,
 413 but there is no reason speech should get a special 
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411 SCHAUER, supra note 282, at 49. 
412 Id., at 50. 
413 Id., 50-2.  
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evaluation. Second, self-development is most possible when people communicate 
information together, but there are many unilateral speeches for self-satisfaction.
414 
Interestingly enough, Redish’s reason for supporting self-fulfillment is very 
different from Aristotelian thought. He contends that freedom of speech should serve 
self-fulfillment because liberal American democracy promotes it. His main idea is that 
self-fulfillment is the only pre-eminent value that freedom of speech works for. Why 
is it self-fulfillment? How is it related to democracy? Should it be really the highest 
value of free speech? In this section, I will answer these questions just with in the 
context of liberalism. 
As I mentioned above, Redish’s self-fulfillment contains two elements: 
“human development” and “self-determination.” The latter is interpreted as individual 
autonomy and the former is the typical target of individualistic enlightenment 
philosophy. Redish points out that the value the American founding fathers sought 
through democratic government is not utilitarian “efficiency,” but a “process-oriented” 
value indicating that Meiklejohn had the problem of ignoring the value that the 
democratic process was designed to attain although he took the significance of process 
into consideration.
415 He interprets the meaning of this process value into an 
“intrinsic” value and an “instrumental” one.
416 The former is the value coming from 
the very being of the system of democracy, that is, “self-rule” or “self decision-
making.”
417 Freedom of speech furthers this value by indirectly fostering instrumental 
value.
418 On the contrary, the latter is a derivative which can be cultivated by 
activating democracy, in other words, “self-development” which is the goal of 
                                                 
414 Id., at 53-6. 
415 Redish, supra note 11, at 601-2. 
416 He explains them like this: “The intrinsic value is one that is achieved by the very existence of a 
democratic system. It is the value of having individuals control their own destinies” and “the 
instrumental value is a goal to which a democratic system is designed to lead, rather than one that is 
attained definitionally by the adoption of a democratic system.” Id. at 602-3. 
417 Id., at 603. 
418 Id., at 604.  
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“classical, fully participatory democracy.”
419 And freedom of speech furthers this 
value by directly fostering intrinsic value.
420 This is because free speech is one of 
many types of human development activities.
421 It is not manifest how he deduces this 
value from the process value of democracy because he does not directly lay out his 
reasoning. I presume that this comes from his belief of liberal democracy.
422 Therefore, 
I can infer that he regards the process value of democracy as that of classical liberal 
democracy.  
In short, Redish claims that the free speech value of self-fulfillment logically 
comes from America’s choice of the democratic system, and separates the free speech 
controversies brought about from his idea into two questions: whether the value of 
self-rule can exist not only in the public sector but also in the private field, and 
whether the value of self-development may still come from political participation 
within the modern political environment and within the changed benefit of 
participation.
423  
First of all, I touch on his presupposition of what “democracy” brings into the 
self-fulfillment of free speech value: self-development plus self-rule.
 424 In other words, 
“democratic process” is one of the means of accomplishing those (intrinsic and 
instrumental) two values, and freedom of speech also “facilitates” those values 
(directly and indirectly).
425 But his conclusion is still that “free speech ultimately 
serves only one true value, individual self-realization” “by reasoning from what we in 
this nation take as given: our democratic system of government.”
426 This is, however, 
                                                 
419 Id. 
420 Id. 
421 Id. 
422 He cites C. B. MacPerson’s writing from The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy: “…Democracy 
would thus make people more active, more energetic; it would advance them in intellect, in virtue, in 
practical activity and efficiency.” Redish, id. 
423 Id., at 602, 604-5. 
424 Id., at 603-4. 
425 Id. 
426 Id., at 593-4.  
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logically unreasonable. These enumerated propositions do not have a causal 
relationship among them. That is, there is no logical connection between freedom of 
speech and individual self-realization in his assertion. He could make an argument like 
the following that would be logical: “freedom of speech serves (or protects) 
democratic process, and the democratic process facilitates only those two values, 
therefore freedom of speech serves only the self-realization value.” Moreover, Baker, 
criticizing Redish’s theory, argues that “although democracy may further the 
development of the individual’s human faculties, a concern with self-development 
does not in any obvious way require a democratic political order.”
427 In short, Redish’s 
assertion of free speech’s self-realization value loses persuasiveness for its 
unreasonableness. 
Second, can the value of self-rule be applied to the private arena, too? This is 
the matter of autonomy. Redish says yes. A society which leaves no room for 
individuals to make decisions during the conflict-solving process can be called a 
“tyranny of the majority.”
428 He tries to prove that the conception of self-rule which 
freedom of speech wants to achieve includes the individual self-rule to say nothing of 
the collective self-rule. For this purpose, he gives an extreme exemplified hypothesis: 
a community where people decide all of the trivial individual matters like dinner menu 
which are interpreted as purely private by vote.
429 Being a political behavior, he 
explains, people’s voting needs the constitutional right to full information to make up 
their own minds before casting their votes.
430 However, if these matters, all of a 
sudden, are consigned to “individual will” from “collective authority,” then people 
                                                 
427 Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditure and Redish’s the Value of Free 
Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 646, 660 (1982). 
428 Id., at 605. 
429 Id., at 606-7. 
430 Id.  
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cannot get the information right for the reason of non-political activity.
431 Redish 
contends that because those are the same matters, they should be equally protected as a 
constitutional right no matter how political they are.
432 Basically, I agree with him that 
people are constitutionally eligible to the full information for their “life-affecting 
decision.” However, again, his logic has a flaw; he made an incorrect hypothesis; he 
created a pretty undemocratic community to explain the democratic value of self-rule. 
Democratic government would not interrupt a purely private realm. It is not a matter 
of collective self-rule from the first. Particularly, purely private speech does not have 
to be protected because it is not even the object of governmental trespass. Furthermore, 
theoretically, a democracy will have a constitutional condition of general freedom; a 
society which decides all of its constituents’ dinner menus is already not a democratic 
one.
433 In brief, I think that the individual self-rule which is served by freedom of 
speech in a private area should be protected by the definition of democracy.
434 And the 
conflicts among individuals’ self-rules may be solved by the democratic principle of 
the value of collective self-rule. 
Third, Redish wants to argue against the elitists’ devaluation of the 
instrumental value of democracy, individual development. Their opinion is that as 
democracy gets more complex and larger, and the masses get more uninterested in 
                                                 
431 Id. 
432 Id. 
433 COHEN, supra note 9, at 120-1. Redish himself acknowledges the possibility of this non-democracy: 
“although in concept such a society is democratic, it of course removes from the individualistic more 
choices than does virtually any authoritarian regime. Nevertheless, the inherent value on which the 
system is premised is (collective) self-rule.” Redish, id. 
434 Only with this context, Redish’s assertion can make sense: “reason would seem to dictate that the 
individual has at least as great a need for a free flow of information and opinion related to life-affecting 
decisions that he makes solely for himself.” Redish, id. On the other hand, Baker does not agree with 
this proposition. He contends that full or complete information is not a critical condition for self-rule 
and democracy saying “it is unclear why full and complete information should have a particularly high 
status among all the goods or resources instrumentally useful to self-rule.” Baker, supra note 427, at 661. 
However, I think he neglects the function of information or speech for the political participation. 
Although the material background has significance in democracy, speech and information has to take 
the superiority because without them, democracy cannot work well as it was designed.  
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political participation for their development.
435 Redish thinks that the elitist’s attack is 
not about the instrumental value of democracy, but the practicality of it. However, the 
intrinsic value of democracy which is a part of his “self-realization” value, in his 
conception, is still left intact.
436 And because the definition of the “political” has been 
changed by modern political theorists from the traditional governmental field to the 
“workplace democracy,”
437 the masses have more opportunities for political 
participation to develop themselves now. Through this private self-government, people 
can obtain many values which can be acquired from the traditional political process.
438 
I think it is acceptable that people participate in the prevalent private political process, 
but it is not easy to say that perfect democracy is working as a governing rule in a 
private workplace. Most workplaces are private institutions which put the economic 
maximization of production as the first purpose. People are positioned high and low to 
make for the greatest efficiency. General political rules hardly work under this strict 
hierarchy. With those surroundings, democracy would not work like the traditional 
political field. For these reasons, Redish’s refutation depending on workplace 
democracy is unpersuasive. 
Democratic perspective emphasizes the political function of speech. By giving 
the advantage of freedom, speech can work for the political participation which is the 
way of achieving the value of democracy: autonomy or self-rule. The utilitarian 
method provides the balancing test for specific cases by which political speech is 
considered more significant than other forms of speech. Proving that free speech 
serves the value of self-rule, I can ascertain that democracy needs freedom of speech 
                                                 
435 Redish, id., at 608. 
436 Id., 609-10. 
437 Redish cites some communitarian advocates of “workplace democracy:” P. BACHRACH, THE 
THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC ELITISM: A CRITIQUE (1967); JANE MANSBRIDGE, The Limits of 
Friendship, in Participation in Politics, XVI Nomos 246 (1975). He acknowledges that in this 
workplace theory, constitutional restrictions on the governmental interruption of individual rights 
became limited. Redish, id. 
438 Id.  
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for fulfilling its value. Redish, who thinks freedom of speech should be protected very 
broadly, contends that the value of democracy is not confined by self-rule, but 
includes self-development and free speech and also directly and indirectly serves those 
two values. According to him, democracy itself is so liberal that the value which 
freedom of speech tries to attain must be expansive to the extent of covering the 
private sector. However, his assertion of the free speech’s function is not perfectly 
logical by virtue of some problems of his way of reasoning. Still less, the fashion he 
used for persuasion to include self-development value does not have logical integrity. 
This less plausible assertion about the function of freedom of speech may verify the 
fault of his presumption of democracy. At this point, we have to question that freedom 
of speech serves only liberal democracy 
 
3.4.2.4 Instant Summary 
Finding truth and protecting autonomy are chief values that freedom of speech has to 
fulfill. Like those of the adversary system we saw in the previous chapter, they also 
need some interventions to decrease the side-effects. Particularly, Scanlon’s 
theoretical shift on autonomy suggests important things about its relationship with 
paternalism. I will delve into that more in the next chapter. And we should check that 
Redish’s liberal assertion on the freedom of speech has a vague logic to agree with 
which we can agree. Even though individual self-realization sounds attractive, it is not 
easy to catch what it really is and to how to fulfill it in a democracy where many 
individuals strive for their own self-interests. 
 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I have covered several aspects of freedom of speech that can be 
compared with aspect of the adversary system, which has been covered in the previous  
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chapter. Through this work, we begin to recognize that autonomy can be a decisive 
factor to show democratic meaning and give a clear comparison. Based on Scanlon’s 
theory, I will do deeper research on the relationship among freedom of speech, 
democracy and autonomy in the next chapter. This will give us a final result in the 
analysis on the adversary system in terms of autonomy and paternalism. 
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CHAPTER 4 
AUTONOMY IN DEMOCRACY: 
AS COMMON VALUE OF FREE SPEECH AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, we have studied the values of the adversary system and of 
freedom of speech, which are each grounded on their own histories. Even with 
different theoretical and practical backgrounds, they are analogous in that they both 
pursue the values of truth and autonomy. As I noted in the introduction chapter, the 
purpose of this article is to find the meaning of the political and constitutional values 
of the adversary system. By finding the political and constitutional values in the arena 
of freedom of speech, values which freedom of speech shares in common with the 
adversary system, I believe that we can arrive at a more objective outcome than the 
morality discussions made in the field of the adversary system do. 
The common values pursued in both arenas boil down to truth and autonomy. 
The truth-finding function begins from the utilitarian belief in free and equal 
competition in an information market. As we noted earlier, the theoretical ideal cannot 
bail out the discredit of the market itself in the real world, whereas it has its inherent 
advantages of free and equal chance to discover the truth. It looks like that there is no 
emphatic objection to some extent of governmental efforts to correct the market 
failure in the realm of free speech as well as in that of economics. That is, even liberal 
theorists can agree on paternalistic intervention through institutional supplements to 
find truth, recognizing the fact that disparity is manipulated in a legal system by 
wealth, social power, and so forth. However, the value of autonomy is in a different 
situation. So-called liberals, whose theories are, in fact, libertarian, still stick to the 
belief that the liberal tradition of American society has to dominate all legal and  
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political rights and institutions with its sovereign value: saving individual autonomy. 
There are many refutations of this idea arguing that we have other values such as 
public good, justice, and social equality which should also be respected in our political 
lives; therefore, sovereign individual autonomy cannot beat them in democracy. In 
freedom of speech, this ideological conflict is shown as the competition between 
nearly absolute protection of speech with respect to autonomy and state regulation vis-
à-vis paternalism. This same phenomenon occurs in the adversary system: zealous 
advocacy and the regulation of lawyer’s ethics. 
The positioning of autonomy as a desired value of the adversary system and 
freedom of speech has been bungled to some extent because theorists have failed to 
standardize its definition. Whereas autonomy is interpreted as an individual’s 
independent decision-making and action free from external coercions in many fields, 
Redish’s “self-fulfillment” mainly focuses on the pursuit of self-interests guarded by 
his libertarian ideas.
439 Pepper confines the autonomy for “first-class citizenship” to 
not moral autonomy but legal autonomy alone.
440 Furthermore, there are scholars who 
analyze freedom of speech within the context of Kantian morality in which autonomy 
works towards a unique presupposition of “morality of duty.”
441 In this paper, the 
conceptual definition of autonomy is based on Gerald Dworkin’s which is introduced 
in chapter 2. But as a political illumination of the adversary system and freedom of 
speech is the main topic of this article, I will focus on autonomy in relation to 
paternalistic intervention in the course of democratic collective decision making. In 
particular, the sheer conception of Kantian moral autonomy which would never permit 
                                                 
439 See section 2.5 and 3.423. 
440 See section 2.433; Paul Lowell Haines, Restraining the Overly Zealous Advocate: Time for Judicial 
Intervention, 65 IND. L. J. 445, 448 (1990). 
441 See Wells, supra note 149 .  
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this intervention theoretically, will be criticized in terms of the feasibility of public 
deliberation in democracy. 
This idea can also be supported by Raz’s perfectionist liberalism. Based on 
value-pluralism, perfectionist liberalism places autonomy as the intrinsic supreme 
value to pursue. Autonomy, in this context, means opportunity to choose without any 
coercion. The government has a duty to control immoral options for making autonomy 
morally perfect, which is the reason why the state cannot be neutral. By the same 
token, perfectionist liberalism may accept paternalism if the government’s 
paternalistic intervention enhances people’s opportunity for autonomous life and if the 
interference is not forceful. Because Raz’s perfectionism is regarded as political 
liberalism on account of its emphasis on autonomy, it shows that the relationship 
between autonomy and paternalism that I set up in this paper can be accepted within 
the context of liberalism in a broad sense. 
I object to a libertarian interpretation of the adversary system. I believe that 
some paternalistic regulation of the adversary system is justified in the particular 
arena—i.e., a lawyer’s representation of her client. This is not a degeneration of the 
value of autonomy in the adversary system unless the interference does serious harm 
to democracy. Indeed, democracy justifies a certain extent of paternalism to realize its 
own purpose: self-rule in a community. Free speech, which works to protect the core 
part of democracy, also needs suitable paternalism to resolve a variety of constrictions 
in the course of the performance of individual autonomy.  Proving this to be right is 
my task in this chapter. 
Specifically, I will start by making clear what the value of autonomy does in 
democracy. The political and constitutional meaning of autonomy cannot exist apart 
from the current democracy system. Although I have criticized Redish’s liberal 
democracy theory in the previous chapters, further clarification on that is needed  
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before I go further. In addition, based on the concept of democratic autonomy 
discussed above, I will delve into autonomy in freedom of speech to find how much 
paternalistic intervention to free speech autonomy is possible. Scanlon’s theoretical 
shift will be usefully referred to in this section. Lastly, I will attempt to modify the 
adversary system with the clarified autonomy which is established on democracy and 
free speech. 
 
4.2 Autonomy, Free Speech, and Democracy 
As noted in the past chapters, democracy inherently means self-rule, not rule by 
external coercion. Nor does it mean the other constituent’s pressure in a group or 
community which is regarded as the “self” out of “self-rule.” While democracy 
signified as self-rule looks like an embodiment of autonomy, this definition may cause 
friction with the value of autonomy because the “self” in this context means the 
collective constituents in the community.
 442 Even though something is decided 
collectively through the democratic political process, there may still be minorities who 
are opposed to that decision. Because we cannot have an idealistic Rousseauian 
society where the individual will is perfectly compatible with the collective will in 
practice, we need to take another step: public debate.
443 
By the same token, we cannot discuss collective decision making in a 
democracy without referring to free speech, for there must be public deliberation 
before the final vote. Without freedom of speech, “democratic” collective decision 
making cannot be fulfilled. This is why most of the articles about the theory of 
                                                 
442 In the field of democracy theory, a politics scholar Carl Cohen defines “community autonomy” as 
“the inter-personal correlate of autonomy in the life of the individual.” And he puts forward the 
democracy-realized government for a pre-condition of it. COHEN, supra note 9, at 269. However, 
Cohen’s this statement is much dependent upon the moral aspect of autonomy which is set up by 
Kantian philosophy. 
443 HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 285 (1999); Robert Post, Racist 
Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 281 (1991).  
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autonomy and democracy deal with freedom of speech. And this type of discussion is 
advantageous to reflect how individual autonomy works in a collective world because 
freedom of speech is one of the most significant individual rights in a democracy. Just 
as individual autonomy struggles with paternalistic intervention, so is collective self-
determination created from the competition between individual autonomy and 
paternalistic state regulations. 
In the following sections, I will illuminate what autonomy in democracy is 
with respect to freedom of speech. At the center of the controversy, specifically, I will 
put Robert Post’s criticism on collectivist theories. My argument will be performed by 
expanding on the pros and cons of Post’s theory raised by various scholars such as 
Richard Fallon, Morris Lipson, Owen Fiss, Cass Sunstein, Susan Brison, and so on. 
And Scanlon’s shift toward categorization of free speech will play a crucial role for 
my position. With all this knowledge, I will find what the right relationship between 
individual autonomy and paternalism is in a democratic society, which is a significant 
clue to the end of this paper: what the adversary system’s value of autonomy is. 
 
4.2.1 Autonomy in Democracy 
As a preliminary step, I want to look at general theories of democracy and the 
constitution and what they say about autonomy in this section. First of all, autonomy is 
the opposite conception to heteronomy by which constituents of a community cannot 
establish laws and regulations to govern themselves.
444 They become inferior objects 
of the superior rulers who make themselves a hierarchical authority to obtain the 
jurisdictional power of their order.
 445 As shown usually in a military organization, this 
“command relationships” cannot be congruous with democracy at all.
446 In practice, 
                                                 
444 COHEN, supra note 9, at 270; Post, supra note 443, at 280. 
445 COHEN, id., at 271. 
446 Id.   
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heteronomy has been exemplified in the form of authoritarian or totalitarian 
governments while ideal autonomy may be realized in the shape of anarchism.
447 
Because of the concept of autonomy, democracy cannot be theoretically squared with 
authoritarianism or totalitarianism. And paternalism is concomitant with autonomy 
because democracy cannot become anarchy. 
Second, hinted at by the concept of heteronomy, we can infer that equality is 
necessary for self-government. Not equipped with equality, a government cannot 
fulfill collective self-decision making because a polity in which citizens do not have 
equal opportunities does not obtain justification for its decisions. At this point, a 
problem appears: how equal should people be? Ideally, as Robert Dahl indicates, all 
constituents in a community should be evaluated as if they are equally competent.
448 
But there are people who are underqualified and who need paternalistic intervention. 
So Dahl suggests “presumptions of personal autonomy,” meaning that “in the absence 
of a compelling showing to the contrary everyone should be assumed to be the best 
judge of his or her own good or interests.”
449 According to Dahl, this assumption is 
needed to safeguard an individual’s minimum autonomy in the course of collective 
decision making. By virtue of this presumption, the state cannot easily intrude on an 
individual’s autonomy paternalistically.
450 Dahl’s exception for paternalism is pretty 
narrow. He insists that only physically or mentally handicapped people should have 
paternalistic intervention with a high burden of proof for enforcement. Considering his 
theory of pluralism which seems utopian, I can understand his perspective on 
autonomy. However, his theory does not take the process of deliberation before final 
                                                 
447 See WOLFF, supra note 152; Rogers Smith, The Constitution and Autonomy, 60 TEX. L. REV. 175, 
193 (1982). 
448 Dahl calls the assumption that “a substantial portion of adults are adequately qualified to govern 
themselves” “a Strong Principle of Equality.” ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CIRTICS 
97-8 (1989). 
449 Id., at 100. 
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collective decisions, in which the necessity of adjusting diverse autonomy happens, 
seriously. I will discuss this subject further with regard to freedom of speech in the 
next section. 
Third, collective self-decision making needs people’s participation. Autonomy 
involves positive and negative aspects. Just as Benjamin Constant underscored the 
importance of the ancient Greek liberty of participation, which is called “active 
liberty” by Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer, corresponding to negative liberty 
which means the state of being free from interruption,
451 so does autonomy have dual 
features. Freedom of speech has to work for the best interest of people’s participation 
to the deliberation through which collective self-decision making is possible. 
Therefore, there is sufficient reason why autonomy should be considered with regard 
to the positive feature. 
Historically, however, autonomy has worked as a powerful ground for privacy 
matters in the constitutional field.
452 It extended its influence to due process matters,
453 
and then to free speech subjects.
454 Attitudes toward autonomy have fluctuated 
according to the experience of society. When natural law theory presided, individual 
autonomy was actively considered for deciding individual rights cases, but state 
interventions were welcome after the Great Depression.
455 As majoritarianism became 
a paramount principle in democratic theory, the “liberal state” needed to seek for a 
safety net for the minority against the majority’s predilection, and autonomy was 
                                                 
451 STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION 3-4 (2005). 
452 Smith gives examples of abortion—Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973); contraception—
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-6 (1965); and others—Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 
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Smith, supra note 447, at 175. 
453 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Smith, id., at 176. 
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favored as a concept.
456 What is the current situation when it comes to autonomy? I 
think that now is the time to impose some limitations on the autonomy theory, which 
has reached the point of excessive libertarian laissez-faire. Specific discussion about 
the relationship between autonomy and collective self-decision making will follow in 
the next section.  
 
4.2.2 Autonomy and Free Speech 
As said earlier, an autonomous individual has participatory liberty in the democratic 
decision making process. Considerable parts of the process are made up of 
deliberation. People—especially citizens in a community—debate directly or 
indirectly about common matters. An autonomous citizen is qualified to decide all 
individual matters by herself. A problem arises whenever an autonomous citizen has to 
be obliged to abide by a decision of the community which is opposite to her opinion or 
interests. Though this is a normal picture in the majority rule of democracy, 
compromising between individual and collective interests is no easy task, especially 
when an autonomous individual is equipped with a libertarian mindset that 
maximizing her interests is the foremost duty of a state. We have to make sure that 
collective decision making—particularly, deliberation—should be autonomous, and 
that we can fulfill it to justify this process of democracy. 
 
4.2.2.1 Individualistic Perspective 
For fair deliberation in a democratic society, the most crucial thing must be the flow of 
information with which participants can build balanced positions. It has directly to do 
with the free speech right, so it is understandable that many jurists have emphasized 
the liberty of “marketplace of ideas” since Justice Holmes. As we noticed, however, in 
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the previous chapter, the market proved to be susceptible to power, money and other 
social factors, and the state’s paternalistic intervention on even the territory of 
individual autonomy has been used to correct this market failure. “Collectivist 
theories,” named by Post, do not want to present individual autonomy as a supreme 
value to preclude all paternalistic regulations.
457 And for collectivists, freedom of 
speech is a meaningful method to serve the “collective processes of public 
deliberation” for which managerial interventions are justified.
458 The collectivists’ 
common attitudes to the traditional justification of autonomy for freedom of speech 
are skeptical because they believe that it just helps to sustain current social disparity in 
terms of speech with the excuse of protecting individual autonomy. 
As for the constitutional evaluation of this issue, Post thinks the mainstream 
Supreme Court decisions which are against prioritizing public deliberation to protect 
the individual speech right should be supported because the state does not have the 
right to regulate individual speech.
 459 Kalven, who thought that well protected 
autonomy would heighten public deliberation, can be positioned as a theoretical 
founder of the autonomy account.
460 There are collectivists, of course, who oppose 
those rulings of the Court. Owen Fiss argues that “the actual effect of speech,” instead 
of “the intrinsic value of autonomy,” should be the ground for free speech protection.
 
461  
According to the collectivists, we may have situations where a certain sacrifice 
of autonomy is needed. And theoretical restrictions can be placed on individual 
                                                 
457 Robert Post, Managing Deliberation: The Quandary of Democratic Dialogue, 103 ETHICS 654, 654 
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459 Post exemplifies some typical Supreme Court cases in the area of campaign finance and the right of 
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461 Owen Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1409-10 (1986).  
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autonomy without any serious harm to democracy or freedom of speech theory. It is 
exactly the opposite status of the traditional autonomy account of free speech. As a 
strong “individualistic” theory, named by Morris Lipson, Post’s theory simply wants, 
criticizing collectivism, to adhere to the account of autonomy for democratic freedom 
of speech.
462 But interestingly enough, it is important to check out that Post, though he 
is a scholar of traditional free speech theory who basically objects to the state’s 
paternalistic intervention in the name of autonomy protection, this does not entirely 
preclude the possibility of governmental “managerial control.” For example, he 
endorses governmental limitation on campaign finance. This is because Post thinks 
that public discourse is as much important to democracy as collectivists do. For 
democracy to succeed, public discussion is a requirement of “self-government” as the 
“communicative medium.”
463 And democracy, for Post, is a reconciliation between 
individual autonomy and collective self-decision making.
464 He believes that public 
deliberation cannot succeed without the participant’s autonomy. Therefore, autonomy 
of free speech should get nearly absolute protection for public deliberation within the 
context of his theory because he also believes that non-autonomous constituents do not 
participate in the deliberation.
465 However, he knows that deliberation would be 
harmed by the side-effects of absolute autonomy at the same time. To justify this 
inconsistency, he gets around to the principle of equal rights instead of freedom of 
speech which is Skelly Wright’s argument for regulation.
466  
Whereas Post and Wright steer clear of the possible controversy of autonomy 
in freedom of speech by running into the discussion of equality, there are still 
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individual autonomy theories which work in the free speech arena. Lipson is the 
representative theorist, and personally, I agree with considerable parts of his argument. 
For a more detailed explanation, I will analyze the philosophical foundation of the 
traditional account of autonomy in freedom of speech. 
As noted earlier, Lipson indicates that Post’s perspective falls back on 
“individualism” which is the term compared with collectivism above. For the opposite 
conception of collectivism which emphasizes the public deliberation for collective 
self-decision making in democracy, I think the name “individualism” for the 
supremacy of individual autonomy, is appropriate. However, I have to clarify the basis 
of Lipson’s individualism because there is a difference between my own perspective 
and Lipson’s in this respect. Taking the mechanism of how paternalism works with 
autonomy as an “external constraint,” as shown in chapter 2, I believe that autonomy 
can theoretically be associated with paternalism to some extent, something Lipson 
does not consider.  
At this point, I want to briefly reiterate this “autonomy and paternalism” of 
moral philosophy. Paternalism may promote autonomy. They are not in a fully 
antagonistic relationship because paternalism fosters a person’s ability to “exercise 
choice.”
467  We can see this in the mandatory duty to wear seat belts in vehicles. We 
can protect a more serious value, life, by restraining the liberty of being comfortable in 
a car.
468 In other words, we can “maximize” our autonomy by paternalizing a smaller 
one when two or more autonomies compete each other.
469 For this process, the 
utilitarian balancing method is used. In sum, Paternalism is used to “maximize 
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aggregate autonomy,”
470 and we can conclude that autonomy can be theoretically 
compatible with paternalism, even in the form of external constraints. 
However, the Kantian conception of autonomy makes matters different. As 
also analyzed in chapter 2, autonomy in Kantian morality does not accept external 
constraints (i.e. commands) unless an agent consents to it at will. Because we cannot 
expect consent from the individuals and minorities who have to follow the regulations 
produced by democratic collective decision making, it is important to know whether 
we are using the concept of Kantian autonomy to deal with their external constraints. 
If we were determined to have Kantian autonomy, we would have to presuppose our 
explicit or implied consent to all governmental policies like the social contract 
theorists.  
Lipson’s difference starts from this point. He understands that the autonomy 
theory is fundamentally Kantian. He tries to correct the general misunderstanding 
about autonomy which connects “negative liberty” with the freedom from “all 
constraints.”
471 Instead, individualism confines negative liberty into liberty from 
“external constraints” alone.
472 It means that autonomy may be constrained internally, 
which is borrowed from the idea of Wolff, whose autonomy is grounded by Kantian 
morality.
473  
“Free will” and “reason” are necessary for a person upon whom is imposed a 
duty of responsibility for her actions.
474 In Wolffian autonomy, a person should act 
autonomously to be responsible for that action. Even though a person can give up her 
autonomy autonomously, she could not abandon her responsibility. There can be no 
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“command” in Wolffian autonomy either because a “combination of freedom and 
responsibility” in this context means moral autonomy.
475 Paternalism, a kind of 
command, therefore, cannot exist. And that is why Lipson also agrees that the only 
political institution which can satisfy Wolffian autonomy is anarchy.
476 
With this definition of individualism, Lipson tries to prove that individualism 
may have paternalistic external constraints on “the choice set of autonomous decision 
makers.”
477 His method of argumentation is to verify the rationality and necessity of 
paternalism from collectivist ideas in the democratic collective decision making 
process, and to show the common autonomy which individualism and collectivism 
share in their theoretical foundations. Therefore, individualism in Lipson’s context has 
to undergo the transformation from Kantian morality to non-Kantian one by his 
argument. To the contrary, I do not think that individualism in terms of emphasizing 
individual autonomy protection means Kantian autonomy only. Because there are non-
Kantian autonomies which are compatible with paternalism, individualism can 
naturally contain regulations during the collective decision making by taking this kind 
of autonomy. Therefore, Lipson’s alternative suggestion of Scanlon’s listener’s 
autonomy can be supported without any theoretical transformation of autonomy in my 
perspective. 
Richard Fallon’s category of autonomy fits well with my argument. Fallon 
classifies autonomy into “descriptive” one and “ascriptive” one on a large scale.
478 
Descriptive autonomy is identified as the most general meaning of autonomy which 
many other scholars use. It denotes “people’s actual condition” that “the extent to 
which they are meaningfully self-governed in a universe shaped by causal forces.”
479 
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In other words, it is basically freedom from constraints. When it comes to descriptive 
autonomy, questions about autonomy are boiled down to “a matter of degree.”
480 
Under this condition, people are divided into the highly autonomous ones with many 
options and the less autonomous ones with scant options.
481 Within the descriptive 
concept, to “preserve” or “promote” autonomy, paternalism can be introduced.
482 This 
descriptive autonomy is where my definition of individualism exists. And I think that 
Post’s idea of autonomy in freedom of speech should be discussed within this field. 
On the other hand, ascriptive autonomy is the “purported metaphysical 
foundation of people’s capacity,” and “right to make and act on their own decisions” 
regardless of the decision’s quality.
483 Influenced by Kantian morality, it retains s 
moral objectivity of “personhood” and a “moral right to personal sovereignty” which 
sound very abstract, and so it does not fit in well with paternalistic intervention.
484 
Autonomy empowered by sovereignty cannot be unequal, so all people have to hold 
equal, ascribed autonomy, which makes people stay away from paternalism. This 
ascriptive autonomy is where Lipson’s individualism exists, and Post’s autonomy in 
free speech allegedly falls into ascriptive autonomy as well.
485 
Fallon contends that both descriptive and ascriptive autonomy should be 
considered when it comes to matters of free speech.
486 However, he acknowledges 
some weak points in the ascriptive autonomy argument. First, it is highly 
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“conclusory.”
487 Post’s logic of opposing paternalism, he indicates, demonstrates this 
problem. Starting with a proposition of ascriptive autonomy’s involvement with 
democracy, his argument, through the hypothesis that a political process without any 
suppression of ideas is required in democracy, concludes that democracy accepts all 
kinds of speech, even “false, manipulative, and deliberately pain-inflicting” ones 
without limitation.
488 Pointing out Post’s incoherency of attitude to other regulations, 
Fallon confesses that the ascriptive autonomy concept is not competent to solve “hard 
questions” about separating bad rules from good ones due to its generality.
489  
For this reason, Fallon tries to compromise about the application of descriptive 
and ascriptive autonomy. He wants to divide the function of each kind of autonomy 
into different categories. Descriptive autonomy is always applied to the matter of 
“other-regarding action,” and ascriptive autonomy goes to “self-regarding action.”
490 
Self-regarding action, according to his explanation citing Joel Feinberg, is composed 
of the decisions that influence only the “interests of the decision maker,”
491 while 
other-regarding actions come during the inter-relationship among people. Self-
regarding action seems to me, for example, like an artistic expression which is not 
intended to be open to others.  
However, I think that this compromise is problematic. Most of all, there may 
be some self-regarding actions which inflict other’s autonomy. Absolute preclusion of 
paternalistic regulation in the area of self-regarding actions may cause some trouble 
with others when the action is opened to others involuntarily. Actually, there must be 
few purely self-regarding actions in contemporary society which will not cause any 
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trouble with others. Almost our entire lives are related to the lives of other people 
voluntarily or involuntarily. And we do not have to rest on ascriptive autonomy for 
those actions, if they exist, because they are mostly protected by privacy. Secondly, 
Feinberg’s “interest” standard for deciding the domain of actions may not be feasible 
in some cases. Interests cannot outstrip the value of life, for example, because nothing 
is more precious than life. The state must not let people kill themselves except in 
special cases, even though it is within the self- regarding domain eligible for ascriptive 
autonomy. For these reasons, I cannot accept the argument that there should be no 
paternalistic interventions on the ground of ascriptive autonomy.
492 
 
4.2.2.2 Collectivistic Perspective 
The scholars representative of “collectivist” views whose views I will survey in this 
section, Fiss, Sunstein and Lipson, who support collectivism on a different account. 
However, they do not have same attitudes to autonomy. Basically, Fiss and Sunstein 
think that we do not need the freedom of speech theory to be supported by the value of 
autonomy. However, Lipson creates his theory within the autonomy value. Fiss, who 
believes that the standard of free speech protection is whether the speech serves 
abundant public deliberation for “true collective self-determination,” thinks that 
autonomy does not have to do with this standard.
493 Within this context of the function 
of free speech, the government is “not only an enemy but also a friend of speech.”
494 
To the contrary, autonomy is tantamount to the prohibition from the governmental 
regulation under “classical liberalism” which is based on “distrust” and “antagonism” 
to the state.
495 Therefore, Fiss’ free speech theory is hardly concordant with the value 
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of autonomy as long as it stays in the field of liberalism. In a word, Fiss’ different 
perspective on the relationship between the individual and the state makes his free 
speech theory disagreeable to the liberal notion of autonomy. He raises a question 
about the proposition that “autonomy will lead to rich public debate.”
496 He is worried 
that the old-fashioned individual autonomy account of freedom of speech would harm 
the public debate which is the foremost element for democracy for him. This is 
because he believes that the traditional justifications of free speech based on 
individual autonomy do not benefit “the conditions of modern society” any more.
497 
And he suggests that the perspective on autonomy should be changed into a functional 
one: “an instrument of collective self-determination.”
498  
All of his arguments are grounded on his understanding of the social structure. 
To him, the modern society was structured on “grossly unequal distributions of power 
and limited capacity of people” to obtain information.
499 Regardless of a society’s 
identity as capitalist or socialist, societies are so unequal that people cannot have fair 
access to the basic social information which is required to make collective self-
decisions. Without enough useful information, people cannot decide rationally. Thus, 
this is a serious problem which has to do with democracy. And under the background 
of autonomy protection, people or institutions that have economic power control the 
“public debate” in a capitalist society.
500 In other words, it is, for the most part, vested 
rights or interests that have been sustained by the group supporting individual 
autonomy. Therefore, unless we leave the account of autonomy, we cannot get a 
democratic answer. 
                                                 
496 Id., at 1410. 
497 Basically, he understands the current society like the place with “no street corners” meaning, 
presumably, individual rights and autonomy got enough protection from the state, which is evidenced in 
Brandenburg. Id., at 1409. 
498 Id., at 1410. 
499 Fiss, Why the State? 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 786 (1987). 
500 Fiss, supra note 461, at 1412.  
133 
Sharing a common process of argument—deliberate democracy—with Fiss, as 
a collectivist, Sunstein bases his argument on a slightly different ground. Basing the 
founding of the United States on a republicanism other than liberalism,
501 Sunstein’s 
perspective focuses on breaking “a naked preference” which is defined by him for the 
“unequal distribution of resources or opportunities through the constitutional 
interpretations.
502 To achieve this purpose, he insists on a drastic change to an active 
interpretation like that of New Deal era should be brought about in the judicial arena. 
The liberal judiciary has supported this preference in the name of neutrality.
503  
Sunstein regards supporting autonomy as protecting the preference.
504 This 
approach is similar to Fiss’ cognition of reality. Sunstein’s difference is that he does 
not completely give up autonomy but save it as a destination to go. Actually, his 
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conception of autonomy is too strictly idealistic to accept the autonomy which works 
in the real world. He claims that the autonomy account cannot be contributed to “the 
satisfaction of private preferences” because autonomy means decision making “with a 
full and vivid awareness of available opportunities, with reference to all relevant 
information, and without illegitimate or excessive constraints on the process of 
preference information.”
505 Very few decisions can meet this requirement, so they 
should be judged non-autonomous. Maybe we will never be perfectly autonomous in 
contemporary society at all. His paternalism-supporting theories are the process to 
make people autonomous in this meaning. In sum, he aims at absolute autonomous 
status by denying the autonomous way. 
Post also indicates the unattainability of Sunstein’s autonomy. Autonomy, to 
him, already exists in a person. It is not an object to have.
506 His logic depends on the 
definition of democracy as self-rule. He understands that if the constituents of a 
democratic society are not autonomous, democracy does not work at all in that society 
because they do not govern themselves.
507 We can see an important clue in this notion. 
Within Post’s context, democracy requires individual constituents, every single one of 
whom is autonomous. And with our given autonomy, our democracy is working now. 
Logically, I think that Post’s perspective makes sense, but we cannot deny that we are 
not perfectly autonomous in reality. At this point, fundamental outlooks on the human 
being make a difference. Even though humans have reason and become autonomous 
like in Kantian philosophy, I do not want to take it as the matter of democracy because 
democracy covers all arenas from individual to collective. There is something which 
creates an obstacle to autonomous decision making on the collective scale, and every 
single autonomous person will not necessarily decide autonomously. Therefore, I 
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believe that those “somethings” should be regulated externally, and so Sunstein’s 
perspective makes sense to some degree. However, constituents of a democratic 
society are still autonomous to some degree, as well. We do not have to give up the 
presumption of our autonomy like Fiss and Sunstein do. If paternalistic interventions 
can coexist with autonomy, it becomes truly possible for us to stay in the area of 
autonomy in terms of freedom of speech. 
In fact, Sunstein’s republican idea depends on the conception of deliberate 
democracy based on republicanism instead of taking the autonomy account.
508 Similar 
to Fiss’ perspective, Sunstein clarifies that the entire constitutional system is for 
guaranteeing “discussion” and “debate” of differently opinioned people in the process 
for finding truth.
509 Because republicanism does not, by itself, exclude the difference 
of opinion and “heterogeneity,” the communicating process has significance.
510 Based 
on the central principle of “political equality” which the American tradition created, 
deliberate democracy, he believes, have three advantages: overcoming the problem of 
preferences, making people an “aspirational” or “altruistic” target, and checking each 
other among people.
511 This point has also directly to do with the matter of the 
relationship between the public and the private. Whereas Sunstein and Fiss want to 
think of free speech matters in terms of the public version as much as possible, the 
individualists disagree on this. 
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Post’s next concern with collectivism is the public/private distinction. Liberal 
ideas adopt the strict distinction between public and private from their theoretical basis. 
The government is regarded as a necessary evil for an individual right or autonomy 
whereas the state has a different significance in the collectivist context like Fiss’.
512 
Fiss points out that in current society, private subjects become big and powerful 
enough to play almost public roles. In particular, huge media conglomerates lead 
public opinion in most contemporary societies. Public deliberation cannot help being 
dominated by them.
513 According to Fiss’ perspective, large private media firms have 
replaced the work of the state, so the latter has been losing its power. Not to mention 
media firms, many private groups equipped with monetary power can control public 
opinion in diverse ways, such as funding and lobbying. All these behaviors can be 
protected in the name of autonomy even though general public, with the exception of 
these opinion producers loses its autonomy. If things are like this, collectivists contend, 
free speech theories should be changed in terms of autonomy. 
As witnessed from the controversy between Post and Fiss on the Supreme 
Court case Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
514 the current situation with regard to 
the media raises a serious question about what autonomy really means today. Fiss 
justifies the Court’s holding by defining the function of media and by trying to impose 
the responsibility of an almost public institution upon it. People’s autonomy, Fiss 
believes, will be enhanced by this managerial remedy. On the other hand, Post argues 
that the meaning of “democratic self-determination” would be severely changed by 
turning a private sector into a public sector. 
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Collectivists contend that we do not have to be bound to the autonomy basis 
any more because there is little opportunity to protect individual autonomy practically 
in the course of democratic collective decision making. We would rather stop 
furthering the unequal situation by the excuse of protecting autonomy than persist in 
invisible individual autonomy ineffectively. On the contrary, individualists contend 
that we cannot discard the ideal of “self-decision making” and can figure out how to 
save autonomy by competition of speech.
515 Contending media outlets, individualists 
believe, can find it for the general public by themselves, and this is only possible in 
the absence of governmental intervention. 
Now, we have to make clear what real “self-determination” is under the 
condition of current media systems. As long as we do not live in a society like the 
New England town meeting, no collective determination can be perfectly autonomous 
for individual constituents. Most public decision makings, in modern society, are done 
representatively by the government, and most speech which can influence the public 
deliberation is produced by the media. Even Post cannot deny the fact of the public 
function of media.
516 Furthermore, the power of interest groups whose goals are 
binding to their partisan interests has grown to a significant degree. Which mechanism 
does individual autonomy work by in this decision making situation? 
Even individualists admit the public function of some private subjects in our 
society.  I think that we cannot deny it. They should be restricted to the extent that 
they entertain a public function. This paternalistic intervention is to provide people 
with more equal opportunities in terms of free speech, which would be the basic 
presumption of public deliberation.
517 The intervention, by enhancing social equality, 
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means the “respect for private rights and [the private] sphere.”
518 However, because it 
is true that governmental regulation is performed by the direct infringement of 
autonomy and that it may be seriously harmful when it is done improperly, I think the 
government should be careful with the regulation of private actors who fulfill a public 
role. This is the reason why I cannot completely agree with the collectivist diagnosis. 
When it comes to leaving the autonomy account of free speech like the collectivists, 
which decides the priority between autonomy and paternalism in free speech, I am in 
Post’s side.
519 Even though regulation is fundamentally geared towards enhancing 
autonomy, it should be done as autonomously as possible. It would not be too late for 
the government to take action after giving the private subjects themselves a chance to 
solve the free speech problem. Of course, if it is determined that there is no or 
practically no room for constraint by private deliberation, then the government may 
straighten at first hand.
 For example, when a news market is dominated by a few 
media companies in an oligopoly, and there is no other media group powerful enough 
to check their information distortion, we can hardly expect fair competition for the 
truth among them. In this case, they should be restricted. 
 
4.2.2.3 Individualistic Restraint on Autonomy 
The epistemological difference on the subject of autonomy creates the divergence 
between the individualists and collectivists. Both of them commonly think of 
autonomy ideally as the goal of the democratic collective self-decision making process. 
However, in terms of practicality, the individualists claim broader reinforcement of 
autonomy to achieve this goal whereas the collectivists stay away from the account of 
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autonomy because it has been misused for disrupting the final goal of autonomy by 
deepening the disparities in society. Now, it looks like my argument returns to the 
liberal versus non-liberal debate. In this section, I will delve into the specific 
justification for the government’s paternalistic intervention in freedom of speech for 
the democratic self-decision making process. Theoretically, as noted earlier, my 
understanding of liberal autonomy may allow paternalism to some extent, which is 
supported by a general knowledge of autonomy that is somewhat different from the 
Kantian notion. For example, individual autonomies cannot conflict with one another 
because they can be witnessed from the respect of moral law which is understood to be 
universal. However, autonomies as self-rule may compete with each other, so we 
should get rid of those things that make competition and balancing unfair through 
paternalistic intervention. 
In the arena of freedom of speech, the most important factor for fair self-rule is 
equal opportunity of speech and equal distribution of information. The hindrance of 
information dissemination or intentional distortion of information should be restricted 
for appropriate public deliberation. Lipson’s theoretical criticism of Wolffian 
individualism based on Kantian morality, which is Post’s position in the free speech 
field, reflects this idea clearly. The specific justification of this perspective is the 
listener’s autonomy, which is set up by Scanlon. Listener’s autonomy accelerates to 
information that “would make a difference” in public deliberation.
520 It is the exact 
same framework within the context of the collective decision making process as in 
Scanlon’s discussion of free speech protection. I think Lipson’s argument on it is 
plausible, and this is why I took a special look at Scanlon’s theoretical shift in the 
previous chapter.  
                                                 
520 Lipson, supra note 471, at 2261.  
140 
Listener’s autonomy has a dual position with regard to speech protection: 
justification for broad protection of speech and justification for the governmental 
regulation of certain kinds of speech. As we found in the previous chapter, the latter is 
at least necessary to realize the ideal of the former in Scanlon’s context. Listener’s 
autonomy precludes the governmental interruption of specific speech because it may 
be useful information for listener’s opinion building which is a prerequisite for the rich 
public deliberation. It contributes to broaden the range of protective speech in terms of 
creating information equality. Unless listener’s autonomy does not conflict with 
speaker’s autonomy, the government has more obstructions for its interference on 
speech. Of course, equal access to information serves rich public deliberation. 
At the same time, listener’s autonomy justifies limited governmental 
intervention because speech that harms rational decision making—specifically, by 
creating a negative effect on public deliberation with false information or information 
which is not worth discussing—has to be tackled. For this discussion, we have to 
define which information should be protected, even by paternalistic interruption, for 
deliberation. As we saw in the previous chapter, Scanlon, before his shift of theory, 
which was called the Millian Principle, understood that any speech which would help 
people to decide autonomously should be absolutely protected. But after his shift in 
theory, he held that we cannot protect expression which would manipulate the 
audience to make a different decision by false inculcation like “subliminal 
advertising.”
521 What Scanlon’s shift shows us is that listener’s autonomy should be 
considered to decide on the level of protection given to information. Speaker’s 
autonomy is not the exclusive consideration in free speech protection any more in 
terms of information for public deliberation. By the same token, Lipson’s information 
protection is decided by the possibility of effective public deliberation by protecting 
                                                 
521 Scanlon, supra note 280, at 525-6  
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“hearer autonomy.”
522 The critical point of the value is whether information would 
make the people have a different opinion for a certain subject.
523 Information that is 
repeated recklessly should be regulated. This information hinders proper public debate 
by distraction or brainwashing. Listener’s autonomy is harmed by this manipulated 
information.
524 Therefore, paternalistic regulation in this case protects and enhances 
autonomy. 
While these different effects of listener’s autonomy reflect the powerful 
collectivist argument,
525 ironically, the emergence of the conception of listener’s 
autonomy becomes another good reason for collectivists’ abandoning the autonomy 
justification for free speech.
526  Sunstein indicates that listener’s autonomy causes 
possible confusion with speaker’s autonomy,
527 which weakens the argument for 
autonomy itself in free speech. An interesting point is that his reason for doubting 
listener’s autonomy comes from anxiety about the less protective speaker’s autonomy. 
Given the blurry boundary between speaker’s autonomy and listener’s autonomy, his 
concern is valid. However, this argument does not match with his definition of 
autonomous status: “decisions reached with a full and vivid awareness of available 
opportunities, with reference to all relevant information and without illegitimate or 
excessive constraints on preference formation.”
528 These requirements were his excuse 
for staying away from the autonomy account. But information equality cannot be 
fulfilled without considering listener’s autonomy. With speaker’s autonomy alone, we 
cannot justify the governmental regulation of speech which Sunstein always asserts. 
                                                 
522 Lipson, supra note 471, at 2266. 
523 Id., at 2266-7. 
524 Id. 
525 Id., at 2263-4. 
526 SUNSTEIN, supra note 352, at 141. 
527 He says, “such an account will make it difficult or impossible to distinguish in the appropriate way 
among different categories of speech.” Id. 
528 Sunstein, supra note 505, at 11.  
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In addition, Sunstein’s understanding of listener’s autonomy is only partial 
even though he discusses it within the exact same framework as Scanlon does.
529 He 
only considers the resisting function of governmental regulation of listener’s 
autonomy. He raises the question of whether, with listener’s autonomy as the prime 
value, low-value speech such as sexual harassment or criminal solicitation would have 
to be protected because of the expanded protection range under a regime of listener’s 
autonomy.
530 Furthermore, he predicts that true commercial speech would be protected, 
yet false political speech would be unprotected by the same token.
531 However, this 
argument really comes from a confusion between speaker autonomy and listener 
autonomy. As Lipson indicates, listener autonomy’s first concern is speech by which 
people would change their position for public deliberation.
532 These types of low-
value speech are hardly the objects of listener autonomy protection. Therefore, 
because most of these types of speech will be discussed within the context of speaker 
autonomy, we do not have to worry about their protection by listener autonomy. 
In sum, paternalism in free speech can be accepted even under individualist 
theories. Paternalism intervenes in speech that may hinder rich public deliberation. 
Under this conception of free speech, autonomy is reinforced by paternalism. This 
paternalism is hinted at by the advantages and necessities of collectivist ideas which 
stray too far from the autonomy account. Their perspectives on the current legal order 
have shaped this position, and they make sense to some extent. However, we do not 
have to abandon autonomy if we allow it some elasticity toward paternalism. And this 
                                                 
529 SUNSTEIN, supra note 352 at 140. 
530 More examples, according to Sunstein, are like these: bribery, threats, unlicensed medical and legal 
advice. Id., at 142. 
531 Id., at 142-3. 
532 He says, “Rich public debate is informed debate, and informed debate is debate based upon 
information that makes a difference in citizen deliberation.” Lipson, supra note  at 2267.  
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flexibility can be supported by Scanlon’s modified theory of autonomy and 
paternalism. Now we can overcome the absolutism of autonomy. 
 
4.2.2.4 Raz’s Perfectionist Liberalism 
I have argued, in the arena of freedom of speech, that both the individualist idea of 
autonomy, which may be interpreted as anti-perfectionist liberalism, and the 
collectivist perspective, which may be evaluated as communitarianism, are wrong in 
terms of the relationship between autonomy and paternalism. I think that Raz’s 
perfectionist liberalism supports my interpretation of autonomy and paternalism. It 
does not accept the “political neutrality” of the state, demonstrating the anti-
perfectionist’s impossibility of neutrality.
533 The state has a duty to protect people’s 
autonomy by enlarging moral opportunities to choose and by limiting immoral 
opportunities. The state can paternalistically intervene through non-coercive methods. 
Even though there is a risk of overgeneralization in connecting my ideas of autonomy 
and paternalism with perfectionist liberalism because more specificity is needed to 
apply Raz’s liberalism to a specific legal area, they correspond to each other in terms 
of the necessity and justification of governmental paternalism. 
First of all, unlike anti-perfectionist liberalism, which puts the priority of the 
right over the good, Raz’s perfectionist liberalism, like Berlin’s thought, insists that 
one cannot disentangle the right and the good. This relatively observed concept of the 
good provides the state with a theoretical justification for its realization. Because the 
state should have a moral obligation to limit immorality to fulfill people’s “well-
                                                 
533 Wojciech Sadurski, Joseph Raz on Liberal Neutrality and the Harm Principle, 10 OXFORD J. L. 
STUD. 122, 123-30 (1990).  
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being,” which is the supreme value of a person, Raz thinks that “the state cannot be 
neutral.”
534 This theory pursues human perfection in a society. 
For Raz, autonomy and liberty constitutes the intrinsic value of a person.
535 
Autonomy means “one’s capacity to choose,” and autonomous persons are “agents 
who can adopt personal projects, develop relationships, and accept commitments to 
causes, through which their personal integrity and sense of dignity and self-respect are 
made concrete.”
536 The duty of the state is to expand opportunities to choose by 
regulating immorality that reduces autonomy.
537 Therefore, Raz does not accept 
limited government that stems from the experience of “anti-absolutist struggles,” and 
that most traditional anti-perfectionist liberalism inherited.
538 For this process of the 
perfectionist project, autonomy realization, value pluralism is a prerequisite.  
To explain his perfectionist ideal, Raz adopts Mill’s harm principle, which has 
been used to justify the individual-centered way of thinking of anti-perfectionist 
liberalism. Raz criticizes this traditional liberal interpretation of the principle, and 
instead makes use of it by turning it into a persuasive theoretical justification of 
perfectionist liberalism by creatively and actively interpreting it.
539 Because Mill did 
not clarify what is or is not harm to others, as noted in chapter 3, liberal theorists 
understood it as an utmost guarantee of individual liberty unless others get harmed. 
Scanlon’s Millian Principle, which was his older theory about autonomy, protected a 
rational agent’s maximized autonomy, as well. Liberal theorists claim that we should 
                                                 
534 Id., at 122. Raz’s well-being is different from that of utilitarianism. “Fundamental units of moral 
concern” of the former are individual, which may cause conflicts from “reconciling self-interest and the 
common good,” but the latter avoid the conflict because self-interest in this conception is “already to 
promote something partly constituted by social reality.” Green, supra note 31, at 322. 
535 Raz, supra note 16, at 369. 
536 Id., at 369-71. 
537 Raz says, “autonomy is valuable only if exercised in pursuit of the good.” Id., at 16. 
538 Green, supra note 31, at 318. 
539 Raz, supra note 16, at 412-3.  
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not consider “private morality” from politics, on account of the difficulty in defining 
the notion of harm, for fear of pressuring people in the name of morality.
540  
Raz argues that “coercive interference with a person” is justified only when it 
is done to prevent harm to person.
541 He presupposes the concept of “autonomy-based 
duty” from the harm principle.
542 People or the state are obligated to promote the 
other’s autonomy, which can be understood enhancing the positive liberty of Berlin’s 
concept. In particular, the state, Raz puts it, should “create an environment providing 
individuals with an adequate range of options and the opportunities to choose 
them.”
543 Coercion in the process of this obligation can be permitted. In other words, 
paternalism, in Raz’s context, is accepted because it promotes autonomy. For the 
practice of this idea, Raz stresses social authority highly, like the government and law, 
as a method to mediate conflicts, an idea with which communitarians might also agree, 
as they put the priority on common good over individual freedom. In terms of 
autonomy, which is promoted within the context of the social and political scale, my 
overall conception about autonomy in this paper is similar to Raz’s perfectionist 
liberalism. 
 
4.2.3 Instant Summary 
To achieve the democratic ideal of self-rule, we need an autonomous collective 
decision making processes. From conflict and association between individual 
autonomy and democratic collective decision making, we should find a proper way to 
protect both of them. I have juxtaposed individualism with collectivism, which are 
representative perspectives on autonomy and paternalism. I have verified that there 
                                                 
540 Id., at 413. 
541 Id., at 412-3. 
542 Id., at 417. 
543 Id., at 418.  
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exists a way to coordinate them in democracy. Autonomy in free speech is not 
completely individualistic or collectivistic. Paternalism on speech is not necessarily 
hostile to autonomy of speech. This relationship can be produced by the application of 
Scanlon’s perspective on autonomy to the collective self-decision making process. 
And this idea can be explained by Raz’s perfectionist liberalism. Autonomy can be 
promoted with the help of the paternalism contained in it. Perfectionist liberalism may 
provide an opportunity for overcoming the amoral or asocial deficiency of traditional 
(anti-perfectionist) liberalism, which I have criticized throughout the previous chapters. 
 
4.3 The Adversary System and Autonomy 
With this background on autonomy as it is interpreted in the arena of freedom of 
speech, I will apply this autonomy to the adversary system in this section. As we have 
discussed so far, autonomy is not interpreted as exclusively individualistic and 
libertarian any more in the free speech area. It can be associated with paternalistic 
intervention without any theoretical abstention. If my presupposition of a reflective 
relationship between freedom of speech and the adversary system is theoretically 
plausible, autonomy in the adversary system may be naturally restricted by 
paternalistic interruption, as well. Because the value of autonomy works toward a 
critical ideal of the adversary system, the adversary system itself can be interpreted 
from non-liberal perspectives. 
The main initiative of my research on the adversary system and freedom of 
speech was to incapacitate the use of the adversary system as an excuse for a party’s 
immoral behavior. In particular, a lawyer’s amorality in terms of a client’s maximized 
autonomy has been the primary object of discussion. If we apply non-liberal theories 
of autonomy to the adversary system, paternalistic regulations on overzealous lawyers 
and clients who behave unethically can be justified. Of course, we need a balanced  
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application of paternalism here like that which I have applied to freedom of speech. It 
is not the purpose of this article to create the most plausible legal ethics theory about 
the matter of a lawyer’s amorality. However, I will briefly analyze and compare 
several theories to find the possible function of my research on the autonomy-
paternalism relationship in the legal ethics field. 
Within Simon’s context, what I have discussed so far is the criticism of the 
“dominant view.
544 The dominant view is the name Simon gave to the traditional legal 
ethics theories which emphasize a lawyer’s zealous advocacy as justifying any 
amorality to enhance the client’s autonomy. Proving that autonomy may accept 
paternalistic intervention, consequently, I support anti-dominant views by 
disempowering the adversary system excuse. As for the anti-dominant views, Bradley 
Wendel has a specific analysis.
545 He has classified the critics of the dominant view 
into the moralist, legalist and authority views.
546 The moralist view insists that the 
account of client autonomy can be rejected because of the lawyer’s morality. The 
moralists argue, according to Wendel, that the dominant view’s autonomy is 
“instrumental” because it denotes the procedural justification of meeting the client’s 
needs without providing any substantial moral good.
547 We notice this criticism in 
Luban’s perspective on Pepper’s legal autonomy in chapter 2.
548 Blaming the 
dominant view’s inconsiderateness on the third party and the opponent,
549 the moralist 
view claims that it should be overcome by the lawyer’s moral paternalism, which 
should be protected to allow lawyers to follow their moral principles. Even though my 
                                                 
544 SIMON, supra note 106, at 7-11. 
545 The anti-dominant views can be paraphrased by “justice-centered approaches” if the dominant view 
is called “client-centered approach.” Susan Carle exemplifies Luban, Simon, Gordon, Rhode, Wendel 
and Pearce as the scholars of justice-centered approaches. Susan Carle, Power as a Factor in Lawyers’ 
Ethical Deliberation, 35 HOFSTR L. REV. 115, 116-7 (2006). 
546 W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 368-72 (2004). 
547 Id. 
548 Carle classifies Luban, Rhode, Pearce, and Shaffer as the legalists. Carle, supra note 545, at 123. 
549 Wendel, supra note 546, at 386-72.  
148 
demonstration of justified paternalism in liberal autonomy theory was not a discussion 
of pure moral philosophy, it can support an objection to the libertarian employment of 
autonomy in legal ethics. 
Wendel explains that the legalist view is different from the moralist one in 
terms of the venue of its criticism of the dominant view. Whereas the latter depends on 
moral philosophy, which is discussed outside the “legal system,” the former seeks to 
find the answer within the legal system: “promoting justice.”
550 Justice in the legal 
system to Simon is decided “contextually” by the “inter-subjective” legal decision 
making process associated with jurists including lawyers.
551 In other words, a lawyer’s 
representation is the process of “rediscovering” legal theories over the “substantive 
principles of justice.”
552 Specifically, legal “entitlement” is an embodiment of legal 
justice for which the lawyer can decide to act in a discretionary manner toward the 
clients.
553 However, his logic of legal theory to determine entitlements is criticized for 
its dependence on moral theory which is grounded in the reasoning of natural law 
theory.
554 Wendel indicates that Simon’s argument is mainly influenced by Ronald 
Dworkin’s right-based natural law theory.
555 After all, the legalist’s justice is in 
essence the same conception as we see in moral philosophy. My discussion on 
autonomy can be matched with the legalist view in that it supports the lawyer’s 
discretionary power in the matter of legal ethics and in that it supports the idea that the 
lawyer’s paternalism may contribute to justice by prohibiting the possible attempt of 
autonomy to take more of an entitlement than is ascribed to it.  
                                                 
550 Id. 
551 Simon, supra note 104, at 1115; Wendel, id. 
552 Wendel, id. 
553 SIMON, supra note 106, at 26-52. 
554 Wendel, supra note 546, at 373. 
555 Id.  
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Finally, the authority theory starts from the conception of respect for the law. 
Sharing a positivistic attitude to the law with the dominant view, the authority theory 
leads to the opposite conclusion through a different methodology: interpretation. 
Wendel, the founder of this theory, focuses on the “social coordination function” of 
law.
556 His perspective on legal ethics is that it is the subject of “political 
philosophy”—not moral theory.
557 Therefore, questions that occur in the lawyer’s 
ethics field have to be answered within the “political domain,” and the lawyers’ 
function as “quasi-officials” are emphasized in this context.
558 In this theory, “legal 
directives” are considered the only authority for the lawyer’s behavior, so the reasons 
that form the basis of legal directive’s legitimacy endow the authority theory with 
“moral force.”
559  
The authority of law obtains vindication from the plurality of moral views 
available to make a decision. In the pluralistic society that exists in a democracy, each 
individual can have her own moral belief, and she can freely behave according to that 
belief unless it does not do harm to others. For this reason, to depend on the lawyer’s 
“first-order morality” for her representation creates a weak foundation for legal ethics 
from the sociological perspective.
560 By making lawyers follow “second-order 
morality”—the respect for the law—the authority theory tries to cut off all possible 
moral dispute about legal ethics. In addition, borrowing Joseph Raz’s discussion of 
“political authority,” Wendel proves the necessity of taking authority theory from 
                                                 
556 Carle, supra note 545, at 124. And Carle sees Wendel as a legalist like Simon, but I tell him apart 
from Simonian legalist because their foundation of theories is totally different even though Wendel’s 
discussion happens within the boundary of legal theory. 
557 Wendel, supra note 546, at 363-4. He defines political philosophy as “the principles that govern 
citizens acting collectively to settle the rights and obligations they owe to one another while living 
together in society.” 
558 Id. 
559 Id. 
560 According to Wendel, first-order moral reason means “reason for action,” while second-order moral 
reason is “reason to act or refrain from acting.” Id., at 365.  
150 
social agreement.
561 That is, a more effective method of fulfilling the goal usually goes 
to “authoritative directives.”
562 Law, as a result of democratic collective decision 
making, has a fair reason to get authority from lawyers.
563 
What the law says is the most powerful standard for evaluating a lawyer’s 
behavior under this theory. But it is totally different from the originalist approach, in 
that the authority theory emphasizes the lawyer’s “public responsibility.”
564 The 
decisive factor that distinguishes this theory from the positivism of the dominant view 
is that the authority theory adopts interpretivism. The lawyer “interprets” the legal 
canon to oblige it, and the “legal text” to consider all possible conditions for the 
proper interpretation. The history of the rule, the intention of the rule-maker, and the 
adaptability of the rule to current situations are the subjects of lawyer’s interpretation. 
My understanding of this interpretivism is that Wendel inserts professionalism into the 
justification of authority of law. Lawyers as professionals are not the agents who find 
“loopholes” in the law like the lawyers in the dominant view.
565 By broadening the 
right of interpretation to lawyers, the authority theory acquires legal and moral 
rationality. Under the authority view, lawyers are returned to their original function as 
jurists—not as legal technicians. 
The authority view shares a basic attitude to law and politics with my research 
on autonomy and paternalism. First, both of them are discussed within the context of a 
conception socially formed through collective decision making, which is exactly the 
same as law making through the political process. And, the social agreement between 
                                                 
561 Id., 377-8. 
562 Id. 
563 Of course, many discussions on the justifications about legal directives and the fairness of the 
democratic process can possibly entails with this proposition. Wendel discusses it in his article, but that 
is off the subject of this article. 
564 Wendel describes the responsibility like this: “ensuring that legal institutions can fulfill their 
distinctive social function of resolving disagreement and providing a stable framework for coordinated 
action notwithstanding persistent normative disagreement.” Id., at 375. 
565 Id., at 391-2.  
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an individual autonomy and the law as a collective decision making allow the lawyer, 
as a legal professional, to have the power to interpret the meaning and jurisdiction of 
legal directives for her discretionary representation as paternalistic intervention. The 
necessity of paternalistic regulation for the proper working of the collective decision 
making process reflects the possibility of lawyer’s disobedience to the law when a 
more precious value has to be saved.
566 
 
4.4 Chapter Summary 
Autonomy means self-rule with the help of some paternalistic intervention. I have 
demonstrated the falsity of the libertarian interpretation of autonomy which regards 
autonomy as a supreme value and does not allow for any paternalism to interrupt it. 
Freedom of speech as a requisite condition of public deliberation needs some 
regulation, and those can be brought in by the liberal understanding of autonomy. 
Individualism and collectivism can be harmonized with each other at the point where 
public deliberation should have its best effect on democratic decision making. The 
collectivist understanding of current society works in favor of a strong initiative for 
speech regulation. Widespread inequality and nearly monopolized speech opportunity 
cannot be a fair reason for absolute protection of individual autonomy in free speech. 
However, because state regulations possibly imply collective power acting in a 
negative way against the individual autonomy that is guaranteed by the Constitution, 
we should be cautious about the collectivists’ excessive nullification of autonomy. In 
this sense, Scanlon’s theoretical shift on the subject of free speech from the absolute 
protection of autonomy to justified paternalistic interventions within the context of 
liberal individualism, and Lipson’s application of Scanlon’s theory to collective 
                                                 
566 As to the duty of confidentiality, see id., 402-5.  
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autonomy suggests a plausible model of the proper relationship between autonomy 
and paternalism. 
From this newly defined autonomy, we can infer the nature of autonomy in the 
adversary system because I have presupposed that freedom of speech and the 
adversary system share the same value of autonomy. Therefore, paternalism acting on 
individual autonomy can be also applied to the lawyer-client relationship within the 
liberal context. That makes it possible to criticize the dominant view of a lawyer’s 
representation as amoral, too. And the moralist, legalist, and authority views have 
aspects to be associated with this newly defined autonomy theory for the common 
purpose of opposing the dominant view. They all need to justify a lawyer’s 
discretionary behavior to overcome the unfair, immoral, and illegal practices of 
lawyers. And paternalism accepted by autonomy in a liberal context can supply a good 
reason for it. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
Autonomy as a value of the adversary system can be compared with autonomy as a 
foundation for a theory of free speech in terms of its social and political interpretation. 
And autonomy from both sides is commonly regarded as a fundamental value which 
should be fulfilled in constitutional politics. In the previous chapters, it was 
demonstrated that the adversary system and freedom of speech, by this decisive factor 
of pursuing the value of autonomy, have a reflective relationship with each other in 
spite of a formal difference in their legal functions—as a legal system and as a 
fundamental right. Using this theoretical mechanism, the interpretation of autonomy in 
freedom of speech can be applied to that in the adversary system. 
In the arena of free speech, autonomy has been the prevalent justification, by 
libertarian theorists, for the protection of individual speech with the least 
governmental interruption so as to increase an individual’s self-fulfillment. For 
example, Redish claims that freedom of speech in American constitutional law should 
be interpreted from the perspective of its own political ideology, liberal democratic 
theory, for fear of being connected with totalitarianism or communism. However, this 
kind of libertarian understanding of free speech is too narrow to contain the proper 
spirit of the Constitution with respect to the concept of autonomy, liberalism and 
communitarianism. The Constitution recognizes a wide spectrum of democratic 
ideologies, which can be called democratic pluralism. Therefore, autonomy in the 
theory of freedom speech should be understood from the point of collective self-
decision making, as well.  
The collectivist approaches lay persuasive foundation for governmental 
intervention on speech in order to reinforce people’s autonomous deliberation through  
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the democratic decision making process by restraining the side-effects of large 
media’s monopolization of deliberation. This justified paternalism does not harm 
autonomy, which is the foremost concern of individualist theorists of free speech. 
However, collectivists deny setting up autonomy as a value of free speech protection 
because they are worried about the possible theoretical attack from individualists: 
whether low-value speech, which collectivists refrain from supporting, should be 
protected according to the logic of protecting autonomy. 
My argument is that the collectivists’ understanding of autonomy is not proper, 
either. Even though they support the governmental regulation of free speech, they still 
do not admit the fact that autonomy can be reinforced by paternalism. Their excessive 
antagonistic positioning of the relationship between autonomy and paternalism makes 
collectivists expunge autonomy from the justification of free speech. However, 
freedom of speech enhances autonomy. By expressing themselves and communicating 
with other members of a community, people fulfill the ideal of autonomous decision 
making in a democratic society. This is the reason why traditional explanations of free 
speech, individualist perspectives that emphasize autonomy, are still meaningful. If we 
can find a justification for paternalistic intervention from the interpretation of 
autonomy itself, we should not discard the value of autonomy from freedom of speech. 
Scanlon’s idea of listener’s interest can provide a useful theoretical foundation for the 
mutually supportive relationship between autonomy and paternalism in the arena of 
freedom of speech. Lipson’s theory, and application of Scanlon’s conception of 
autonomy in free speech, champions my understanding of autonomy and paternalism. 
In the jurisprudential aspect, Raz’s perfectionist liberalism and autonomy 
theory lies on a similar line to my argument. His liberalism, preserving governmental 
authority, does not stem from the self-interest that most anti-perfectionist liberalism 
pursues. Instead, autonomy, which is a matter of freedom of choice among plural  
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candidates in this context, is a decisive factor of the liberalness of Raz’s theory. The 
state should guarantee this plurality of options by suppressing values that encourage 
heteronomy. By negating “the priority of the right over the good,” which is the anti-
perfectionist principle, the government can legitimately retain the power to 
paternalistically control heteronymous activities.  
This newly positioned relationship between autonomy and paternalism in free 
speech theory can be applied to the adversary system according to the reflective 
relationship between freedom of speech and the adversary system. Because 
paternalistic interventions into autonomy can be accepted to some extent in a 
perfectionist liberal theory of free speech, the value of autonomy in the adversary 
system can be interpreted differently from the common understanding of 
individualistic liberalism, which is also called the Dominant View in the field of legal 
ethics. The Dominant View contends that lawyers’ amorality, during their 
representation of the client, should be justified because they strive to maximize the 
interests of the client. The lawyer’s immoral activity is based on the anti-perfectionist 
liberalness of the adversary system which has been most prominent in the American 
legal system. However, with perfectionist liberalism, which shares with the collectivist 
idea of free speech the justification of governmental interruption, the adversary 
system’s excuse of the lawyer’s amoral behaviors in the name of zealous advocacy, 
upon which the Dominant View focuses, can be reasonably criticized. 
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